

· THE ·
RHINELAND
OCCUPATION

HENRY T. ALLEN
MAJOR-GENERAL, U.S.A.

ILLUSTRATED



PUBLISHERS
THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY : INDIANAPOLIS


Library



LIBRARY
COLLEGE OF PUGET SOUND
TACOMA, WASH.

THIS ITEM HAS BEEN
DISCARDED BY THE
UNIVERSITY
OF PUGET SOUND
COLLINS MEMORIAL LIBRARY

THE RHINELAND OCCUPATION



General Henry T. Allen

· THE ·
RHINELAND
OCCUPATIONN

HENRY T. ALLEN
MAJOR-GENERAL, U.S.A.

ILLUSTRATED




PUBLISHERS

THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY : INDIANAPOLIS

COPYRIGHT, 1927
BY THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY

Printed in the United States of America



PRINTED AND BOUND
BY BRAUNWORTH & CO., INC.
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

COLLEGE LIBRARY
SOUND
100-1-11221

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I The Rhineland and the Rhinelanders . . .	1
II The March of the Third United States Army into Germany	11
III The Supreme Military Command	28
IV Military Government	46
V Terms of the Armistice	56
VI Relations between the Army and the Pop- ulation	68
VII The Rhineland Commission	79
VIII Comparison of Military Governments . .	90
IX Control of Public Utilities and Private Indus- tries	101
X A Farther Advance into Germany	110
XI Under the Rhineland Agreement	116
XII The American Forces in Germany	127
XIII The Interallied Rhineland High Commission .	142
XIV The von Kapp Event and the Ruhr Revolt .	159
XV The German Commissioner	171
XVI The Separatist Movement	186
XVII Sanctions	203
XVIII Some Matters before the High Commission .	216
XIX Special Sessions of the High Commission .	233
XX The Year of Conferences, 1922	247
XXI Occupation of the Ruhr, 1923	266
XXII Final Days of the Occupation	281

40251

CONTENTS—*Concluded*

A p p e n d i c e s

	PAGE
I Agreement between the United States of America, Belgium, The British Empire and France, of the One Part, and Germany, of the Other Part, with Regard to the Military Occupation of the Territories of the Rhine	299
II Treaty between the United States and Germany	306
III Terms of Armistice Signed by Germany . . .	311
IV Black Troops	319
V The Smeets Case	325
VI Fortifications of Coblenz	333
VII Formal Farewell to General Allen, February 6, 1923	334
Index	341

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

General Henry T. Allen.....	<i>Frontispiece</i>
Diagram illustrating Prussian Government.....	FACING PAGE 6
General Dickman	12
General Pershing at gate of General Allen's residence in Coblenz	20
Map of Occupied Territory.....	30
Map of Fortifications of Coblenz.....	52
American Headquarters at Coblenz.....	82
Map showing successive German defensive systems...	98
Lieutenant-General Liggett	128
Marshal Foch and General Allen at Coblenz.....	136
Baron Rolin-Jacquemyns, Belgian High Commissioner	144
General Hutchinson, Field Marshal Wilson, General Allen and Sir Harold Stuart.....	154
Order of the Battle, Eleven A.M., November 11, 1918..	164
Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg	174
Reichstag Representation, December 31, 1922.....	188
Generals Degoutte, Johnston and Allen.....	198
Paul Tirard, French High Commissioner, General Allen and General Mondacq.....	206
General Allen inspecting French troops under his com- mand	236
Premier Poincaré	258
Lord Kilmarnock, British High Commissioner.....	288
Final Departure of American Troops from Ehrenbreit- stein	292

INTRODUCTION

TO ESTIMATE properly the status of the civil and military representation of the United States on the Rhine from the Armistice in November, 1918, to the final lowering of our flag over Ehrenbreitstein in February, 1923, it is necessary to know something of the strong cross-currents and of the heated discussions of them during the greatest of all conferences—that which preceded the Versailles Treaty. In the vast concourse of representatives of the victorious nations assembled in Paris, January, 1919, selfish nationalism in a large measure succeeded to that international solidarity that had been necessary to secure victory.

It is scarcely worth while to discuss the question of the advantages that would have accrued by continuing yet longer the war, or of the responsibility for ending it while the German forces were retreating to a homeland torn with internal strife and rent with revolution unknown at the time to the Allies and Associated Powers. There was a persistent thought that Germany, in retreating to its bases, might shorten its front and thus continue the struggle a number of months longer. In the recent intensive fighting, the losses had been specially heavy. The European governments and populations were war weary and ready to discuss a settlement based on the utterances of America's War President. When the new German Chancellor, Prince Maximilian of Baden, on October

INTRODUCTION

fifth requested President Wilson to "take in hand the restoration of peace" on the basis of the "program set forth in the President's message to Congress, January 8, 1918, and in his later pronunciamientos," the countries that had visualized German victory in May and June and had been bled white were ready for an armistice.

As late as 1922, the writer ventured to mention to Marshal Foch the advisability of having made peace on German soil, possibly in Berlin. His reaction was immediate and left no doubt of the responsibility for the decision, which was largely imposed upon him, but which he still believed justifiable. "If we had marched on to Berlin, neither you nor we could have demobilized our forces; it would have been necessary to hold all that country," pointing to a large wall map of Germany. "Come to the map, I will show you."

It was indeed important for the representatives of the United States in exercising their part in the administration of the Rhineland to know that the Armistice and the Treaty were based on the Fourteen Points—modified only by the elimination of Point II, the freedom of the seas, and the addition of a requirement that Germany make reparation for damage done to civilians and their property by aggressions on land, at sea and from the air.

It was two months from the signing of the Armistice before the Conference was duly organized for its work. Fifty-two commissions were created and these held more than one thousand six hundred sessions before the Treaty was ready for signature. Among the many important measures that made this Congress of far greater moment than that of Vienna or Berlin—

INTRODUCTION

such as Italy's claim in the Adriatic, Japan's in the Far East, the vast reparations and the restoration of Poland—the western boundary of Germany loomed large. The discussions bearing on this matter, as on various others, indicated in clear terms the conflict between a peace of justice and a peace of selfishness. There was no serious question about the return of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, because Point VIII specifically stated that the wrong done to France in 1871, "which had unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all."

The openly expressed desire to make treaties with the separate states of Germany was but another way of indicating a wish to see that country cut up into several states. The creation of an independent state of the Rhineland and Westphalia, for example, would have greatly weakened Prussia, the dominating element of the *Reich* and the nightmare of France. A separation of Bavaria from Germany would have meant even more. It was but natural that a measure of that sort, a measure that would have been followed one hundred years ago, should have found favor in the eyes of those unduly influenced by forceful means as the antidote to fear and the best method of obtaining security. Possessed of the knowledge of what Germany had intended to do to its western enemies in case of victory, and knowing the drastic terms it had imposed on Russia one year before by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, it was human to indulge in thought of similar sanctions.

The Left Bank of the Rhine, meaning the territory of Germany lying west of the river between Alsace-

INTRODUCTION

Lorraine and Holland, had been the subject of a secret agreement between Russia and France in February, 1917. By the terms of that agreement, this territory was to be completely separated from Germany and be made an autonomous or neutral state and also be occupied by French troops until all the terms of the final treaty had been fulfilled. The political frontier of France was to remain unchanged, but its military and economic frontier was to be advanced to the Rhine. This program found much support in France during the Conference and was strongly advocated by Marshal Foch who, immediately after the Armistice, proposed the Rhine as the western boundary of Germany. He further proposed the establishment of an independent state on the Left Bank, and the occupation of the Rhine bridges until all the terms of the treaty had been executed. The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the French Senate formally approved this plan. The English delegation opposed it as the creation of another Alsace-Lorraine. The American delegation considered it contrary to the conditions of the Armistice and a source of future war.

The debate on this subject continued for six months and ended in a compromise, whereby the United States and England were to come to the support of France in case of an unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany. The territory west of the Rhine was to be demilitarized and Germany was to assemble no forces there, nor within a zone fifty kilometers wide east of and parallel to that river. The bridgeheads of Cologne, Coblenz and Mayence were to be held respectively five, ten and fifteen years, contingent upon the faithful execution of the Treaty by Germany. Thus

INTRODUCTION

Germany's political and economic frontier remained unchanged, while her military frontier became a line fifty kilometers east of the Rhine. This result did not satisfy the extremists who felt not only justified in their claims, but insisted on renewing them later when the United States failed to become a party to the Tripartite Arrangement. Indeed, there were some who saw France's safety only in her complete supremacy of the continent. Politically and militarily this could be secured through spheres of influence and alliances and by partition of the principal enemy state; economically it could be attained partly at least, by repressing the trade and industry of the recent enemy.

Having been twice invaded within fifty years, the present moment of victory seemed opportune to some to make security doubly sure and give France that position on the continent that comported with her prestige in the days of Louis XIV and the Great Napoleon. Continental conditions had greatly changed with Germany's population sixty-five per cent. greater than that of France, and its capacity to apply scientific developments to commercial ends presenting a yet greater disparity between the two countries. Under such conditions and with the knowledge that her big war partners were averse to a policy of sowing dragon teeth, France would have shown a greater wisdom in victory, and would have created a greater hope of early peace by the exercise of unusual magnanimity. The more the Conference demanded of Germany, the stronger surged the importance of security. Faith in the newly born League of Nations was not sufficient to meet the requirements of this security or satisfy such a state of mind.

INTRODUCTION

Nothing shows in more striking terms the attitude of our delegation at Paris toward the restoration of peace and a desire to curb militarism on the continent than its conception and advocacy of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, an organization declared to be the "supreme representative of the Allied and Associated Powers" on the Rhine. This historical departure in the domain of holding forces in foreign territory was to come into effect on the ratification of the Treaty. In miniature, this body was to continue some of the unsatisfying discussions of Paris bearing on the Rhineland.

As France had consented to a settlement of the western boundary of Germany on the strength of an agreement that was never fulfilled, she felt justified in making new demands, once her forces were holding on the Rhine. The American representative on that commission was unofficial or was an observer and reporter; yet for the greater part of the time, he was also the commander of the American Forces. He was independent of other countries in control of the Coblenz Zone, both administratively and militarily. Our government never recognized authority over our troops by the High Military Command at Paris, or by the Commander-in-Chief of the Interallied Rhineland Forces at Mayence; nor did Washington ever admit the supremacy of the High Commission over the American Zone. Under such conditions one may well conceive of the position of the *High Observer* as being somewhat delicate. As military commander he was charged along with the commanders of the Allied Forces of England, France and Belgium in compelling Germany's compliance with the terms of the Armistice

INTRODUCTION

and naturally with supervision of the administration and control of the territory and population comprised in his sector; as representative of the State Department he was to represent, if anything, America's desire for a genuine peace, based on the physical and moral restoration of both sides. In any event that was the policy of America's representation on the Rhine, once we had made a treaty of peace with the enemy.

From January 10, 1920, when the Treaty became effective through ratification by three great powers, until the United States made a separate treaty of peace with Germany in August, the same year, our Associates were at peace with Germany, while we continued under Armistice terms technically at war with that power. Under the provisions of the new treaty with Germany, we retained the privileges and rights held under the terms of the Armistice, and furthermore we were accorded all the advantages and privileges that would have accrued to us had we signed the Versailles Treaty. What then was our status and by what authority was the American representation continued in Central Europe two and a half years longer? This question was doubtless given consideration by the State Department, but in its highly commended wisdom, no pronouncement was ever made that might have furnished additional matter for discussion by those who were already protesting the legality and policy of our tenure.

Practically speaking, it may be said that with the ratification of the Treaty and the establishment of a *modus vivendi*, proposed by the writer and accepted by the High Commissioners of Belgium, France and

INTRODUCTION

England, the American military government terminated January 10, 1920. This measure consisted in making the ordinances of the High Commission the orders of the Commanding General of the American Forces and in publishing them for the information and guidance of all persons in the American Zone. It is obvious, therefore, that the ordinances drafted by the High Commission for the entire Rhineland had to conform to our requirements. Under this condition, the influence of America's representation on the High Commission was far greater than its informal designation would indicate.

Neither the State Department nor the War Department saw fit to burden its representative with matters of policy; but as there was no adverse criticism of the frequent reports of his acts and decisions as they occurred, it must be assumed that both were satisfied. The final chapter sets forth the attitude of the Rhine representatives of France, England and Belgium, as well as that of Germany toward the American representation in the Rhineland.

THE RHINELAND OCCUPATION

THE RHINELAND OCCUPATION

CHAPTER I

THE RHINELAND AND THE RHINELANDERS

TO THE average American, the Rhineland was known more for its antiquities, history, mythology and poetry than for its twentieth-century civilization. Culture thrived there when Prussia was still in darkness, and civilization had fallen and risen again on the Rhine before such comparatively modern cities as Berlin and Hamburg had outgrown the village status. Barbarian hordes and imperial armies have so often moved back and forth over its land, that the resulting admixture of blood has produced a people quite different from the Germans of Prussia or Saxony.

When Cæsar arrived in 55 B. C. and built his military bridge over the Rhine at Engers, near Coblenz, he found a people of mixed Celtic and Teutonic blood—the progenitors of the present inhabitants. His follower, Drusus, erected a castle in Coblenz and made the town with its neighboring hill, later called Ehrenbreitstein, one of the strongest Roman positions. Rome's intention at this time seems to have been to accept the Rhine as its natural frontier. History, however, has repeatedly proved natural frontiers to be military absurdities and the fact that their posses-

sion merely entails further seizures. The Rhine became the frontier of the Roman Empire not from choice but because the Teutonic tribes of Central Germany imposed it. The defeat of Varus in A. D. 17 by Arminius in the Teutoberg forest ended the period of Roman expansion and brought about a static condition in which all efforts of the conquerors were concentrated in strengthening their colonization on the left bank of the Rhine, with Treves on the Moselle as the seat of government and center of operations. This same city would have been the headquarters of the Interallied Forces had the Germans made a counter-attack at the time of the American holding on the Rhine and, possibly also, had a forward movement been undertaken. This city was the focus of the military roads, the arteries of the Roman Empire, which formed the general outlines of the very roads over which we advanced to the Rhine.

For administrative purposes, the Germany of Rome was divided into two provinces: Germania Inferior, whose capital was Cologne; and Germania Superior, in which were Treves and Coblenz. History was repeating itself in such exactness as to cause astonishment. The center of America's activities was the heart of the Roman administration.

From the time of Charlemagne to the fall of Napoleon, the Rhineland as a border region suffered terribly from invasions—Imperial, French and Swedish. Within this period France had developed a stable government and a national spirit within her domain, while Germany was still in feudal chaos. Probably the severest of all scourges for the Rhineland was the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648, during which the erst-

while American area, as shown by preserved statistics of individual communities, lost two-thirds of its population and three-fourths of its live stock. A little later Louis XIV devastated the Palatinate, part of the present French holding, in the belief that the best protection for France would be the creation of a desert beyond her borders. Such radicalism went beyond any suggestions at the Paris Conference.

The last Elector of Treves transferred his capital to Coblenz just before the French Revolution, where he built in 1887 the palace which later became a residence for the German Emperors. This beautifully situated palace was not occupied by the American Commanders, because of the absence of modern installations and because more convenient buildings were available.

During the Napoleonic occupation Coblenz, as the capital of the Department of the Eifel, was incorporated into France. This period proved beneficial to the country. Industrial and commercial development had become nearly impossible, with each petty state establishing a customs frontier and enriching itself without regard to the Empire as a whole. The Great Corsican understood the evils of such a system and, in withdrawing power from each little ruler, organized the Rhineland into an organic unit, which he governed efficiently. His work was continued by Prussia which received the territory in 1815 by the Treaty of Vienna for its sacrifices in the great struggle. Prussia took up with energy the work begun by Napoleon and his administrators, and its soldiers and traders proved as efficient and capable as their French predecessors had been. Though these foreign governors never acquired

the love of the natives, they gained their respect and admiration. The Rhineland became the Rhine Province and its fortunes were merged with those of Prussia. In the wars of the Bismarckian era, the young Rhinelanders followed the Prussian banners, but the enthusiasm and the loyalty which the Province displayed at this time were not offered to Prussia, but to a united Germany—to a *Deutschland über Alles*.

The era following this witnessed the change of Germany into an industrial nation. The Rhine region, with its great deposits of coal in the Ruhr Basin and iron ore in the Briey District taken from France in 1871, became a center of much of the wealth which accrued to Germany in the transformation. In 1914 no sign of discord arose in the Rhine Province and it entered the war with every evidence of enthusiasm for the cause of the Empire. While its troops never bore the reputation for aggressiveness that characterized the Prussians and Bavarians, yet more than a million of its seven million population served with the colors.

The political institutions with which Americans came in contact during the occupation were largely those of the old régime. Theoretically, the Revolution of November, 1918, had converted imperial Germany into a republic, but the transformation of an autocracy into a democracy can not be accomplished in a day. The prestige of institutions and long-grounded traditions made a force with which the most ardent revolutionists had to reckon. Where the knowledge and practise of government have been for centuries the exclusive privilege of the aristocratic and landed classes, change becomes still more difficult. Discredited as the old officials and institutions were, the

government of the newly chosen President Ebert wisely refrained from radical changes. The counsel of moderation won the day and most of the old officials remained at their posts, while their fate was being debated at Weimar. Their retention in office in the Rhineland was required by the Armistice. Trained and responsible officials as agents of a new or temporary sovereignty, could transmit and carry out orders better than the agents of workmen's councils. Neither did the high Allied authorities in occupied territory desire an atmosphere charged with unrest which would have been the inevitable result had factions been permitted to change established institutions.


German civil administration, and Prussian officialdom in particular, have been aptly described as an army in civilian clothes. The primary duty of presidents, *Landräte*, burgomasters and *Vorsteher*s is to carry out punctiliously the orders of their superiors. Instructions prepared by the Cabinet pass from level to level of the bureaucracy and eventually reach the people as regulations for their guidance. Such a system possesses certain advantages and may be readily visualized by a bureaucrat, but it is utterly foreign to the spirit of American political life. Local self-government does exist to a certain extent, but its institutions are primitive and the wishes of the inhabitants are ever subject to disapproval of the local representative of the central authority. There is no intent here to discredit the added rights and privileges given to the people and to the separate states by the Weimar Constitution, but simply to give an indication of German administration in its local application, which remains largely unchanged.

If we compare Prussia to the United States, its provinces may be likened to our states, remembering, however, that the province has no attribute of sovereignty. Provinces according to size and population are divided into *Regierungs-Bezirke*—institutions we do not have—and these in turn are subdivided into *Kreises* about the size of our counties. These *Kreises* may be either urban (*stadt Kreis*) or rural (*land Kreis*). The *stadt Kreis* is the fundamental unit of government and is indivisible, whereas the *land Kreis* is subdivided into urban and rural townships. The last named are made up of a number of villages, termed *Gemeinden* (communities), each of which is presided over by a *Vorsteher* (supervisor) who serves without salary to enforce the laws.

Oberpräsidenten and *Regierungspräsidenten* are the officials in the higher sphere of government. The Rhine Province, one of Prussia's twelve provinces, was headed by an *Oberpräsident*, residing in Coblenz; and its five *Regierungs-Bezirke*, known by the names of their chief cities and seats of administration—Dusseldorf, Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Coblenz and Treves—were administered each by a president. In the Rhineland for a century nearly all the important government posts had been held by Prussians, *Oberpräsident Groote* being a marked exception. This policy had long been a source of dissatisfaction to the Rhinelanders who were not consulted as to their governors. Though not foreigners these executives were often alien in religion and sentiment. Regardless of the reasons that may be marshalled against such a form of government, it is obvious that its autocratic nature peculiarly qualified it to adapt itself to the requirements of an occupying military force.

DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING PRUSSIAN GOVERNMENT

STATE



The astonishment felt in Allied countries when it was learned that their troops were received by the hated enemy in almost a friendly manner, was equaled only by the surprise of the soldiers themselves. The average soldier looked forward with curiosity to seeing Germany. His surprise at his reception was tempered by the natural thought that this attitude was assumed for some special reasons. He knew little or nothing of the course of events in that country. The Rhinelander of 1918 was a changed man from that of 1914. Hunger, disappointment, the collapse of idols and the strain of four years of war had been effective in this metamorphosis. To the peasants and workers, the Armistice stood primarily for relief from the horrors of the front; to the wives and mothers it meant the end of heartbreaking uncertainty. These were major thoughts, beside which victory or defeat meant little. All of these were desirous of forgetting the black past and of returning to the paths of peace and work, which had been their accustomed lot.

Theories of autocrats and radical revolutionists had sprung up side by side, without any apparent perception by either of the incongruity of the partnership. The last months of 1918 were a momentous epoch in Germany's psychological and governmental changes. It was a period in which century-old habits of thought were being profoundly revolutionized and in which neither the past, present nor future could be perceived in its proper light. The military and ruling classes, humiliated by defeat, hated their enemies who had come among them as conquerors, but yet more did they hate their socialistic countrymen who had usurped the government. The ideas of the great middle class were

being revolutionized by internal disorder and the opinion of the outside world. The dawn of a public opinion, not molded by imperial decree, was at hand; and, with the flight of the Emperor, it was evident that the iron hand of the military was ended.

In the heated discussions in the spring of 1917 in the German press on the advisability of the ruthless submarine campaign, the people managed to get a look behind the scenes and see the discord and wrangling which was going on in high governmental circles. This caused an awakening. The government's decision to continue the war and its declaration that America's entrance into the struggle would be of little influence upon that issue, were received by the people with misgivings and incredulity. The messages, letters and discourses of President Wilson leading up to their consolidation in the Fourteen Points, and the insidious statement from Allied sources that the war was being fought against autocracy and not the German people, were most influential in connection with the impending crisis.

The astonishing victories in the spring of 1918 aroused the drooping spirits of the country and enabled the Pan-Germans temporarily to combat internal discontent. On the other hand, the fraternization with the Russians on the Eastern frontier, existing since early in 1917, had so impregnated certain divisions with Bolshevism that when transferred to the Western front, they proved unreliable and had to be disbanded. Furthermore, the young classes of recruits, composed of boys who had been removed prematurely from school to the munition factories, where they were subjected to the worst influences,

joined the colors with unpatriotic spirit and mistrust in their leaders. The army had suffered such an irretrievable loss of morale before March, 1918, that only prompt and decisive victory could have averted eventual dissolution. When finally conditions at the front became so threatening that some action was inevitable, the attempt to liberalize the government was tardy, half-hearted and unavailing.

The period of constitutional monarchy with Prince Max of Bavaria as Chancellor proved short-lived. The government, having yielded to the Liberals, drifted further and further from conservative councils until the spirit of revolution once afield proved too powerful to be held in check. The Revolution of November ninth, two days before the Armistice, was the culminating stroke. The Majority Socialists accepted the responsibility of government, and the abdication and flight of the Emperor destroyed the respect in a large measure of the middle classes for the monarchy. These despised the Emperor for running away, feared the Spartacists who were organizing the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils, and accepted the personalities of the new government without confidence in their ability to guide the ship of state.

There was little on the political horizon to command the respect of the young German. He knew of the crimes of the Bolshevists throughout the country and believed Allied intervention preferable to the excesses of such fanatics. He was scarcely ready to associate patriotism with loyalty to an Ebert or a Scheidemann. Confronted with all this political turmoil, the American soldier appeared to the Rhinelanders almost as a friend, who would at least end the

Bolshevist menace. This accounts for the attitude of the inhabitants at the end of 1918, which so puzzled the Americans. In the Rhinelanders' curiosity and friendliness, he was unable to realize the stern frame of mind which animated the newly arrived victorious army.

CHAPTER II

THE MARCH OF THE THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY INTO GERMANY

ON THE cessation of hostilities the Allied Armies were in order at the front extending from northwest to southeast; the Belgian Army, the British Armies, a group of French Armies, the American Armies, and finally another group of French Armies on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier. From each of these groups, a force was selected for the occupation of Germany. These were: a part of the Belgian Army, the Second British Army, the Fifth French Army, the Third American Army, the Tenth French Army and the Eighth French Army. At five-thirty in the morning of November 17, 1918, six days after the Armistice, these vast forces of more than a million men, under Ferdinand Foch, Marshal of France, started to move in a north-easterly direction.

The whole battle line* from the Swiss border to the North Sea surged forward in one great wave. This was the closing scene of perhaps the greatest drama of history. It was deemed not improbable that

*The Belgians were moving to their zone of occupation with Aix-la-Chapelle or Aachen, the old capital of Charlemagne, as their headquarters; the British to their zone with Cologne as their headquarters; the Americans, to Coblenz as their headquarters; and the French to their zone with Mayence as their headquarters. Only the Belgians had no designated bridgehead.

hostilities might again break out, and therefore it was essential that this great force in its advance should be so disposed, both laterally and in depth, that battle-order might be resumed without delay.

In the center a quarter of a million men of a new nation from over the seas moved down the valley of the Moselle to the Rhine along routes which had been traveled both ways for centuries by multitudes of armed men—from the time of the Romans to this, the epoch of the Americans. This force was the Third United States Army called into existence by Special Order 198, American Expeditionary Forces on November 7, 1918. Even at that date there were many who believed the war could not be ended before the spring of 1919. This army was still in the process of organization when the Armistice was signed. The creation of a staff for such a force and the general adjustment of its component parts under the ever-changing conditions of actual fighting was a considerable problem. This army was put under the command of Major-General Joseph T. Dickman, who had formerly commanded the 3rd Division and later the First Army Corps. Its Chief of Staff was Brigadier-General Malin Craig.

At the time, this army was composed of two corps: the Third and the Fourth, commanded respectively by Generals Hines and Summerall, each consisting of three divisions. Later the Seventh Corps under General Hahn, composed of the 89th and 90th Divisions, was added and followed on. The advance entirely to the Rhine was made by only the two corps first mentioned, while the Seventh Corps went into garrison shortly after crossing the German frontier



J. F. Dickman
Major
Cavalry

General Dickman

near Treves or Trier. Four of the six forward divisions stood in the first battle line when the advance began, from left to right as follows: 2nd, 32nd, 1st and 3rd. The 42nd marched as a support to the 2nd and 32nd, thus making the Left Wing; the 4th as a support to 1st and 3rd, making the Right Wing.

It was generally conceded that the privilege of serving in the Army of Occupation was awarded to those divisions that had most distinguished themselves in battle—four regular, two National Guard and two National Armies. Possibly greater consideration in this respect was being given to the regular units, which could be held longer than either the National Army or National Guard.* When the clamor for mustering out the national divisions became effective, the 5th and 6th Regular Divisions were ordered to the occupied territory to replace the 32nd and 42nd.

As the Third Army approached the Franco-Luxemburg frontier, November 18, 1918, some apprehension arose lest the population of the Grand Duchy, restrained by the German occupation of four years, might become disorderly. An agreement was therefore arranged between the American Army and the German command whereby our advance guards should follow the last detachments of the retiring Germans at a distance of ten kilometers. This was the first agreement made by the Americans with the Germans following the cessation of hostilities.

When our forces entered the city of Luxemburg two days later, the American Commander-in-Chief issued this proclamation for the purpose of making

*The average American who had been conscripted for the war did not lose much time in making known his desire to return to his business or profession, once the war was ended.

clear the disposition of our forces toward the population of that neutral country:

“PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF LUXEMBURG

“After four years of invasion, Luxemburg is now happily liberated. Your freedom from German occupation was exacted of the invaders by the American and Allied Armies as a condition of the present Armistice. It now becomes necessary for the American troops to pass through Luxemburg and to establish and maintain for a time their communications upon your territory.

“The American troops have come to Luxemburg as friends and will conduct themselves here strictly in accordance with international law. No hardship need be expected from their presence, which will not extend beyond what is deemed strictly necessary. Your government and institutions will nowhere be interfered with. You will be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of your lives and occupations. Your persons and your property will be fully respected. It will be necessary for the American Army to utilize certain buildings, railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, and possibly other public works for shelter, transportation or communication; but beyond that, whatever supplies may be required will be paid for at just valuation.

“It is assumed that you will commit no aggressions upon the American Army and will not give any information, aid or comfort to the enemies. You are expected cheerfully to observe such rules as the American military commanders may find it necessary to make for the safety of their troops and your own protection.

“JOHN J. PERSHING.

“Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.”

As Luxemburg was a disarmed neutral state and had sharply protested against Germany's invasion of her rights in the first days of the war, there was no intention on the part of the American commanders to treat it as an enemy country. Yet relations with the population and particularly dealings with the Luxemburg authorities required constant tact on the part of the military authorities responsible for carrying on the occupation. The invasion and occupation of a country by a foreign army, even though it comes as a liberator, is apt to give rise to sources of friction. During the stay of the Third Army in the Grand Duchy, the gratitude of the Luxemburgers for their liberation and the liberal policy of the American authorities in all civil matters prevented any unfortunate incidents. The stay of the army there was very brief. The billeting of such a large force within such limited boundaries taxed the accommodations of the small Grand Duchy, with a population of only two hundred and sixty thousand, to the utmost. Although Luxemburg continued to be occupied by American troops until the summer of 1919, it was never attached to the territory under the jurisdiction of the Third Army, except for a few weeks in the spring of that year.

This little country, which had achieved its independence at the Paris Conference in the face of the covetousness of both France and Belgium, was included in the American Zone by Marshal Foch, yet he selected its capital, of the same name, as his secondary headquarters, and sent in a French regiment as a guard for himself. He also designated General Latour as *Commandant d'Armes*, with

authority to control postal traffic and circulation by rail and highway. He was proposing still further authority for this commandant when General Pershing wrote him as follows: "The President considers that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to publish any further decree to the people of Luxemburg. He agrees with me that the Army of the United States is threatened with no danger from Luxemburg. If, therefore, you should consider it indispensable to publish a further decree concerning Luxemburg, the President would deem it most advisable that all American combat troops be withdrawn from the Duchy, in the interests of all concerned." A rather long discussion followed this, in which the Marshal showed that he feared such a withdrawal might be interpreted as a belief that the French authorities were carrying out activities in the Grand Duchy in which the United States declined to have any part. The situation was in consequence cleared for the American authorities. The city of Luxemburg would have been preferable to Treves for General Pershing's Advanced Headquarters and would have been used as such had it not been taken by Marshal Foch.

The cordial and even enthusiastic reception of our troops by the population of the country made a deep impression on every soldier who shared it. The parade of the 32nd Division through the streets of the city of Luxemburg November 21, 1918, was made the occasion for a national holiday. Bands, societies and Boy Scouts escorted the parading troops. A banner bearing the inscription, "To the Saviors of our dear Country," made a particularly striking impression on our soldiers. Observers in the 1st and 32nd Divisions

commented strongly on the genuineness of the joy of the Luxemburgers in bidding the Americans welcome. The population of that country is equaled by those of Luxemburg blood living in the United States, and that too may have had some influence in the matter of our reception. Our troops were surprised to learn that German, rather than French, was spoken generally by the people. While the Luxemburgers evinced deep resentment toward their recent masters, there did not seem to be any marked reasons for complaint such as were so common in other countries invaded by German troops. Requisitions had been partly paid for in cash and no evidence of wanton destruction was observed. The Duchy suffered great economic loss, however, by having a large amount of German marks disbursed to its people at the rate of one mark to one hundred and twenty-five centimes, whereas the mark had already shrunk to eighty centimes.

While the Headquarters of the Third Army were still in the Grand Duchy, at Hollerich, Brigadier-General H. A. Smith arrived, preparatory to taking station as Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs at Treves, the old Roman city which General Pershing had decided upon as his Advanced Headquarters. The District of Treves was additional to the Coblenz bridgehead for the Third American Army.

In order to aid the personnel that would be designated eventually to administer German territory, a pamphlet, entitled *Notes on German Local Government*, was prepared by the Second Section of the General Staff at Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces. This pamphlet contained important notes on the organizations of the German governmen-

tal system and in addition several pages devoted to German laws on billeting and requisitions. It further contained information on the administration of justice and was at the time the only information distributed among officers of the army on the organization, government and laws of the country which they were called upon to govern.

During the advance to the Rhine the Headquarters of the Third Army published the proclamations of Marshal Foch and General Pershing, and also a set of instructions for the guidance of officers and men, which later appeared as Army Memorandum No. 4.

Marshal Foch's Proclamation to the Inhabitants of the Occupied Territory, published simultaneously by all the Allied and Associated Armies of Occupation follows:

"PROCLAMATION

of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to the Inhabitants of the Occupied Territory.

"The Allied military authority herewith assumes command of the country. It demands strictest obedience from all. The laws and regulations in force at the moment of occupation will be continued inasfar as they do not affect our rights or our safety.

"Public services will continue to operate under the direction and control of the military authorities. Public officials will be held responsible for the conscientious and honest discharge of the duties with which they are entrusted. The Courts will continue to dispense justice.

"The inhabitants must abstain in word and deed from any act of hostility, direct or indirect, toward the Allied authorities. They must obey the requisitions which might be made on them in conformity with law. Every person guilty of a crime or misde-

meanor, whether as a principle or an accomplice, will be immediately arrested and brought before a court-martial. Every infraction of the regulations issued, as well as every refusal of obedience to orders, will be severely punished.

“The present proclamation declares the occupation of the country by the Allied Armies. It points out to each one his duty, which is to aid in the reestablishment of civil life by work, calm and disciplined. Let all persons diligently discharge such duty.

“FOCH, MARSHAL OF FRANCE,
“Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies.”

A perusal of this formal document shows that it permitted a wide interpretation by the several Allied commanders. While bringing home to the population the essential truth that the Allies were a unit in occupation as well as in war, it wisely permitted each nation to treat the defeated enemy according to the dictates of its national policy and characteristics. For conciseness and clearness this proclamation may be cited as a model.

General Pershing's Proclamation, less the first paragraph, follows:

“PROCLAMATION TO THE INHABITANTS

“The above mentioned areas and their inhabitants are under the regulations and authority of the American Army. These orders are succinct, and strict observance is expected of all. Those who observe these regulations have nothing to fear. The American Army is not bringing war against the civilian population. All that lawfully and peacefully abide by the regulations laid down by the military authorities may

count on protection for their persons, homes, property and beliefs. The others will be arrested at once and brought strictly to account.

“The American Army on their part will adhere strictly to the law of nations as well as the laws of civilized warfare. The population on their part must offer no signs of enmity toward the American troops nor place obstruction in their path, either by word or deed.

“It is the duty of the population to regain their normal mode of life and to reestablish the schools, churches, hospitals and charitable institutions, and to continue in their regular local activities. Therein they will not be disturbed, but rather assisted and protected. Insofar as their scope and bearing permit, the courts, city departments and civil establishments will be continued under the supervision of the American Army. The existing laws and regulations, insofar as they do not interfere with the duty and security of the American troops, shall remain in force.

“All violations of the regulations, inimical conduct or overt hostility against the orders of the military authorities will be severely punished.

“JOHN J. PERSHING,
“Commander-in-Chief of the American
Expeditionary Forces.”

Naturally this document was intended only for the population of the sector allotted to the Third American Army and the personnel of the latter. The geographical delimitation of the area of American control set forth in the first paragraph, unquoted, was changed before the Rhine was reached, due to the insistence of Marshal Foch that certain French troops should be placed in our zone and the unwillingness of General Pershing to share our area with any other troops, even though placed under the American Commander. As



General Pershing at Gate of General Allen's Residence in Coblenz

a result of this divergence of views and as a compromise, the *Kreises* of Simmern, Zell, St. Goar, St. Goarshausen and Unterlahn were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Tenth French Army on our right. This disagreeable episode suggested that the French would insist on a dominant attitude on the Rhine.

The other paragraphs of the proclamation are notable by reason of the repeated declaration that the occupation would be conducted in accord with the laws of nations and of civilized warfare. While warning the population that any word or act inimical to the occupying forces would be severely punished, the proclamation breathes throughout a spirit of humanity and justice, in marked contrast to the proclamation of the German Army in France and Belgium.

Memorandum No. 4, Third Army, was published November twenty-eighth, and was the first specific regulation issued by the American Army for observance by the German population. It was realized, however, that any regulations issued without first-hand knowledge would be subject to changes as the occupation progressed. In a force of more than two hundred and forty thousand, it was inevitable that some individuals, including officers, would have a false conception of the proper treatment to be accorded the defeated enemy. Regulations were therefore necessary for both the victors and the defeated. The first sentence of this Memorandum, however, leaves no doubt of the intention of the army to control the country: "In stopping in a town where a halt for the night or a longer period has been ordered, the commanding officer will send for the burgo-master, chief of police and other prominent officials."

In subsequent paragraphs: "He will hand them copies of the proclamation of Marshal Foch and the American Commander-in-Chief. He will inform them that military government has been established in the town and surrounding district; that the principal object of this government is to provide for the security and efficiency of the United States Army; that so long as the inhabitants conduct themselves peacefully and quietly, the ordinary civil and criminal laws will be continued in force and will be administered by the local officials; and that private property and personal rights will be respected. Should an official decline to serve, the commanding officer will direct the official next in rank or a suitable civilian to act as such."

Under the terms of the Armistice, officials might properly have been required to serve, yet there was no intention on the part of the American authorities to compel such service. In many cases, our arrival was welcomed by officials who regarded our presence as being of great assistance to them in enforcing their authority which had been weakened by the Revolution. During the month of November, soldiers' and workmen's councils had been created in many towns of the Rhineland and these organizations had usurped much of the power of former officials. Our coming therefore was a matter of prime importance to them in restoring their authority.

In the final paragraph of Memorandum No. 4 appears the following: "He will direct the burgo-master to furnish billets for so many officers, so many men, and so many animals and such supplies (fuel, forage, straw, etc.,) as may be needed for the troops under his command. Food will not be requisitioned.

. . . Requisitions should generally be made upon the municipal authorities, but may be made upon individuals if necessary. . . . All receipts should be signed in duplicate by a supply officer and approved by the commanding officer."

The right of the occupying armies to billet and requisition was specifically provided for in the Armistice terms and this Memorandum made the burgomasters the agencies through which this was accomplished. So many reports had been received of the hunger and misery within the territory already occupied that it was deemed wise to prohibit requisitions of foodstuffs until the true situation could be ascertained by investigation. This humane consideration was in accord with the several military holdings by American troops within recent years—Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines and Mexico.

During the enemy's retreat, its High Command had utilized its requisitioning power to the fullest extent. The German lines of supply had gone to pieces completely, and that army, stranded as it was, had to live on the country or starve. In consequence many parts of the occupied country had been swept bare and could have furnished very little food, even if we had desired to exercise our undoubted rights. The farmers feared that we would act as their own troops had done and therefore concealed their few remaining food supplies to avoid starvation. Demands for forage were met on every hand by deceit and subterfuges, and it required much effort to secure enough to satisfy the requirements of our animal transport.

It became apparent soon that the available supplies were so very short that our chief dependence would

have to be placed on our remote forage dumps in France. As our line of communication was long and difficult, it was almost impossible, during the first few weeks of occupation, to maintain the current army rations. Forage had to be requisitioned, and our demands, following as they did directly on those of the retreating German Army, worked much hardship on the rural population. Horses and cattle without forage for the winter had to be sold, thus reducing the farmer's producing capacity and diminishing his meat and milk supplies. On the other hand, fuel was readily furnished and no division reported any difficulty in securing the necessary quantity for its use. Our system of receipts and the assurance that cash payment would be made promptly produced such a favorable impression that as the advance progressed less and less difficulty was experienced in securing our requirements.

The German people were accustomed to having troops of their own army quartered on them, and as billeting is provided for in their own laws, they accepted the demands of a foreign army somewhat as a matter of course. From history and experience the population of this entire region was prepared for such an eventuality.* In spite of this, the attitude of the authorities and people toward us was variously interpreted. Nearly all of our divisions in commenting on their impressions of the first few days on German soil noted the studied obliviousness to our presence by the people. Combatants are rarely resentful and our soldiers were prepared not to indulge unnecessary

*Many living Rhinelanders had formed part of the German forces of occupation in and about Nancy, following the Franco-Prussian War.

animosity. Having been the recipients of enthusiastic welcome in liberated France and Belgium, they were in a way surprised now. It was but natural that the arches and decorations prepared by the Germans for their own returning troops should disappear with our advance and that the inhabitants should appear as indifferent as possible to their conquerors. The failure of the Armistice terms to compel the German Army to lay down its arms on the battle-fields permitted the home-coming troops to manifest an air of superiority, if not victory. Had their arms been left in France and Belgium, defeat would have been evident to soldier and civilian, regardless of their stations.

Apparently burgomasters and officials had been instructed by higher authorities to receive us with due courtesy, but not to show any evidence of friendship. There existed an unwarranted fear of us among all classes, partly as a result of war stories, but yet more of the dread of the unknown. Certain elements of the German press had consistently described us as a nation of barbarians; and while these stories did not gain wide credence among the German people, there were many who believed them and conducted themselves accordingly. Nearly all of the male inhabitants had served in the army and had seen the suffering of civil populations in the countries occupied by their troops. They were therefore frightened lest retaliation be inflicted on their homes and families for the acts of their armies in Belgium and France. These fears were gradually dispelled and reports of the correct and disciplined conduct of the American Army and the kindness of individual soldiers spread to all corners of the American Zone. Indeed the thought

was becoming prevalent that the American was a friend of the German. The attitude of indifference to us and obliviousness to our presence was swinging to the other extreme.

No act of hostility was noted during the first week and the opinion was becoming quite general that the population was desirous of creating a favorable impression. While many American soldiers favorably reacted to this friendly disposition of the people and appreciated the efforts of the women to make them comfortable in their billets, others looked upon all friendly expressions and acts as part of a directed plan. In a report of the 1st Division describing its advance, comment was made on the action of the population as follows: "In their over-zealous effort to obtain the good will of the Americans the Germans accomplished the opposite results. . . . It is very probable that this mode of reception had been instigated by the German government."

In the early part of December the *Bittburger Zeitung*, one of the largest rural dailies, wrote, "It is just to acknowledge that the American military authorities are efficient without harshness and the behavior of the American troops is wonderfully good. Not only officers but soldiers are considerate and seem obliging." The *Trierische Zeitung* of about the same date stated, "What is most conspicuous in the Americans is the assurance and the peaceful manner in which they perform their duties. We hear no strident sounds or insolence; we see no dissatisfaction, much less a haughty mien, but always a friendly smile when intercourse with citizens is necessary."

Perhaps the friendly attitude toward the occupying

forces was in part due to another cause. Bolshevism had appeared to Germany as the most ruthless of enemies, and our coming as a shield to the homes and property of the Rhinelanders. The Allied Armies, enemies as they were, were far preferable to the anarchy of Spartacists and Bolsheviks. The *Coblenzer Zeitung* even urged the German government to move the *Reichstag* to Coblenz. "The American occupation would assure sufficient protection against the eruption of terrorist elements from neighboring German territory. Any attempt at influence on the part of our outside opponents is hardly to be expected as the American troops, where they have hitherto appeared, have not interfered with the political life of the occupied territory."

Such a suggestion from that source was unexpected.

CHAPTER III

THE SUPREME MILITARY COMMAND

WHEN the Armistice was signed, it was not a permanent termination of hostilities and therefore the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, Marshal Foch, retained his command while delegating much of his authority to the commanding generals of the separate Allied Armies. He directed the advance into Germany and partitioned the German territory to the four occupying countries as shown on the map.

A knowledge of the food and economic conditions where this High Command was to exercise its control was essential in determining its successful application. At this time very little was known of the food status by the Allied officials or public. Germany had been pictured vicariously as a land of milk and honey and a wilderness. The system of rationing the population was introduced late in 1914 for certain foodstuffs, and subsequently for staple articles such as meats, fats, bread, milk, eggs, sugar and coffee. Thereafter at the end of the harvest each year, a survey was made of all available food supplies in the empire. Those required for the army were withdrawn from the total estimated for the ensuing twelve months. These supplies for the soldiers were generous in quantity, for it was known that men must have ample rations to undergo the physical ordeal of the front. It was, however,

provided that on the line of communication or at depots they should receive less than in combat divisions. Though the soldier in the rear of the fighting lines received little, the ration of the civilian was far less. For a greater part of the time, Germany was in such dire straits for food that the ration computed by dividing up all the available supplies, after the army had been provided, was just sufficient to sustain life.

In this highly organized industrial country, which had to import large quantities of foodstuffs in peace time, great economy and careful organization were necessary to avert starvation. The problem became doubly acute in sending vast numbers from the farm to the colors. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the industrial centers had to be fed from the predominantly agricultural country bordering on Russia. The long haul involved placed a severe strain on the railways already taxed with the tremendous traffic of army supplies and munitions, and it required not only that the system of equalization and distribution be scientifically elaborated, but that it be honestly and efficiently administered. Every *Kreis* of the empire was classed in respect to each article of the ration it produced as either a plus or minus district, depending upon whether it produced more or less than it required.

In 1917 the official ration was recognized as insufficient to maintain the munition workers at a high efficiency. Special amounts were therefore withdrawn from the general stocks to increase their quota. This could be accomplished only by diminishing the ration of the civil population as a whole, but in so doing the government instantly aroused discontent among wide

classes of the population. The success of the system depended upon the honesty of individuals and their willingness to accept both the letter and spirit of the regulations. Whether any nation can be hungry and honest at the same time is doubtful.

The German people, in many cases, did not carry out the rules prescribed by their leaders. Secret traffic in foodstuffs and profiteering by clandestine dealers became common with rich and poor. Illegal traffic assumed such proportions that the army of gendarmes and secret agents was powerless to check it. There was no shortage of bread and potatoes, but meat and fats in many localities could not be issued for weeks at a time. The use of milk had to be restricted to mothers, babies and the aged. This lack of nourishment primarily affected the industrial centers. The workmen willingly listened to the agitators and Bolshevists and in turn exercised their own influence on the poorer classes to increase discontent. As the food situation showed no improvement, the consequent general depression reacted strongly on the morale of the army. The Revolution of November 9, 1918, and the terms of the Armistice brought about the first really critical situation.

When hostilities ceased no cases of actual starvation existed, but the ration would have had to be reduced still further in the near future. The Revolution lowered the public morale, and brought about a disordered condition of the country which prevented enforcement of the food laws. Disorganization of the railways and surrender to the Allies of rolling stock still further destroyed the machinery of the food administration. Therefore when the Americans

Map of occupied territory in Western Europe, showing regions A (US), B (Belgium), E (England), and F (France). The map includes major cities like Cologne, Bonn, Frankfurt, and Strasbourg, and labels for 'NEUTRAL ZONE' and '50 KILM. ZONE'.

A - U.S.
B - BELGIUM
E - ENGLAND.
F - FRANCE

entered the Rhineland they found a preeminently agricultural country threatened with starvation.

The Allies knew quite as little about the industrial conditions obtaining in the enemy's country at this time as they did about the food. Certain elements of the Allied press had published alarming articles; that Germany had continued to manufacture during the war and was preparing to dump vast quantities of goods on the markets of the world, while the Allied nations due to the strain on their industrial organizations by the wastage of war, would be unable to export manufactured articles for months after November 11, 1918. The economic situation of Germany was far worse than was known by the Allies and it was growing still more precarious as the blockade continued. Raw materials had been completely exhausted and the resumption of manufacturing depended on the procurement of new supplies. Even had the necessary imports been permitted, a considerable time must have elapsed before the actual process of manufacturing could begin.

Although the fact that Germany's industrial plants had come out of the war practically intact was a decided factor in its favor, the inference should not follow that they were prepared to dump goods in foreign countries. Indeed in the winter of 1918-19 Germany's economic situation portended the gravest consequences. During four years of war, its establishments had been placed one by one at the disposal of the government, with the result that factories engaged in their customary peace-time operations practically did not exist when the war ended. New machinery had been installed, the old had been stored

away and the owners were employing new staffs and personnel. Most of the old force had been scattered to the four winds on mobilization to be replaced by women, cripples, and men unfit for active service. This new personnel, however skilled it may have become in the manufacture of munitions, knew nothing of the former manufacturing processes of the establishment. Time was just as necessary for German factories to reorganize as for Allied ones, and without raw materials not even a start could be made.

Furthermore, the *Kriegsamt* keenly recognized the necessity of intensive organization to offset the greater resources of the Allies. Methodical and far reaching, it seized capitalist and laborer alike and diverted the money of the one and the labor of the other to further the purpose of the German High Command. Work unessential for the prosecution of the war became a crime against the state, and from coal deposit to copper kettle in the peasant's dwelling, all resources were placed at the disposal of that efficient bureau. By 1917-18 a condition closely akin to state socialism had been created. Officers at Berlin manipulated factories and raw materials as generals maneuvered armies in the field.

The demobilization of industry was intended to extend over many months and was to coincide with that of the army. The Revolution, however, made the execution of this plan impracticable. The army could not be restrained and simply went home without waiting for demobilization orders. The authority of the *Kriegsamt* vanished and industrial hopes were all but destroyed. Unemployed soldiers filled the cities, a prey to soap-box anarchists, while government subsidies reached enormous proportions.

This disastrous situation became even further complicated by disorganization of the railways. The occupation of France, Belgium, Serbia, Poland and Roumania had given Germany so many additional engines and so much railway stock that up to the Revolution, war wastage had not seriously interfered with transportation. With the coming of the Revolution, however, coal production ceased, strikes spread, and entire sections of the country were paralyzed. Cities and towns passed over to the Spartacists, and through traffic became nearly impossible. In addition to these conditions, the demands of the Allies for five thousand engines and one hundred and fifty thousand cars, however just they were, further crippled the railway authorities. By December, 1918, Bolshevism seemed to have smothered lawful authority, making the possibility of a return to normal conditions appear a fanciful dream. The American occupied territory, primarily agricultural, felt the disorder less than did many parts of the interior or of the other zones held by the Allies. Throughout the American Zone the Catholic workmen, vastly in the majority, were organized into Christian trade unions and were more conservative than ordinary trade unions. American occupation, therefore, never had to face a labor situation such as that which confronted the British at Cologne, the French at Ludwigshafen and other places, or the Belgians at Aix-la-Chapelle. In following the development of American administration, it must be remembered that the people we were governing were largely of an agricultural population.

The following will show that the occupation and administration of an enemy's territory is a compli-

cated procedure. It indicates the difficulties that fall upon the Superior Command.

In accordance with the principles laid down in the Hague Convention, the Interallied Control, beginning with the advance from France, was to be exercised by the commanding generals of the Allied Armies under the supreme command of the Marshal, the Commander-in-Chief. Officers charged with civilian administration were to be attached to their military units and move forward with them. Laws and regulations in force at the time of the occupation were to be respected insofar as they did not affect the occupying power or compromise its security. The proclamations issued, the police regulations published, and the *Instructions for Civil Administration* promulgated by the High Military Command set out in much detail the obligations resting on the troops, the population, and the official authorities both Allied and German. German municipal authorities were directed to keep lists of the names and domiciles of all persons within their jurisdiction, travel was regulated, assemblages except upon authority of the military command were prohibited, censorship, post, telephone and telegraph offices were established, taking of photographs without permit was forbidden, and a large number of other rules pertaining to armies and ammunition, pigeons, restaurants, cafés, etc., were included.

It must be admitted that in the proclamations issued by army commanders the instructions and regulations so accurately laid down by the Marshal were not always followed. Such action was unavoidable as the customs of the four nations taking part in the occupation differed so widely that complete uni-

formity could not be expected. In some cases, no attempt was made to enforce the regulations of the High Command when they lay counter to the national policy of the country of the army concerned.

Paragraph XXXIV of the Armistice states, "To assure the best execution of the present agreement, the principle of a Permanent International Armistice Commission is admitted. This Commission will perform its duties under the supreme authority of the military and navy Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies." The commission appointed under this paragraph was known as the Permanent Interallied Armistice Commission and was charged with the general supervision of Armistice conditions and with formal communications to the German government. Seven sub-commissions operated under this permanent commission. The first for financial and administrative questions was concerned with the recovery from Germany of the costs of maintaining the troops in occupied areas under Article IX of the Armistice. The second for restitution of industrial machinery dealt with the return by Germany of confiscated French and Belgian machinery. The third was for the return of French and Belgian securities. The fourth was for agricultural implements received from Germany in lieu of rolling stock. The fifth took over surrendered railway material. The sixth and seventh dealt with military equipment and motor transportation which Germany was required by the Armistice to surrender.

Owing to the difficulties of applying the laws of war where Armistice terms had precedence and where the views of the Allied and Associated governments

were at variance, the Supreme Military Command deemed it advisable to appoint additional commissions to deal with questions of policy and administration as they arose. Fifteen additional commissions were thus appointed, but matters not specially given to them were retained by the Permanent Armistice Commission referred to above. The most important of these bodies was the Interallied Rhineland Commission, commonly known as the I. A. R. C. It was originally charged with the general supervision of the occupied territory and by reason of its importance is described in another chapter at length.

The third commission dealing with matters pertaining to the occupation was the Interallied Economic Commission, commonly known as the Luxemburg Commission. This body was formed December 13, 1918, and was charged with the supervision of the distribution of raw materials to factories in the Rhineland, with distribution of the products of the factories and with regulation of interchange of goods between occupied areas and the rest of Germany. This commission had six economic sections to carry out its decrees—one each at Aix-la-Chapelle, Munchen-Gladbach, Cologne, Treves, Mayence and Ludwigshafen.

The fourth commission, the Interallied Railway, was to administer the railways of Luxemburg and the occupied territories. There were sections of it at Coblenz, Saarbrücken and Luxemburg City. The fifth commission, the Interallied Waterways, was to control navigation on the Rhine. It had a branch at Coblenz and control centers at Duisburg and Emmerich.

The sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth commis-

sions were respectively: the Road, to provide for the maintenance of the highways and roads; the Coal; the Government of the Rhineland, composed of a civil administration and officers in charge of civil affairs; the Receiving, to inspect and receipt for the rolling stock and raw materials handed over by Germany under the terms of the Armistice; the Calais Railways and Calais Waterways to administer these communications in Belgium and in consequence only indirectly connected with the occupied territory; the Postal control; the Shipping Commission, to deal with established questions pertaining to turning over to the Allies German shipping including river craft; the Rotterdam Food to settle commercial and other details arising from the sale of foodstuffs to Germany by the Allies; the Compièges Finance, to manage financial matters between the Allies and Germany.

The sixteenth commission, the Interallied Military Food, was created to distribute rations to the Rhineland population, supplemental to the amounts granted Germany as a whole by the Hoover Commission. It accomplished much during the critical spring months of 1919, by alleviating the widely spread hunger.

These commissions, appointed for reasons of national policy and of uniform control, did not achieve all the success expected; partly because their duties were not clearly defined and partly because there was not sufficient concordance of effort. Each of these commissions contained American representatives who were required to maintain adequate liaison with American headquarters and make reports to General Pershing in France and his advanced headquarters at Treves on matters of economic, industrial and financial concern to our Zone.

The Luxemburg Commission was of very great usefulness. Paragraph XXVI of the Armistice stated, "The Blockade of the Allied and Associated Powers is to be continued as at present, German merchant vessels found at sea being liable to capture." This clause apparently gave the Allies the right to continue the blockade of the entire territory included within the boundary of Germany of 1914. Furthermore, Article I of Annex 2 stipulated that lines of communication, up to and including the Rhine and on the Right Bank within the bridgeheads,* were to be under full control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. The result of a complete exercise of this right of blockade would have been to isolate Germany from the rest of the world and, further, to isolate occupied territory from the rest of Germany. In fact this was accomplished only too well by an elaborate and cumbersome system of passes which impeded circulation not only between occupied and unoccupied territory, but between the zones of the different armies.

The last paragraph of Section VI of the Armistice states: "There shall be no general measure or official order having as its consequence an impairment of the industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel." This sentence was in reality a contradiction of Section XXVI; for the complete commercial isolation of occupied and unoccupied territories would have, as its direct consequence, an impairment of the industrial establishments and a reduction of their personnel, since local markets would not have sufficed

*The bridgeheads were the territories east of the Rhine included between the river and the semi-circumferences described with a radius of thirty kilometers with the headquarters of the three armies as centers.

for sales or purchases of raw materials. Furthermore, the closing of factories in occupied territories by means of the blockade would have presented a serious military problem, because the employees thus thrown out of work would have been reduced shortly to starvation. Rioting and disorder would have been the inevitable consequence of such action.

This Luxemburg Commission was established precisely to supervise the distribution of raw materials, to control their output and to regulate the economic relations of occupied territory and the rest of Germany in such a manner that industrial plants could be operated and yet prevented from competing too strongly with similar factories in France and Belgium. Germany, having almost entirely demobilized its army, had thereby obtained a considerable economic advantage over its enemies, who were still obliged to maintain great armies in the field. On December 13, 1918, Marshal Foch made the first tentative plan for the organization of this commission, but it did not come into existence until January 6, 1919.

Between these dates he delegated power to import and export certain commodities to the Interallied Railway Commission. This authorization was at first limited to the importation of raw materials, fuel, food supplies and spare parts necessary for the operation of factories. All exports were forbidden. It was composed of delegates from the American, Belgian, English and French Armies and one French civil official. General Mangin, representing France, was appointed President. Economic sections of it were established at Aix-la-Chapelle and München-Gladbach

under Belgian supervision, at Cologne under British, at Treves under American, and at Mayence and Ludwigshafen under French. Each section was given authority to determine its own method of work, and there was in consequence considerable divergence of operation. During the early months, until April 15, 1919, separate permits were required for each individual shipment. Such a policy could not continue and the change, when it came, reduced considerably the work of the several sections.

The American section, by informing the Chambers of Commerce at Coblenz and Treves of all rules and regulations issued by the Luxemburg Commission and of all changes of methods as they became effective, placed the responsibility for properly working out requests on those commercial bodies. This method greatly lessened the duties of the American section and permitted a maximum of work with a minimum of personnel. In spite of the fact that the six economic sections constantly exchanged statistical data on economic matters and worked under the direction of the same central commission at Luxemburg, they soon developed differences of policy. This was partly due to the different points of view of the Allies, but still more to the fact that the plural control referred to above asserted itself strongly in most economic matters. The Luxemburg Commission was created to be the supreme authority on all economic matters, but on May 13, 1919, it was entirely superseded by the Interallied Rhineland Commission, an organization better adapted to meet the many civil problems that were arising in the Rhineland.

Section XXVI of the Armistice states: "The

Allies and the United States are to consider the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice to the extent recognized as necessary." Such action proved to be absolutely necessary as the food situation became daily worse instead of better. This was due to the continuation of the blockade, to the long absence of agricultural laborers from the land, and in a considerable degree to the impoverishment of the soil from lack of fertilizers. Hunger riots and disorders were to be feared throughout Germany. To avoid this the Supreme Economic Council, sitting at Paris, decided February 24, 1919, that the food supply of the occupied territories of Germany should be considered distinct from that of unoccupied Germany and should be administered under the auspices of an Interallied Military Food Commission to be organized by Marshal Foch. This organization was the sixteenth commission mentioned above, through which the Marshal endeavored to exercise personal control in the Rhineland. The duties of this body were to estimate the amount of food in the country, to determine a reasonable ration for the population, and to supplement the actual food by importations until a suitable ration was obtained. This last duty required the armies to make arrangements for the importation and sale of supplies. The distribution of the food after arrival was directed almost entirely by German authorities, though the Allies reserved the right to supervise its distribution.

The source of supply was intended originally to be solely the Hoover stocks which were held by the Permanent Supply Commission at Rotterdam and Antwerp. For several months, however, nothing was received from this source, as the Belgians could not

guarantee the safety of German crews in Belgian waters and the Germans and Belgians could not agree on terms of shipment in Belgian bottoms. Finally, in order to avoid a grave crisis, the British Army sold a portion of its reserve stocks to save the Cologne population from starvation. The French soon did likewise, and the United States followed their examples. All these sales were from army supplies and were independent of the Hoover stocks. The various food commissions made their own arrangements with the local German authorities as to payment, but it was arranged by Interallied agreement that each army should supplement the German per capita ration in equal amounts. An inequality or partiality in the distribution by any of the war partners would at that time have created a lasting prejudice in Germany against the responsible nation.

The work of the Hoover Commission during the war had been the study of the development, distribution and control of the food supply of the world. After the Armistice, when it became necessary for humanitarian reasons to ration Germany, this duty was entrusted to that Commission as the only organization in existence capable of carrying out the project. This commission had in theory nothing whatever to do with any of Marshal Foch's commissions for occupied territories. It was a purely civil organization in no sense connected with the military administration. However, since it supplied food to entire Germany, it came into close contact with the Allied Armies in the Rhineland and its bases at Rotterdam and Antwerp became sources from which the military commissions drew their supplies for the Rhineland population.

Under authority bestowed in the following provision of the terms of the Armistice, the Allies took over the railways and waterways with their complete material and personnel on entering the Rhineland: "Roads and means of communication of every kind, railways, waterways, highways, bridges, telegraphs and telephones shall be in no way impaired. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain." The Interallied Railway Commission was composed of an American, an English, a Belgian and a French delegate, the latter being its President. Means of transportation necessarily had to be kept under Interallied control, because not only its use but also its physical condition was a matter of common concern to all the occupying armies. The division of railways into zones following military delimitations would have been utterly impracticable. Furthermore, as transportation is one of the most vital factors in war matters, Marshal Foch deemed it advisable to keep it under his control.

The five sub-commissions of this Railway Commission—in Luxemburg, Saarbrücken, Mayence, Coblenz and Cologne—with a more or less technically trained staff were selected from the respective armies. The railways of the Rhineland are the property of Prussia. For purposes of administration they are divided geographically into units known as directions or administrations; for example, the direction of Cologne, of Saarbrücken, etc. Each direction has its president and board of directors, and all railway officials and workers are government employees. Proper pay and treatment were assured all railway employees as long as their duties were suitably performed, but severe

punishment was indicated in case of strikes or any malfeasance.

The duties of the Railway Commission fell under two heads: operation and maintenance, and enforcement of purely military orders such as those pertaining to the blockade and circulation. The first classification demanded a general supervision, a planning of time tables, a system of repairs, an account of rolling stock, and advanced supplies of fuel and oil for thirty days. Above all, plans were made for taking over and operating all the lines without German assistance in case of an emergency. The duties under the second classification necessitated enforcing the rules laid down by the Luxemburg Commission—examination of all incoming and outgoing consignments and confiscation of those not properly authorized. Orders were issued to the German personnel forbidding the sale of tickets to civilians not provided with passes, thus enforcing circulation instructions and making the blockade effective.

The Interallied Waterways Commission worked hand in hand with the Railway Commission. Like all the others, it was composed of delegates from the four armies and was presided over by a Frenchman. It was charged with the responsibility of regulating navigation on the Saar, Moselle and Rhine, but in practise it concerned itself only with the last named river, as the others are navigable in only a very restricted sense.

The pressure of war compelled Germany to institute, under the Ministry of Public Works, a boat traffic division intended to manage inland water transportation so as to produce maximum results, always insuring priority to military supplies. By the beginning of

the occupation, this division had developed an efficient organization with headquarters for the western group of rivers at Duisburg, the junction of the Ruhr and the Rhine Rivers. The Allies, having decided to avail themselves of this organization, moved the headquarters of the Waterways Commission to Cologne, and thereafter issued all orders to German navigators through that agency.

Control posts, charged with giving clearance papers to vessel commanders and with the organization and supervision of armed patrol boats to enforce police and traffic regulations were established as follows: for the Belgians at Emerich, for the English at Ruhrort and Cologne, for the Americans at Coblenz, and for the French at Mayence and Ludwigshafen. The duties of this commission, as far as we were concerned, were considerably extended later by reason of the necessity of transporting supplies from the United States up the Rhine for the American Forces.

Copies of the various proclamations and orders published by or under authority of Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, serve to explain further the character of the duties and responsibilities of the Supreme Military Command. It was charged with directing field forces about one million strong, and more important still, with the control of a population six times as great. The welfare of the people on and among whom these forces were billeted and garrisoned was likewise in the keeping of the Supreme Commander. He could not fail to be mindful of what this vast occupation would mean in history, and how greatly future generations might be influenced by the manner in which this power was exercised.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY GOVERNMENT*

THE homeward movement of the remaining combat divisions continued unabated: the 4th left Germany July twelfth, the 2nd, July twenty-first, the 3rd, August eleventh, the 1st, August twenty-first. With their departure, only a few minor units of the old army were left with the permanent garrison. Simultaneously with their departure, the new territorial organization was extended. In the bridgehead and in the *land* and *stadt Kreises* of Coblenz, the reorganization took place September twelfth. The perimeter of our bridgehead, at thirty kilometers distant from Coblenz, included a number of townships and *Gemeinden* which belonged to *Kreises* whose capitals were in the neutral zone. That made a strict *Kreis* organization on the right bank of the Rhine impossible. In respect to the *Kreises* of Coblenz, where the Headquarters of the American Forces in Germany and most of the new troops were to be garrisoned, certain variations were also necessary, even had the city not become the seat of the Interallied High Commission.

With the departure of the Third Army and with the limited forces assigned as the American contin-

*Military government is the exercise of military power by a belligerent over the territory and inhabitants of an enemy by virtue of an occupation of said territory.

gent for holding our area, it was evident we could not properly cover our original territory—certainly not without an implication that the forces in the other zones were unnecessarily strong. Therefore an agreement was made with the French authorities, whereby the Treves *Bezirk* was turned over to them. Treves was occupied by the 38th French Division, September 3, 1919, and by the tenth of that month all of our officers connected with civil affairs in that *Bezirk* had been withdrawn. Considering our previous foreign occupations, mentioned elsewhere, and this holding in Central Europe, our country has had occasion to establish military governments within the past generation more frequently than any other state.

Once having consented to participate in the occupation under the terms of the Armistice, America could not divest itself of exercising governmental suzerainty in the Rhineland. Efficient administration under such conditions demands a thorough organization and a skilled personnel imbued with the importance of the psychological, economic and political factors involved. It is no serious reflection on our administration to say that we were not in possession of such a machine as the situation required. With each month, however, changes and improvements brought our military government up to a higher standard. Yet it was only at the departure of the combat divisions for the United States, with the departure of the Third United States Army, that the machine was at its best, and it was then that the American Forces in Germany was bequeathed a most valuable inheritance. The magnitude of the responsibilities assumed in the Rhineland occupation was underestimated. Belief was indulged

in many quarters that the armies could occupy enemy soil and yet dispossess themselves of most of the responsibility of government. It is not outside the range of possibility that the negotiations at Compiègne, where the terms were formulated on which hostilities were to cease, were responsible for this delusion, as far as the United States was concerned.

The intensive efforts concentrated on bringing about an early decision in the field, the problem of moving a quarter of a million men to the Rhine, and the uncertainty in regard to the nature of the occupation were in part responsible for our failure to prepare properly for the task at hand. The defects of our system have been so definitely set forth in Colonel Hunt's report on Military Government of the Occupied Territory 1918-20 and our experiences were so enlightening that a future occupation would find us better prepared. The want of a proper preparation, however, laid a heavy burden on the Third Army Commander and his subordinates charged with the administration and security of their respective commands. The Second Section of General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, had prepared a pamphlet dealing with the subject, but its material was antiquated and its treatment inaccurate. More from the lack of something better than because of its inherent value, this pamphlet proved of some use, and during the march to the Rhine it constituted for both commanders and staffs the sole source of information regarding the government of the country they were to occupy. The absence of a proper training and organization was a tremendous disadvantage in guiding the destinies of nearly a million civilians whom the fortunes of war had

placed under our temporary sovereignty. American aptitude was, however, quick in lessening these disadvantages.

General Orders No. 225, of the American Expeditionary Forces, dated December 10, 1918, set forth and defined the organization and manner by which the mandates of the proclamations and all subsequent orders should be executed. Under it, an Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, previously referred to, was appointed for the entire occupied territory with office at Advance Headquarters at Treves. This officer was the personal representative of General Pershing with respect to all matters affecting the government of the civil population. He was authorized to issue special orders and instructions for the control and management of the population and when necessity demanded, he modified to a certain extent the provisions of the original proclamation and of this general order. In a word, his office was the fountain head of civil authority in the American Zone. In the opinion of the writer, this officer should have been a member of the staff of the Third Army Commander who was responsible for the maintenance of public order and the security of the troops. In a military government, the head of civil affairs should be placed on a parity with other staff heads. In the winter of 1918-19, peace was not so certain that precautions against renewed attacks or an uprising of the population could be neglected. Separation of executive and legislative duties, a dogma of our government, is wholly unsuited to a military occupation. In the French and Belgian Armies, civil affairs were comprised in an additional section of the General Staff; and in the British Army

they were made coordinate with general, supply and administration staffs. The difficulties of maintaining adequate understanding and communication between the Commanding General of the Third Army at Coblenz and the civil affairs officer at Treves, more than one hundred miles away, was an additional handicap. These facts were sufficient to account for the decision of our Commander-in-Chief to give subsequently to the Army Commander limited legislative and interpretive power. The provisional policy adopted by the latter toward the population was outlined in Memorandum No. 4, Third Army, previously mentioned, and issued November 30, 1918, the day before moving out of Luxemburg.

General Pershing's ordinances—called in the German translation *Anordnungen*—were published December ninth, and with Orders No. 1, of Advance Headquarters at Treves, December 13, 1918, they comprised the fundamental principles upon which our entire military government was based. The former announced the regulations which were to govern the relations of the population to the occupying forces, and the latter the organization of the military government which was to make these regulations effective. General Orders No. 1 made the Officer charged with Civil Affairs at Treves the direct representative of the Commander-in-Chief, with full power to promulgate the orders of the military government and to supervise them. He was wholly independent of the Commander of the Third Army, whose tactical formations he was utilizing. That discord did not arise from this grave mistake, whereby the authority of the Commanding General was limited in a very real

sense, must be ascribed to the spirit in which the several headquarters subordinated personal considerations to public welfare.

The German government is so highly and minutely organized on a hierarchal system of provinces, *Bezirks* and *Kreises*, that it offered special advantages for adoption and adaptation by a foreign military government. The advantages of organizing our military government along these lines was not recognized in time and the change from using our tactical formations as units of control was not made until the following June—until the frequent movements of such formations declared our original policy fallacious. Possibly due to their better knowledge of German local government and perhaps for other reasons, the French and British Armies modeled their military administrations from the outset along lines paralleling the civil system they found in Germany.

The supervision of the control of civil affairs in lesser military units was exercised by the Army Commander through his own Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. Orders No. 1, Advance Headquarters, established five main departments: Public Works and Utilities; Fiscal Affairs; Sanitation and Public Health; Schools and Charitable Institutions; and a Legal Department. This broad organization was destined to meet any situation which might confront the military government in occupied territory. Its comprehensiveness suggested a definite reversal of the limited interference that existed in the mind of American authorities prior to the occupation.

The head of Public Works and Utilities was to supervise municipal light and gas plants, street rail-

ways and telephone lines. Our jurisdiction over railways was limited by the Interallied Railway Commission and over other public utilities by the lack of coal. The production and distribution of this necessity was in the hands of the Interallied Coal Commission.

The head of Fiscal Affairs was to supervise banks, other financial institutions, and taxation. The exercise of these duties proved light, but the fines of our provost courts put in his custody sums at times exceeding one hundred thousand marks weekly before the value of this unit had vanished.


The head of Sanitation and Public Health was directly charged with the vital matter of conditions in German villages where hunger and the doubly crowded condition due to billeting, gave considerable anxiety. The question of civilian food supply was added to his duties.

The head of the Legal Department exercised general supervision over all provost courts and the care of their very numerous records. He also served as technical adviser to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, particularly in drafting the rules governing the operation of provost courts. Later when a certain amount of supervision over German courts was found necessary, he was charged also with that.

The Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs at Treves was prevented, by geographical reasons, from maintaining direct relations with the highest German official of the occupied territories, the *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province, at Coblenz. This duty, therefore, devolved upon the Civil Affairs Officer of the Third Army who came to occupy a position of influence and

FORTIFICATIONS OF COBLENZ

SCALE 1:25000



respect among the German officials. After June 1, 1919, when Advance General Headquarters was abandoned, he became the principal authority of the Commander of the Third Army in civil matters, as he was later of the Commander of the American Forces. The duties and responsibilities of his office by a natural process of evolution became numerous and important and his authority was exercised under the personal supervision of the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General.

Orders No. 1, General Headquarters, directed appointment by each corps commander of an officer in charge of civil affairs, but outlined no duties for him. In two instances judge advocates were expected to conduct these duties in addition to their regular ones. As a matter of fact, their duties were limited chiefly to troops that were unattached to divisions. Corps commanders did not exercise great influence in civil administration. Division commanders, through their Civil Affairs Officers, became the real administrators of local affairs under the terms of the Armistice. The provisions of Orders No. 1 not only charged the division commander with responsibilities for the enforcement of military orders in his area, but endowed him with very extensive control of the judicial organization set up to enforce them. His authority in respect to military commissions was subject only to that of the Commander-in-Chief. He was given power to appoint superior provost courts and to approve, disapprove or mitigate their findings, yet the Army Commander had the right to express a final opinion. The civil affairs officer of the division occupied a position equivalent to that of a head of a gen-

eral staff section and exercised his authority over a broad field of activities.

The various changes of stations of troops referred to as having an important bearing on the organization of military government is seen from the following: the first divisional unit to leave Germany for the United States, March, 1919, was the 42nd, billeted in *Kreis Ahrweiler*. Its place was taken by the 4th Division from the Adenau-Cochem area. The 6th Division was ordered up from France to replace the 4th, but only part of it had arrived in the region of Bad Berberich, when orders directed its return to the United States. The location and movement of one of our big divisions, originally of twenty-seven thousand men, was a matter of considerable moment in the localities concerned.

With the signing of the Treaty of Peace at Versailles, June 20, 1919, the divisions were sent home as fast as transportation was available. Between April 1, and July 2, 1919, when the American Forces in Germany succeeded the Third United States Army, the 89th, 90th, 32nd and 6th Divisions had been embarked or were embarking at French ports. Their departure left such a gap in our occupation that a reorganization of military government became necessary. Under the new and better system, the personnel for such a government became independent of the commanders of tactical units. Their officials were subordinated to the office of civil affairs, and military government was coordinated with German governmental agencies, particularly that of the *Kreis*.

Civil Affairs Bulletin of May 7, 1919, outlined the new system, and officers of civil affairs were installed

to take over military governmental powers at once from division commanders. A field officer, with assistants for provost courts, sanitation, etc., was placed at the head of each office, with the long title of Kreis Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. In usual parlance, this was shortened to the first two words of the title. The changed policy proved of the greatest value to the Commander of the American Forces in Germany who continued the development of the administration outlined in the Bulletin of the Third Army. On July sixteenth, he designated the civil affairs officer of Treves as the superior American representative in that *Bezirk*.

CHAPTER V

TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE

UNDER the last Article of the terms of the momentous document signed near Compiègne, November 11, 1918, an Armistice Commission was created, though its duties were not defined. It was clearly intended, nevertheless, to serve as an agency between the Allies and the Germans. All communications between the Allies and the hostile powers passed through its hands, all complaints were taken up by it, all requests were submitted through it, and all interpretations of the Armistice were made by it. The Germans soon conceived the thought that it might be an agency through which new agreements modifying the terms of the Armistice could be made and they accordingly submitted a number of requests to that end. The Allies did not agree with that view and in order that a clear understanding might be had, the president of the Commission, General Nudant, issued a formal statement to the effect that the Commission was not an organ for agreements, but simply an organ for arranging details for compliance with agreements already made. Most of the German pleas for leniency when failing to comply with obligations imposed by the occupying forces were based on the impossibility of compliance owing to the Revolution. It is not conceiv-

able that the Armistice Commission was vested with authority to modify the terms of the Armistice. At best, it was little more than an agency for arranging as expeditiously as possible the details for carrying out the provisions of that document. From time to time it took cognizance of German protests and rectified mistakes or abuses of subordinates.

Scarcely had the guns ceased firing on the morning of November eleventh when Allied prisoners began to straggle over from the German line. They were in a pitiful condition—ravenously hungry and most of them in rags and in indescribable filth. This exodus lasted about one week. The deplorable condition of these prisoners and the stories they brought of terrible conditions of hunger which they had suffered in the prison camps from which they had been released, caused bitter resentment among the Allied troops. Article X of the Armistice provided for “the immediate repatriation without reciprocity . . . of all prisoners of war, including persons under trial and persons convicted, belonging to the Allies and the United States.” The Germans, in answer to our protest, claimed that as soon as the Armistice was signed these prisoners had practically mutinied, demanding immediate release and refusing to obey orders. Without waiting for transportation they escaped and the difficult journey back accounted for their famished and ragged appearance.

As the weeks passed, other stories began to be heard about the starvation of prisoners who were still in German camps in the interior. New protests were lodged by the Armistice Commission. In reply the Germans stated they were doing all in their power to

feed and care for the prisoners, but that the utmost difficulty was being encountered, partly because the government had largely lost control over the country as a result of the Revolution and partly because the prisoners themselves refused to obey orders any longer or to submit to the regulations necessary for their proper maintenance and orderly release. Some stories affirmed that American prisoners had been brutally treated by German guards after the Armistice was signed. These complaints were also protested. It was not possible for the Allies to determine the truth about the condition of the prisoners until the middle of December, when an investigation confirmed the statements made by the Germans. The American representative on the Armistice Commission, openly disavowed the brutalities to American soldiers. As a matter of fact, it has been established that the American prisoners as a whole were reasonably well treated in the internment camps. Their ration was far from sufficient, but most of them agreed that it was the same food on which the civil population lived.

As the Third Army advanced into the Rhineland, it found along the roads German wagons, trucks and various quantities of abandoned equipment which naturally became its property. However, shortly after the Army of Occupation settled in its area it discovered that a substantial amount of war material—military stores, munitions and equipment—were in use in different parts of the Zone. An investigation disclosed the fact that the German Army, unable to withdraw all its munitions within the thirty-six days allowed for evacuation, had disposed of them under

authority from Berlin to corporations and individuals at whatever price could be had.

That was in violation of the sixth Article of the Armistice which states: "No destruction of any kind shall be permitted, military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact; so also military stores, food, munitions and equipment not removed during the period fixed for evacuation." In thus disposing of their military property, the Germans claimed that they were merely giving the Rhinelanders an opportunity to share in the benefits from liquidation of military stores which the rest of Germany would enjoy when demobilization was effected. They further claimed that the bona fide purchasers became owners of private property which was immune from seizure, and furthermore that the Armistice did not forbid the German Army to sell its property during the period fixed for evacuation. Had the Americans accepted this invalid view-point, it would have been necessary to examine every sale to determine whether it had been made in good faith, or in order to avoid fulfilling the terms of the Armistice. Bills of sale from the German military authorities, of which there were many, were not definitive.

The war material found in our area could be divided into three classes: that which had been abandoned and consequently clearly fell to the occupying forces, that which had been transferred by legal sale prior to November eleventh and equally clearly belonged to the holder, and that which had been transferred subsequent to November eleventh. The Armistice did not prohibit directly the Germans from selling their stores. Following the practise after

1871, when there was ambiguity, the decision favored the French and similarly they said it should now favor themselves. It was clear, however, that the property had not been removed during the evacuation period. Be this as it may, there was enough doubt to cause the Army Commander to clarify the situation by an order, one paragraph of which stated: "All military stores, food, munitions, and equipment which belonged to the German Army upon the eleventh day of November, 1918, the day of the signing of the Armistice, and which has not been removed from the Zone of the American Army of Occupation, during the period of time fixed by the Armistice for evacuation, are hereby declared forfeited under the terms of the Armistice, to the American Army."

The Germans protested vigorously against this order—at first to the Army Commander, from whom they received no response; then to the Armistice Commission, and finally to Marshal Foch. The decision of the Army Commander was upheld and in consequence they had to submit. Those who disobeyed the order were tried by provost court or commissions and the property was confiscated. Many Germans believed that these persons were tried because they had purchased the war material rather than because they had disobeyed the letter of the order, quoted above, requiring that such property be turned in to the American authorities.

The Germans protested again to the Army Commander, the Commission and Marshal Foch against the alleged illegal trials. Finally, to make our position clear, General Pershing issued another clarifying order. Collection of the enemy war material proved

a difficult undertaking. Masses of supplies of all descriptions and values were reported throughout the area. Much of the property was so dispersed and in such condition that collecting it and restoring it were not in the interests of economy. This was especially true of animals left behind in the retreat. Some of these had been nursed back to strength, and to have taken them would have deprived the farmers of assistance in securing much-needed foodstuffs.

One source of information with regard to war material illegally disposed of was the record of sales kept by various agents of the Berlin government. Many of these were civil government officials, such as *Landräte* and burgomasters. By far the greatest amount of information came from the records of the Eighth German Army Corps, whose Headquarters had been at Coblenz. The knowledge on the part of the population that the American Army had obtained these records led to voluntary reports that otherwise might not have been made. These records proved particularly valuable, in that they contained the date of sale and the amount of money realized from each article. With this information, it was but one step further to seize the money which these agents had collected, in lieu of the property itself. This was not quite so simple as it appears when the property had changed hands more than once and could not be identified as having had its value refunded.

The American authorities disposed of the abandoned or sold property as rapidly as possible by public sales. The money received from such sales was stored in the vaults of the Headquarters building in Coblenz, and after being deposited to the credit of the

United States, was reinvoyced back to the Army and used to pay troops. By the middle of August, 1919, all of the enemy war material had been sold or otherwise disposed of and a receipt was in the hands of every authorized possessor of such property. The magnitude of the task can be realized from the ten million marks received, before that unit had radically depreciated.

Under Article IV of the Armistice, Germany had to leave in the hands of the Allies five thousand guns—half light, half heavy—twenty-five thousand machine guns, three thousand mine-throwers and one thousand and seven hundred fighting and bombing planes. Article VIII required the delivery of five thousand locomotives, and one hundred and fifty thousand cars in good order with all necessary spare parts and fittings. The clauses dealing with ships and naval material did not directly concern the Army of Occupation. Article VII demanded the delivery of “five thousand motor trucks in good condition within a period of thirty-six days.” The railways of Alsace-Lorraine were to be handed over in thirty-one days with all personnel and material organically connected with that system, and the material in the several bridgeheads had to be sufficient to permit normal operation of the railways in them.

The Germans were remarkably slow in carrying out these demands and continually attempted to foist poor material upon the Allies. On the other hand, the Allies subjected every piece of material to a rigid inspection and accepted nothing that was not in good condition. As a result, on the last day of the period assigned only two thousand locomotives and twenty-

one thousand cars had been accepted. The Germans claimed that practically none of their locomotives was in good condition, that the revolution prevented deliveries on time, that men to do repair work could not be found, that the Allied receiving facilities were inadequate, and that the personnel delivering the material were so badly treated by the Allies that it was almost impossible to induce men to undertake the delivery.

They endeavored to surrender obsolete cannon without recoil cylinders. They failed to turn over the required number of airplanes, for which a compromise was made by the acceptance of twenty draft horses for each airplane not surrendered. The delivery of trucks was particularly delayed, probably due to the fact that many used in the war had been requisitioned from private firms, which still owned them. By February sixth, the Allies had accepted 3,861 locomotives and 118,698 cars from 9,000 and 200,000 respectively that had been offered. It was said that the locomotives accepted represented two-fifths of the serviceable number then owned by Germany. As the full quota of material to be surrendered approached, the Allies made an arrangement for its division among themselves. Belgium was to receive one-tenth of all the war material surrendered; America two-tenths; England three-tenths, and France four-tenths. By February 13, 1919, the Americans had received their full share of guns and machine guns, and a week later of trucks. By March thirteenth, all railway material and trucks had been delivered.

Article V of the Armistice, prescribed that: "A neutral zone shall be set up on the right bank of the

Rhine between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and the river and ten kilometers distant starting from the Dutch frontier and extending to the Swiss frontier." The breadth of this zone was therefore forty kilometers. This same Article provided that the countries west of the Rhine should be assured by garrisons holding the principal river-crossings—Mayence, Coblenz and Cologne—together with bridgeheads at these points of a thirty kilometer radius. The bridgeheads were thus originally prescribed as segments of circles, whose centers were the centers of the cities mentioned with radii as stated. It was early recognized that certain changes had to be made to avoid administrative difficulties. For example, the Mayence bridgehead would have cut into the city of Frankfurt in such a way as to paralyze the city administration.

Control of the Neutral Zone was not mentioned in the terms of the Armistice, but as soon as the occupation was established Marshal Pétain, Commander of the French Armies, submitted a very lengthy memorandum to Marshal Foch, which became the regulations for the control of that Zone. They were drawn up under these several subheads: general arrangements, limits and organization, military government, control of police garrisons, and arms and ammunition. The Germans protested also against these regulations. They objected to control over circulation in the Neutral Zone, on the ground that it did not concern the Allies. Marshal Foch insisted on it, pointing out the danger to the bridgeheads that might ensue in case German soldiers in civilian clothes were brought into the Zone in sufficient numbers.

The right of unannounced visits of inspection was also protested. As mentioned elsewhere, the Allies permitted a temporary use by German forces in the Neutral Zone in March, 1919. The Germans later asked to have that privilege made permanent, but were refused. When it was found that these forces were composed chiefly of non-commissioned officers, it was the Allies who protested. The Germans replied by saying that since service as non-commissioned officers was a profession in the German Army, it would be unfair to men who had devoted their life to the work to lose their occupation as a result of the country's defeat.

During the war, Germany despoiled many factories and plants in Northern France and Belgium of machinery, tools and material. This was done with a treble purpose: to obtain material for war work and other ends in Germany, injure the industrial efficiency of those countries in order to weaken them militarily, and to eliminate future industrial competition. The degree to which this spoliation was carried and its systematic development are set forth in a letter by the American representative on the Commission of Industrial Restitution. He stated that there were a number of industrial committees attached to the higher staffs of the German forces which exploited the agriculture, forests and industries of the occupied regions, and that these committees had the power of requisition which they exercised to meet the demands of German industry. Doubt concerning the restitution of such property was removed when the protocol extending the Armistice for the second time was signed January 16, 1919. The Allies decided to insert clauses requiring specifically that Germany restore what had been

taken. The Germans objected. They offered to pay an indemnity, but desired to keep the machinery as necessary to their commerce and industry.

Under the protocol, a subcommission called the Service of Industrial Restitution was organized with its offices at Wiesbaden, while a corresponding German committee with offices at Frankfurt was set up to facilitate collection by the German government of French and Belgian machinery and property in private hands. The French and Belgians were inclined to give the Germans a taste of their own medicine by paying little or no attention to their repeated excuses for delays. By the beginning of March, 1919, it was realized that the restitution of property did not concern Americans and our representative was accordingly withdrawn. A number of Germans known to have been actively engaged in removing French and Belgian property were arrested, with the protest from the German government that the Armistice terms forbade arrest for acts committed prior to November eleventh. When it was shown that these individuals were acting under orders, they were released. The case was different, however, when individuals on their own initiative had taken such property. This was in violation of the laws of civilized warfare and was simply pillage. The American authorities permitted the French to search the houses of two individuals in the American Zone with the result that in one house nothing was found, but in the second stolen property was found and seized. The culprit, a captain, was turned over to the French for trial for violating the laws of war, but before facing the court he committed suicide in jail.

The Germans made frequent complaints that the French and Belgians while on tours of inspection to discover stolen machinery were using their official positions to obtain trade secrets. They also protested against the designation of thieves and robbers given them by the Allied press. They claimed that as the Allied blockade prevented them from purchasing supplies abroad, they had been compelled by military necessity to seize property where they were holding and that they were justified under military law in so doing. The Allies sharply disagreed with this viewpoint. It was soon found that the Germans would be able to restore only a part of the machinery removed. The Allies finally modified their policy. From the beginning they had been less insistent in the Alsace-Lorraine and Saar districts where a more conciliatory attitude was in evidence. Machinery in those districts was permitted to remain in place until some business arrangement could be made that would hurt both parties the least possible. It was realized that although the machinery had been unlawfully removed, it would be unwise to take it in an arbitrary manner since much of it was then in the hands of virtually innocent purchasers. Gradually the lenient and businesslike system of restitution inaugurated in Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar Basin was extended to Germany itself.

CHAPTER VI

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE POPULATION

THE attitude to be adopted by our troops toward the German population was set forth three days before the Allied Armies entered Germany, in General Orders No. 218. This order, which follows, clearly indicates the spirit of America throughout the holding. By appealing to the pride of our soldiers, it adopted the surest method of reaching its goal. It also reveals the nobility of character of our Commander-in-Chief.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

General Orders
No. 218.

France, November 28, 1918.

“You have come not as despoilers or oppressors, but simply as the instruments of a strong free government whose purposes toward the people of Germany are beneficent. During our occupation the civil population is under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army.

“It is, therefore, the intention of this order to appeal directly to your pride in your position as representatives of a powerful but righteous nation, with the firm conviction that you will so conduct yourself in your relations with the inhabitants of Germany as will cause them to respect you and the country you have the honor to represent. While you

appear among them as a conquering army, you will exhibit no ill-will toward the inhabitants.

"On the other hand, you are warned against conduct unbecoming your position as instruments of military rule. So long as a state of war continues, Germany remains enemy territory and there must be no intimate personal associations with its inhabitants. A dignified and reserved attitude will be maintained on your part at all times.

"It is not believed that any acts of pillage or violence will be committed by members of the American forces but, should any persons prove themselves unworthy of this confidence, their acts will be considered not only as crimes against the sufferers but as dishonoring the American Army and as a direct insult to the flag of the United States. Such transgressions, should they occur, will be punished with the severest penalties known to our military law."

The spirit of this order is strikingly at variance with the declarations of hate that have emanated from some of our noncombatant citizens who, far from the firing lines at all times and oblivious to the essentials of peace, have continued their unbridled denunciation of our former foes. Following the intent of this order, every effort was made to impress our soldiers with the fact that having the advantages of the armed against the unarmed, it would be cowardly not to show courtesy and consideration.

This order was shortly followed by one from the Third Army, which prescribed that members of the forces of occupation should confine themselves to official relations with the Germans and should limit their personal relations to an attitude of courteous tolerance. This latter order, popularly known as the "Anti-Fraternizing Order" became probably the most

discussed regulation issued by the Army of Occupation. It affected the private life of practically every member of the command. At the time it was issued, its full effect was not appreciated by the army, which had not yet recovered from the emotions produced on the field of battle and the war propaganda which tended to produce distrust and hatred of all things German. During the first days of the occupation, feeling on both sides was in fact so intense, distrustful and bitter that it is surprising no clashes occurred. Under the influence of the preachings as the prelude to our entrance into the war and under the information disseminated during the war period, a majority of Americans believed that the Germans respected no agreement nor moral law, that they sought evil for evil's sake, and above all sought revenge for their defeat. The inhabitants had also received their full share of such preaching, whereby the American Army had been conjured up as an undisciplined mob of semi-savages.

In spite of efforts to put all the troops in barracks and public buildings, many were billeted in the houses of the inhabitants who, inspired partly by fear and partly by orders from the burgomasters and other officials, did everything in their power to be conciliatory. For the first time in months, the soldiers were sleeping in beds. The first night the German women prepared supper for them, believing that they were required to furnish food as they had been compelled to do for their own soldiers. After supper the soldiers went into the warm kitchen to enjoy a luxury in marked contrast to the cold nights in the field. Soldiers and children nearly always develop quick friend-

ships, and the American soldier and the German child were no exception to the rule. By the time the soldiers had reached their permanent stations their mental attitude had changed. They learned that a great deal of what they had heard about the innate viciousness of all Germans was not true and their war memories began to fade. In making his billet in a German home, the soldier found that he could not avoid acquaintance with his enforced host and both parties made offers of friendship. The shortage of fuel and the fact that the kitchen was, as a rule, the only part of the house heated, practically compelled the soldier to pass his evenings with the family, and thus a friendly or hostile attitude developed, dependent upon whether their temperaments were in accord.

It was soon realized that it was impossible to enforce the Anti-Fraternization Order in billets, particularly in the small villages, where the people were poor and the house had a single living-room to be shared by soldier and civilian. The result was inevitable, and at the end of a few months the only effect of this order was to prevent the soldier being seen in public with his new acquaintances. It was sound in theory and succeeded in achieving its purpose as far as the officers were concerned, but its failure to achieve practical results among the soldiers soon became known to all. This order, as might be supposed, irritated the German population, largely because its purpose was misinterpreted in the belief that it was intended to show a feeling of personal superiority on the part of the occupying army. The imagined contempt wounded their pride. The Anti-Fraternization Order continued in effect during the

entire existence of the Third Army and as late as September, 1919. The American Army was the last of the occupying armies to rescind this order. Its recession was immediately followed by a striking increase in the venereal rate among the troops. This, however, was probably due less to the revocation of the order than to the increased number of women who came to Germany on the departure of the last of the Expeditionary Forces from France.

About the middle of April, 1919, rumors of the severity of the peace terms became noised throughout the American Zone. This, coupled with the food situation and the growth of Bolshevism in unoccupied Germany, brought home to the people the fulness of their defeat. A general spirit of discontent developed, and the people no longer tried to hide dislike of their conquerors. The moment the Germans showed an insubordinate spirit, the troops reacted violently and their forgotten dislike flared up anew. Numerous fights occurred between disorderly elements of the army and similar elements among the young demobilized German soldiers, most of which, however, originated in drink and jealousy over women. Though it is believed the principal source of this ill feeling grew out of the peace terms, there were other apparent causes which sprung from this primary discontent; discrimination in prices against Americans, increase of drunkenness among Germans, incivility toward officers and soldiers, and insulting remarks to our women welfare workers.

The German civil authorities, realizing that matters could not continue thus, issued a proclamation cautioning their citizens against the practises which

had irritated the occupying army and urging them to maintain relations with the soldiers as friendly as possible. The American Army Commander enjoined the soldiers to continue the attitude insisted upon from the beginning—of treating the defeated enemy both justly and fairly. The result of these conciliatory measures on both sides and the signing of a separate peace between the United States and Germany in July, 1920, established peaceful if not friendly relations.

It was to be expected that some members of the Third Army of two hundred and fifty thousand in the course of six months and of the smaller permanent force in a period of four years would marry German girls, in spite of the Anti-Fraternizing Order and of war hatred. It is a custom among Germans of a certain class to consider an engagement the equivalent of a marriage, and a number of soldiers came forward and announced that they were engaged and admitted that their fiancées were about to become mothers. They expressed willingness to stand trial for violating orders but considered themselves bound in honor to marry the girls. This was a situation which had not been foreseen when the order was promulgated. Discipline, love, honor were at stake. After considerable hesitation, the American Commander decided to permit the marriages when the soldier acknowledged his responsibility and desired the girl as a wife, and when the latter submitted a statement from an American surgeon or responsible German physician attesting her pregnancy.

Senior non-commissioned officers were permitted to marry, as in the United States, but the number of

others who were asking this privilege, alleging pregnancy, increased to such a degree in the permanent American Forces in Germany as to arouse suspicion. It was believed by some of the population that such a condition was a *sine qua non* of marriage. A refusal to permit marriage and a policy of sending all married soldiers back to the United States in such cases, radically diminished the number of applicants for matrimony. When later it was learned that the War Department approved marriage permissions of soldiers who were desirous of righting their wrongs to the unmarried mothers, the number of applicants again increased.

All uniformed officials—such as police, gendarmes, railway guards, trainmen, postmen, customs officials, state and city foresters—were required to salute Allied officers, but otherwise no courtesies other than those required by the common usage of society were demanded. These officials had always been required to salute German officers, and, in consequence, they anticipated a continuance being required.

Crimes have been committed to a greater or less extent by every military force occupying a hostile country. The American Forces could not be expected to be an exception, yet the American authorities made every effort to decrease the number committed by their forces to the lowest minimum, and to inculcate in the troops a proper desire to uphold the dignity of their country. It was learned that German officials, for a while at least, were keeping a record of all crimes and offenses committed by our forces—possibly to show the world that the Allies were guilty of iniquities and that the German misdeeds in Belgium

and France were not unique. Possibly there was another thought, that the publication of such a record might mitigate the punishment of those Germans who were charged by the Allies with being war criminals. The average German, however, resents and disbelieves the wide-spread reports of these crimes and considers them for the most part an unfounded imputation on the character of his soldiers and country.

Every complaint submitted by a German against an American was investigated by a commissioned officer and a report made to the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, giving the nature and circumstance of the offense charged and the action taken. All claims for damages were sent to the Rents, Requisitions and Claim Service, and if misconduct were involved, a copy was forwarded also to Civil Affairs. The judge advocate was also required to furnish the same office with copies of all general court-martial cases, in order that a complete and convenient record might be made.

It must be admitted that the number of trials of Americans for alleged offenses against Germans were few in comparison with the number of complaints lodged. This was chiefly due to the fact that the civilian could seldom bring any substantial clue other than that the malefactor was an American soldier. Probably many of the offenders were soldiers absent without leave, whom our authorities were seeking to apprehend. Very often too the civilian was afraid to make his complaint direct, preferring simply to inform his burgomaster, thus diminishing the chance of identification by the delay.

A careful record was kept of the trials of civilians before our provost courts. This list comprised many

varieties of offenses, of which the following were the most numerous, in the order named: violation of circulation orders, sale or unlawful possession of United States property, violation of sanitary regulations, sale of prohibited drinks, larceny of United States property, vagrancy, and assaults on American soldiers. The orders published by the army were on the whole faithfully complied with, except those pertaining to alcohol, sanitation and circulation. The first two of these were of special importance to the well being of the army. These three regulations upset the people's manner of living. They caused them and us more trouble and resulted in more irritation than did the enforcement of all other orders.

Under the circulation order, subsequently withdrawn, every German over fourteen years of age had to provide himself with an identification card and to obtain permission from the military authorities for all travel, even minor journeys. In the interest of sanitation the highly prized manure piles, often close to the family kitchen, were ordered scattered over the fields to the great dissatisfaction of their owners, whose carefully prepared plans of fertilizing were broken up. To reduce the danger of influenza, it was insisted that the windows should be open at night, thus letting the accumulated heat of the day escape. However important such orders were for us, they violated long standing practises of the people and were consequently considered unreasonable.

A military occupation which accomplishes its purpose with the least interference in the local affairs of the people is in the end the most successful. The Rhinelander to-day feels that although the Americans

were severe, they were preeminently fair in their dealings and that they pursued their objectives honestly without chicanery or double dealing.

It is an interesting question as to how far illiteracy influenced the relations between the soldiers and the population. The Director of Education of the Third Army, Doctor Benton, based literacy on the ability to read and understand a newspaper. An investigation discovered 9,929 illiterates in the Third Army, but that number was by no means complete. It is large enough, however, to cause earnest consideration of a still greater development of our public school system. Through the establishment of post schools in every occupied town and hamlet in our area under regimental chaplains or enlisted men who had been teachers, the above number of illiterates was reduced by June, 1919, to 1,311.

On the coming into force of the ordinances of the High Commission, two important restrictions on the population were removed—regulations relative to circulation and censorship. There was no change, however, in the restrictions concerning the entry of German military and naval officers, who were still required to secure permission from the military authorities. Finally the removal of the restriction as to these persons permitted them to visit their families and homes. All control posts, except those for the examination of goods coming into the American area were also removed, though that was not done entirely in the other zones. With the removal of further restrictions, American business men and tourists came into Germany in rapidly increasing numbers. On the other hand, the many Germans who desired to go to

America had to refer their applications to our Commissioner in Berlin and later to our Ambassador there. In general the restrictions in the American and British Zones were less burdensome to the population than were those in the French and Belgian.

History and tradition have made the matter of military occupation more familiar to the Rhinelanders than to almost any people of Europe. It has been frequently imposed upon them and they likewise have helped impose it upon others. That perhaps accounted for their marvelous complacency in respect to the many inconveniences and irritations that are a necessary accompaniment of such a status.

CHAPTER VII

THE RHINELAND COMMISSION

THE Luxemburg Commission had not achieved any positive results other than in the regulation of imports and exports. Financial matters were wholly outside its jurisdiction. Presumably they were handled by the French Comptroller of Finance, but in reality by each army within its own sphere. Fuel and food problems were controlled partly by the armies and partly by international commissions, such as the Interallied Coal and the Hoover Commissions. Much difficulty arose from the lack of coordination of policies of those bodies. The civilian representatives of the United States and Great Britain who had replaced military officers of their respective governments on the Luxemburg Commission, recognized and reported that that body did not have proper authority for exercising the needed control over conditions on the Left Bank of the Rhine. Thereupon the Supreme Economic Council sitting in Paris promulgated the following charter of the Interallied Rhineland Commission April 21, 1919: "1. That an Interallied Commission, consisting of four commissioners, one for each Ally concerned with the administration of the occupied territories, should together with an Italian liaison officer be set up with full authority to coordi-

nate the administration of the four Army Commands on all economic, industrial and food questions, in accordance with the policy laid down from time to time by the Supreme Council. 2. That orders would be issued under the authority of the Supreme War Council to the Army Commands in the various areas, that directions given by the Commission shall be uniformly executed throughout the whole area."

The authority thus granted this commission was greatly in excess of those formerly exercised by the Luxemburg Commission which it succeeded. The decision to lodge power in the new Commission for coordination of the food policies of the various armies, was in itself a long step toward a unified control of occupied territory. The member appointed by France, who later became its President and still later President of the High Commission, was Monsieur Paul Tirard—a former civil governor of Morocco and subsequent comptroller of occupied territory under Marshal Foch. Sir Harold Stuart, an administrator of long experience in the Indian Civil Service, was sent as Great Britain's representative. Mr. Pierrepont B. Noyes and Monsieur Transconster, both successful manufacturers, were appointed members by their respective governments, the American and Belgian. At the time the charter was granted, steps were taken to assure its cooperation with the armies. The Commanding General of the Third Army received a letter from General Pershing May sixth, directing that his forces assist the new commission in every possible way. There was, of course, no desire on the part of the army to obstruct the Commission and as a matter of fact it was largely due to the cor-

dial reception accorded it by Lieutenant-General Liggett, then commanding our Army of Occupation in succession to Major-General Dickman, that Coblenz was made its headquarters.


The Commission temporarily established its offices at Luxemburg in order to smooth over the transition period between the régimes of the two Commissions mentioned above. It was realized that as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a neutral country, it would be more fitting and convenient if the seat of the Commission were established in a Rhenish city. After an inspection of the facilities available in the larger towns in the area of each army, it was decided to move to Coblenz. This rather small municipality was not only the most important governmental city in the occupied territories, but the American Commander was entirely agreeable to having the seat of the Commission established there, despite the strain which this measure would place on the limited billeting facilities. The transfer took place the third week in May, 1919, the offices being established in the court building. As it was known that this Commission would be succeeded eventually by the High Commission, the offices were transferred later to the *Oberpräsidium*—the seat of government of the Rhine Province—a building much larger and more suitable in all respects. The *Oberpräsident* was thus compelled to find offices elsewhere in the city.

Under the charter authorizing this Commission to coordinate the administration of economic, industrial and food questions in the several areas, it made a study of all laws and regulations bearing on these matters, whether promulgated by German or Prussian

authority, and signified its approval or disapproval in each case. The announcements of the decisions were communicated directly by the commission to the Army Commanders who took the necessary steps to apprise the civil officials of the changes made for their guidance. The larger part of the new German laws related to taxes and they were almost without exception approved by the Commission. The dyestuff industry, one of the most important in Germany, had been so hedged about by regulations of the Supreme Economic Council, and subsequently by the Peace Treaty, that many problems pertaining to it were constantly referred to the Interallied Commission for solution. A sub-committee dealing solely with that industry had to be established. As there were no dye factories in the American area, our army was not directly concerned with these questions at that time. Some of the decisions follow:

On December nineteenth, the Commission promulgated a decision to the effect that Allied banks which had been established in Germany should not be subject to civil judicial tribunals for violating the German laws of fiscal evasion, provided the transactions had been made with the consent of the military authorities. That decision also did not affect the American Army, because at that time there were no such banks in our area.

A decision of October twenty-eighth, however, concerned the American Army primarily. The United States had been disposing of its excess of war material, due to reduction of forces, since the middle of March, 1919. The Army Commander had forbidden the German government to levy customs and other duties



American Headquarters at Coblenz

on this material when sold to civilians, whether Germans or other nationals. The decision in question ruled that German purchasers should pay the regular duties, thereby revoking army orders. However, as the larger quantity of the army's surplus stores had been sold before the decision was made, it did not have the importance it would have had if made a few months earlier. As it could not be retroactive, it was not contested.

Probably the most important decision of the Commission was that of November fifteenth, which authorized the German customs officials to resume their duties on the western frontier. Although the United States and England had never raised any objection to Germany's continuance in collecting customs duties along its western frontier, the French and Belgian military commanders had taken a different attitude, thereby creating the notorious "Hole in the West," through which the merchandise of Europe, particularly of France and Belgium, flowed duty free into the interior of Germany. At the same time Germany was being stripped of merchandise purchased with the depreciated mark, without receiving any export duties. The decision of the Commission was, therefore, greeted by all civil officials with expressions of satisfaction. It was undoubtedly an act of justice and wisdom in the interest of the Allies as well as those of Germany. The losses at this frontier were diminishing Germany's capacity to pay claims for reparation.

The Rhineland Commission also served to communicate the decisions of the Supreme Council at Paris to the armies. The agreement of the Allies to

permit Germany to levy customs on a gold basis was transmitted to the armies January 8, 1920. This was also a useful measure, tending to bolster up German finances which were falling into a most serious disorder.

One of the most important decisions of the many published concerning foodstuffs by this Commission, was promulgated November thirteenth. It forbade the transportation of foods by foreign merchants—particularly Belgian, French and Dutch—purchased in the depreciated currency. The shortage of food in Germany, made this a matter of grave concern. German civil officials were instructed to carry out this decision under penalty of dismissal; furthermore, they were assured the full cooperation of Allied forces. An instruction of this Commission, dated November twenty-fifth, laid down a set of rules to guide the armies in their requisitions and purchases of foodstuffs, but as the customs and policies in the different countries were so dissimilar, this was not entirely successful. The dissolution of the Interallied Coal Commission October twelfth, put additional work on the Rhineland Commission, necessitating a special committee for that commodity. A month later, however, the Supreme Council turned back the responsibility for coal production and distribution to the German government.

Perhaps the most important work of the Rhineland Commission was in the drafting of a code of laws—ordinances—for promulgation by the High Commission which was to be called into existence as soon as the Peace Treaty was signed. In this work the American Commissioner kept constantly in touch with the

Army Commander, hearing his views and determining his own policy in many cases by the experience of the army.

It is not generally known that the conception of governing the Rhineland by a high civil commission originated in American minds. President Wilson's proposal to that effect was based on a letter of Mr. Noyes, American member of the Interallied Rhineland Commission, which embodied definite recommendations. The principles formulated therein were presented by the President and approved by the Council of Four, the Big Four. The plan as outlined in the letter was then referred to a sub-commission, which drew up the Rhineland Agreement. The letter in question was written at Coblenz by Mr. Noyes, who held and presented the views of a large number of officers of the American Army who for some months had been following closely events in the Rhineland—especially, Colonel I. L. Hunt, at the time Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. Doctor Dorten's efforts in attempting to foment revolution in the occupied territories had considerable influence in causing the drafting of this letter and yet more in determining the future policy there.

The Commanding General of the Tenth French Army on May twenty-first had approached General Liggett, asking for American assistance in promoting a Rhine Republic, whereas Mr. Noyes' letter was sent to the President a few days later, May twenty-seventh. Dorten's conception, backed by the French military party, envisaged something more than a Rhenish state within the German empire. President Wilson having disapproved the French proposal at Paris of

making the Rhine the political frontier, the army was bound to respect the status quo in occupied territories in accordance with its instructions as well as with the terms of the Armistice. American and British views were so radically opposed to any scheme involving a forcible separation of the Rhine Province from Germany, that a very critical situation might develop if a supreme organization were not created in which the Allies could exchange views and take action as a unit. It was not known at this time that the United States would not sign the Treaty and likewise would not participate in such a Commission as an equal.

There seemed to be two possible forms which such a supreme authority might assume: an Interallied Military Commission, in which the armies stood on an even footing, or a civil body in which the governments were equally represented. After a thorough discussion of the matter with American officers, Mr. Noyes decided to recommend the latter as his solution of the problem. His reasons are outlined in the following letter to the President:

“American Commission
to Negotiate Peace.

“Paris, May 27, 1919.

“To the Honorable Woodrow Wilson,
President of the United States of America,
11 Place des Etats-Unis, Paris.

“Dear Sir:

“After a month spent in the Rhineland as American Commissioner, I feel there is danger that a disastrous mistake will be made. The ‘convention’ for the government of these territories, as drafted by the military representatives of the Supreme War Council on May eleventh, is more brutal, I believe, than even its

authors desire upon second thought. It provides for unendurable oppression of six million people during a period of years.

“This ‘convention’ is not liable to be adopted without great modification. What alarms me, however, is that none of the revisions of this document which I have seen, recognize that its basic principle is bad—that the quartering of any enemy army in a country as its master in time of peace and the billeting of troops on the civil population will insure hatred and ultimate disaster.

“I have discussed this matter at length with the American Commanders of the Army of Occupation; men who have seen military occupation at short range for six months. These officers emphatically endorse the above statements. They say that an occupying army, even one with the best intentions, is guilty of outrages and that mutual irritation, in spite of every effort to the contrary, grows apace. Force and more force must inevitably be the history of such occupation long continued.

“Forgetting the apparent ambitions of the French and possibly overlooking political limitations, I have sketched below a plan which seems to me the maximum for military domination in the Rhineland after the signing of peace. Our army commanders and others who have studied the subject on the ground agree with this program:

SKELETON PLAN

“1. As few troops as possible, concentrated in barracks or reserve areas, with no billeting, excepting possibly for officers;

“2. Complete self-government for the territory with the exception below;

“3. A Civil Commission with powers:

“a. To make regulations or change old ones,

whenever German law or actions threaten the carrying out of treaty terms, or threaten the comfort or security of troops.

“b. To authorize the army to take control under martial law, either in danger spots or throughout the territory, whenever conditions seem to the commission to make this necessary.

“Very truly yours,

“Pierrepont B. Noyes,

“American Delegate Interallied Rhineland Commission.”

Evidently the desire to make the burden of military occupation as light as possible was uppermost in the mind of Mr. Noyes and his military advisers. There was still another reason not mentioned in the letter. The economic condition of Germany, although at the time of writing no worse than it had been during the winter, showed no sign of improvement. More important than Germany's losses of territory, which the negotiations at Versailles foreshadowed, were the restrictions which it was believed would be placed on both the finances and industry of the land. As the Rhineland is one of the most important parts of Prussia, both as to wealth and population, its economic restoration along with the rest of the *Reich*, was essential if the war obligations were to be met.

There are two distinct conceptions of the purposes of an occupation: to compel compliance with war decisions and inflict penalty on the population, or simply to compel compliance with war decisions. The policy of the United States has been founded always upon the latter and our practise was clearly set forth in orders as early as 1863: “As military government is carried out by military force, it is incumbent upon those who

administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice and humanity—virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.”

The deliberations of the Committee of the Peace Conference to which Mr. Noyes' proposition, approved by the Council of Four, was referred are set forth at some length in the French White Book. This Committee evolved the Rhineland Agreement, the Magna Charta of the High Commission, which was signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, by the representatives of America, Great Britain, France, Belgium and of Germany. Under it the Interallied Rhineland Commission was supplanted by the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, whose operations are recorded later.

CHAPTER VIII

COMPARISON OF MILITARY GOVERNMENTS

DURING the period of our military administration in Germany, advantage was taken of the courteous privilege of the Allied Army Commanders to study the systems developed by them to meet the problems confronting their armies in the matter of military government. It was not possible for any of the armies concerned to have a fully organized plan that did not require some evolution. The conclusions drawn from this comparative study are interesting as showing the different methods followed in reaching similar objectives.

It must be constantly borne in mind that under the terms of the Armistice all the Allied commands were required to exercise their authority through regularly appointed or elected German officials. Naturally they were not required under the general rules of international law to retain a hostile or inefficient official in office. All the armies fully exercised the right to discharge their duties to the satisfaction of the Allied authorities. The German bureaucracy was a carefully selected, trained body of officials with reasonable prospects of life tenure of office, and in consequence supervision of their work was a far simpler matter than actual government by Allied officials would have

been. That, however, is not intended to suggest that an army occupying an enemy country should not have a thorough organization for military government.

The American occupied territory lay between the British and French Zones and therefore we had greater opportunity of becoming familiar with their methods than with those of the Belgians whose territory at no time touched ours. The British, with large experience in colonial administration, realized more fully than either the French or ourselves the necessity of assigning an ample number of trained staff officers to this duty. We had had for fifteen years a certain sort of general staff system, but we were compelled to learn general staff principles as applied to operations after the war began. As we had largely adopted the French general staff system, it could have been expected that we would now follow that country in developing our staff system for military government. On the contrary, we gradually approached the British methods without, however, appreciating as fully as they did the necessity for having such a complete organization as would meet the many intricate problems of occupation—problems which until recently found no place in our military schools.

Our gradual development tending toward the adoption of the British system was, in a large measure, the result of common thought inherent in the two armies as a result of a long period of common history in the evolution of principles of government. This community of thought was even more notable later in discussing matters of importance before the High Commission. It was most noticeable in the administration of justice, since both were familiar with the

general principles of criminal law originating in common law—principles differing greatly from the civil law in respect to the rights of the accused. The lack of trained officials for civil duty led our provost courts to follow the lines of military discipline and to assess penalties disproportionate to the offenses.

In making this comparative study, we begin with the Tenth French Army, our neighbor on the right. A special section of the General Staff, called the Bureau of Civil Affairs, was created and charged with practically all the matters of military government. It was realized that to parcel them out among the various General Staff sections and services would be a handicap to purely military efficiency of the entire staff. There was also no assurance that the officers who had been selected with other objects in mind would possess special aptitude for this class of work. In the present enlightened stage of international public opinion, no army can afford to ignore this phase of staff organization. The Chief of the Bureau of Civil Affairs, being a member of the General Staff, met in daily conference with the Chiefs of the other sections, thus insuring harmonious action in a common policy.

The original zone of occupation of this Tenth French Army embraced four different *Bezirks*—political entities: that of Wiesbaden in the province of Hesse-Nassau, that of the Rhenish province of Hesse, and a portion each of that of Coblenz and Treves in the Rhine Province. For each of these political subdivisions a superior administrator was appointed, with offices respectively at Wiesbaden, Mayence, Kreuznach and Saarbrücken. These administrators served under the Chief of Bureau of Civil Affairs. Each *Kreis* had

an administrator who served under the *Bezirk* administrator. At the same time liaison officers were placed with the presidents of the Coblenz and Treves *Bezirks*, who served also as liaison officers with the American Headquarters in those cities.

All these French officials met at Mayence one day per week for a conference with the Commanding General. Orders within the occupied territory concerning purely civil matters were issued by the civil administrators; those concerning purely military subjects by division or other commanders. In case of conflict of policy, the matter was referred to the army commander.

This differed from the British system, whereby all civil officers serve on the staff of the military commander. The French system has the great merit of territorial rather than tactical organization, thereby permitting any reassignment of troops without disturbing the civil administration.

The Bureau of Civil Affairs comprised the following sections: 1. Control of German administration; 2. Organization and officials; 3. Civilian food supply; 4. Economic matters; 5. Miscellaneous, including press and propaganda, French performances in local theaters, etc.

Embraced in the foregoing duties of the French civil affairs organization are many matters for which no provision was ever made in the American Zone. The economic section concerned itself with stimulating trade in Germany which was considered a matter of much importance to France, but scarcely seemed germane to a holding force. None of the duties of the miscellaneous section had a counterpart with us, as we

indulged in no propaganda whether by papers or theatrical performances. In particular we never interfered with German budgets and had no organization to look after such matters, whereas the French supervised them minutely.

The following matters were assigned by the French to staff sections: 1. Sanitation and public health. As this involved a large number of German officials, it was put under a medical officer serving with the civil administration. 2. Public works and public utilities. The French assigned this work to the army engineers. With us the chief engineer of the army handled it. Probably it would have been better for us to have assigned an engineer officer to civil duty to supervise these activities. 3. Elections. The policy regarding these in the French Army was centered in the civil bureau, but the intelligence section of the army furnished secret data when required. At first our intelligence section supervised these matters, but later such supervision as was undertaken was made by the office of civil affairs. 4. Circulation. That of private individuals in the French Zone was controlled by the intelligence section; that of public officials by the bureau of civil affairs. With us it was controlled by the intelligence section under instructions in the early stages from the Advanced Headquarters. Our restrictions were made greater than necessary as a concession to a common policy. 5. Censorship. In the French Army this was entirely controlled by the intelligence section of the General Staff. With us the same was true.

The strong features of the French organization are: Recognition of the army commander as the head

of both military and civil administration, the creation of a special section of the General Staff to handle civil matters, and the organization of civil administration on territorial lines. The failure, however, to assign these civil administrators to the staffs of the respective military commanders presented unusual opportunity for friction.

The Second British Army had its Headquarters at Cologne about the same distance north of Coblenz as was the Headquarters of the Tenth French Army at Mayence, south of us. Perhaps because of their greater experience, the British put an organization into effect in the beginning which more nearly embraced all the fundamental principles of military government than did any other army. The spirit of British institutions lends itself easily to the adaptation of new methods to new situations. Their unwritten constitution encourages a certain flexibility of mind.

The first principle applied by the British Army was that the army commander was the supreme authority. Army Headquarters did not attempt to interfere in the administration of military government, concerning itself with the larger questions of policy emanating from Marshal Foch's Headquarters. The British seem to make an error in designating their chief civil administrator as military governor. While this title may not cause any confusion in the British minds, it certainly did in the minds of the Germans who looked upon the military governor as the supreme local authority. If there was any confusion as to divided authority it was quickly removed, because their rather loosely joined staff organization was fully imbued with the spirit of cooperation.

The second principle applied was the creation of a special section of the General Staff to meet the new conditions following active operations. The normal British General Staff comprises the following sections: training, intelligence, operations, supply and transportation, and administration. In practice the chief of staff ordinarily controls all staff departments. All these sections were primarily intended for operations, and consequently it was necessary to add a new one for civil affairs.

The third principle established was that the area commandants controlled absolutely the civil administration in their respective areas. In this they differed from the French. The principle that subordinate commanders should have a trained civil staff, thus freeing the military commander and his staff of civil administration, was carried out down to the lowest units—to the town commandant, or town major, who became the supervisor of the local burgomaster.

The fourth principle involved was that army commands were made coextensive with political subdivisions. In a way that subordinated the responsibilities of the operations section to civil administration. A better solution perhaps would have been to assign civil administrators to political divisions and make them automatically members of the staffs of the military commanders occupying the political divisions.


Army staff organizations closely connected with economic matters were very helpful to British trade. A bureau of information for business men where German exporting and importing houses could get in touch with those of other countries was maintained in the office of the Military Governor, the chief civil ad-

ministrator. Its facilities were courteously extended to all Allied citizens. Cologne, the largest industrial city in occupied territories, was the logical center for such information. The British military government, as stated, possessed more of the essentially fundamental principles than any other: centralization of authority, special staff section for civil affairs, assignment of staff officers of this section to subordinate military commanders, and control through political subdivisions. The title of Military Governor is undoubtedly misleading, but the dignity with which this official surrounded himself impressed itself on German officials. The fairness and liberality with which the population was treated did much to bring about amicable relations. Considering the bitterness of feeling between the two countries during the war, this was a notable achievement and demonstrated the wisdom of the philosophy of the magnanimity of the victor.

The Rhine Province north of Cologne, along with Westphalia adjoining it, is the industrial center of modern Germany. For some reason, which the Belgians consider an oversight, their army had no bridgehead on the right bank of the Rhine—all their troops being on the left bank. This thickly populated industrial center was difficult to control, on account of the prevailing labor unrest. The Headquarters of the Belgian Army was at Aix-la-Chapelle which was also Headquarters of the Thirty-third French Corps, with which Marshal Foch saw fit to reinforce the Belgian forces. As in the French Zone, there was no confusion as to who was the real head of the military government. The Belgians applied the first principle of having one supreme head, the military commander.

In the Belgian Army, the first section of the General Staff controls operations; the second, intelligence; the third, personnel, and the fourth, transportation and supply. In order to provide for the necessities of military government they added three more: administrative control, military justice, and economy. The first of these three comprised the real directing spirit of their civil administration, and its head acted directly under the chief of staff, just as did the first four sections named. While the addition of one section for civil affairs is fundamentally necessary, it would seem that it could have included the other two and have performed all the duties required by a military government.

The Belgian Zone comprised parts of two *Bezirks*: Aix-la-Chapelle and Düsseldorf. Each of these became an administrative district, the French corps commander at the former place, the Belgian commander of the Düsseldorf *Bezirk* being at Crefeld. On the staff of each was a chief comptroller who was the head of civil administration. Likewise on the staff of cavalry and infantry divisions there was a comptroller to handle civil matters. A civil administrator was also assigned to each *Kreis*. The Belgians thus followed the German territorial organization in supervising the work of civil administration. By attempting control through tactical organizations, they found that their corps areas fitted into the German organization better than did their divisional areas, thus emphasizing the importance of keeping the civil administration independent of tactical requirements. Conferences on civil affairs were held periodically as in the French and American Zones.



Special phases of the military government were assigned the General Staff sections as follows: Circulation, censorship and police matters to the second, requisitions to the third, and civilian food supply to the fourth. As might be supposed, Belgian methods of military government would follow closely French methods. These two peoples have in part a common language, and in a large measure common institutions, particularly in jurisprudence. A similar parallel exists to that between the English and American systems, previously stated.

A word concerning the German system as applied in Belgium is useful in this comparative study. The talent of the Germans for organization is shown by the fact that they adopted practically all of the principles heretofore shown, or at least indicated, as requisite to a correct form of military government in their occupation of Belgium.

The Governor-General was a military officer, but he had trained civil administrators from the German bureaucracy. These men were specially selected and had a knowledge of French—even down to the lowest grades. The Belgians were the only allied forces which created civilian administrators, giving them military authority, without military rank. The German government in Belgium was territorially organized, its jurisdiction extending to the provinces of Luxemburg, Limburg, Liège, Namur, Brabant, Hainaut and East Flanders. Each of these provinces was governed by a lieutenant-general assisted by a civil president of the grade of *Landrät* or *Regierungsrat*. The arrondissements were governed by major-generals or colonels assisted by a civil commissioner of the

grade of *Regierungsassessor*. This system was general except in the zone of the line of communications, directly behind the fighting troops; but even here the communications inspector had a trained official with him to handle civil affairs. Control of the population between the zones of operations and the bases in Germany involved disorders and the display of the mailed fist. The stories of barbarities inflicted in Belgium are as generally believed by the Allies as they are generally denied by the Germans.

In summing up, it can well be said: that there should be an undivided and centralized control—not such as we had when the Advanced General Headquarters at Treves was charged with civil affairs; the officer in charge of civil affairs should be a staff officer coordinate in rank with the chiefs of sections of the General Staff; all senior military commanders should have the corresponding civil administrators attached to their staffs; civil administrators should be selected by reason of special qualifications; and civil administration should correspond with the the political subdivisions of the country.

CHAPTER IX

CONTROL OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND PRIVATE INDUSTRIES

Two distinct methods of administration were available for the American authorities, either by direct control or by use of the German civil officials who were already in charge of them. The second was chosen because of the advantages of economizing in military personnel, and of the facilities and benefits to be derived from the established organization. Operating responsibility was thus placed on officials accountable to their own government and obligated to the welfare of their own people. Directors of public utilities were informed that they would be held responsible for the efficient operations of their plants; but that they would be given responsible aid by the army in procuring coal, oil and other necessities, as well as in adjusting difficulties which might arise from the extra burden placed on their plants. Coblenz' normal population of sixty thousand was increased by the occupation to eighty thousand.

In general, title to public utilities is vested in the city or town in which the plants operate, but in several cases, notably in respect to the electric light and power, private corporations served the communities. This was the case with the power company supplying Coblenz with gas. An early survey made of the public

utility plants in the American area showed them to be in a deplorable condition. All repairs that could possibly be avoided were put off during the war and now they were called upon to supply not only their normal requirements, but also those of the occupying forces. It was at once decided that the troops and all industries essential to them should be given precedence in service and supply.

The gas of Coblenz came from its own eighteen retorts at the junction of the Moselle and the Rhine and from the Concordia smelting works, at Bendorf. Nearly one-fourth of the entire gas consumption of the city was used at the water-works. The survey above mentioned also showed that the diminished production of coal reparations would seriously interfere with the gas supply. On account of friction between the Concordia plant and German coal agencies, our gas supply was threatened. Decisive action remedied this situation, and in general it could be said that the work of the officials at the gas plants was remarkably satisfactory.

The water-works of Coblenz are on an island of the Rhine just above the city. It might be supposed that the water in those island wells comes from the river, but that is not the case, as the river bed has an impervious layer not far below the ground line. The pumping plant of the three pump houses, without storage facilities, soon proved inadequate to meet the increased demands and steps had to be taken to augment the output. Moreover, it developed that the American troops occupying the barracks consumed from one hundred to one thousand per cent. more water than the German soldiers who had preceded them. The extreme high water in December and January,

1919-20, surpassing all records for more than a century, caused a partial interruption of the water service. A few inches higher would have completely crippled all the pumps.

More difficulty was experienced in the administration of power and light than in any other branch of public utilities; first, because the street railway was privately owned, and secondly because the power plant at Höhn was in the neutral zone, making direct intervention impossible. The entire electrical apparatus connected with this power and light was in such a condition that repairs were continually demanded. The occupation of Coblenz by troops and the numerous personnel of the High Commission necessitated many extra installations. The miners at Höhn, for reasons that seemed just, were on the eve of a strike. The American authorities intervened successfully in this matter, but not until it was made known that the American bridgehead would be extended if necessary to include Höhn and all its plants.

Although the coal supply for Alsace-Lorraine, the Rhine Province and the Palatinate was supervised by the Interallied Coal Commission sitting at Cologne, the American supply was secured through the German industrial board at Coblenz. The strike in the Ruhr district in March and April, 1919, was not felt in the American Zone for a couple of months, but then it became difficult to obtain sufficient coal in the usual way to meet our requirements. During the floods of the Rhine, in the Spartacist uprising in the Ruhr in 1920, and subsequently at rare intervals, it became necessary to requisition coal in Rhine barges intended for unoccupied Germany. Such were the demands of the

Allies for coal and so unsettled were industrial conditions of all kinds in Germany that the German authorities were unable to supply all the demands of the occupying forces and public utilities, to say nothing of industries and households. It was necessary at one time to secure coal from England and the United States and also to use brown coal briquettes and coke from German sources as substitutes.

The chaotic state of industry following four years of war was aggravated by the demobilization of the army, releasing hundreds of thousands of men who thronged the cities looking for work. The resulting difficulties were increased by the surrender of the five thousand engines and one hundred and fifty thousand railway cars, thus adding to the paralysis of transportation; and still further by the blockade that was painfully near bringing on both starvation and Bolshevism. The removal of the blockade was the result of an agreement wherein each of the Allies was to exert itself to induce Germany to sign the Treaty of Peace. Germany finally yielded. It was noted, however, that during the occupation the blockade was constantly lessened. The Allies realized that it was too absolute and drastic and might drive the Germans into Bolshevism, and their industries into utter bankruptcy. In either case, reparations would have been sacrificed and the economic restoration of Europe delayed for an indefinite period. The blockade was formally lifted July 12, 1920.

To meet the horrible conditions of the unemployed, due to the industrial depression, the high cost of living, and the lure of Bolshevism with its promises of wealth and a social millennium, thousands of men were

set to work on roads by the four Armies of Occupation. The strong hand of the Allies held the hungry men in the occupied territories, dazed with the changed order of things, to the paths of duty, but in the unoccupied territory it was entirely different. Strikes were inevitable, and only tact, with a judicious display of force combined with a forbearance on the part of employers and laborers, prevented a complete standstill of industries even in the occupied territories. Solely industrial strikes were of less concern to the armies than those among workmen employed by the several authorities or in public utilities; yet it was obviously to the interests of the Allies to prevent all disorders, regardless of the source. Even in purely industrial strikes, we adopted a strictly military policy. There should be no labor agitation in conjunction with any strike, under penalty of arrest and trial of the leaders; and strikers must find employment elsewhere if the strikes were not promptly settled, under penalty of deportation from the American area.

It was well known that the ever-increasing cost of living was beyond the rate of pay obtained by the average workman. The American authorities therefore let it be known that they were interested in strikes, but would interfere only when their own interests were directly concerned. Any other attitude would have placed the Americans in the position of being forced to settle all strikes, which the many involved difficulties and complexities clearly forbade. Had strikes been wholly forbidden, unscrupulous and short-sighted employers might have held wages below a living minimum, and discontent would have grown on all sides. On the other hand, had we not taken some

action the workers would have made unreasonable demands, also resulting in disorder and violence.

The policy of confining labor troubles to disputes was early adopted. Orders were accordingly issued directing all land counselors and burgomasters to notify their respective American officers in charge of civil affairs whenever a strike appeared imminent. Both sides were then summoned to appear at the office of Civil Affairs, where a calm statement of both parties was heard. The position of the United States was clearly stated and reasons given why American authorities did not arbitrate. It was explained that it was far better to have the matter amicably settled by themselves rather than by a stranger, almost certainly an untrained one. One conference of this sort was generally sufficient, particularly as the Civil Affairs official subsequently visited the plant or institution to show his continued interest.

In March, 1919, the Army Commander issued a proclamation whereby all German laborers, employed by American authorities under requisition or otherwise, were forbidden jointly or in conspiracy to plan, attempt or carry out any scheme to strike or abandon work. In spite of this, the stevedores engaged in unloading our supplies at the ports of Andernach and Bendorf left their work simultaneously. The prominent strikers at the former place were arrested, tried and sentenced; while at the latter, all returned to work before action was taken. The Andernach strikers served their sentences without pay, doing the very same work for which they had been previously paid. Work for the American authorities became subsequently a highly prized occupation, particularly when a ration was furnished.

In the case of strikes in public utilities, such as light and water-works and quarries furnishing stone for the United States engineers, matters were handled more forcefully as stated than in purely industrial plants. The order prohibiting such strikes had to be amended for the very simple reason that the wages of employees in the public utilities were not being changed to meet the continually increasing cost of living as was done in the private institutions. Frequent requests from workmen in public utilities were made to the American authorities for permission to strike. Eventually a policy was adopted for labor troubles in those places which was almost identical with that used in the purely commercial strikes.

From the earliest days of occupation, the American authorities were reluctant to requisition labor. Indeed as early as December, 1918, a memorandum stated that local commanders were not authorized to requisition labor without the approval of the higher authority, except in cases requiring immediate action. The higher authority was interpreted as the first sections of the staffs of division, corps and army commanders. Roadwork was carried on for a long time by voluntary German labor, but later it became necessary to make requisition on local officials for such labor.

With the departure of the American Expeditionary Forces from France it was at first intended to have the Commanding General on the Rhine become the Commander-in-Chief of all American military elements in Europe. The French ports were to be given up, and Rotterdam and Antwerp became the bases of our Rhine Forces. This change demanded the employment of many stevedores to discharge the Rhine barges

carrying up our supplies. The condition of the roads which had greatly deteriorated under the strain of our heavy trucks also required many laborers. As a general policy, soldiers were not to be employed on work which would tend to belittle their dignity or lower their status in the eyes of the German population. This would apply in particular to the construction and maintenance of roads also utilized by the inhabitants. Again it was necessary to requisition labor.

In the early stages the American authorities paid no attention to the German law, requiring old age and disability insurance, thus permitting many policies to lapse. This impolitic act was righted. Not only must the German working man pay the premiums on both kinds of insurance, under penalty of a fine, but the employer, also under a like penalty, must pay a prescribed premium on the insurance of each of his employees.

The importance of railways to the occupying forces was of nearly equal value to that of the public utilities mentioned above. All in all, the supervised German railway administration had been very satisfactory to the American authorities. Strikes and interruptions of whatever character had been very few. It was not until August, 1920, that there was any serious concern of this nature. At this time, the French authorities supported by the Reparations Commission, sitting at Paris, insisted that railways charged with reparations traffic, particularly coal from the Ruhr Basin, should be put under the direct control of the Bureau of Communications and Supplies at Wiesbaden.

At a meeting of the High Commission, August, 1920, the French High Commissioner submitted a re-

quest for such a transfer. The other members were unanimous in their opinion that the Rhineland Agreement gave to the military authorities control over railways only for military purposes and that the High Commission had authority to issue ordinances only insofar as might be necessary for securing the maintenance, safety and requirements of the Allied and Associated Forces. The High Commission therefore decided that under the Agreement reparations traffic could not be controlled by the military authorities and that the commission itself had no power to authorize such an exercise.

Nevertheless, the French High Commissioner continued to urge in vain that the request of the Reparations Commission should be met. He proposed that the respective governments should be requested to negotiate an extension of the Rhineland Agreement that would authorize this control. In this he was also unsuccessful.

CHAPTER X

A FARTHER ADVANCE INTO GERMANY

IN THE immediate months following the Armistice, there seemed no possibility of a recurrence of hostilities. The Spartacist situation was regarded by the former exponents of Pan-Germanism as more dangerous than the occupation of the entire country by the Allies would be. Influential Berlin papers were begging that foreign troops garrison the larger cities in order to end, once for all, the anarchy that was threatening to render the economic recovery of the country possible. The government besought the Allies to present the terms of peace at once, that the industrial life of the nation could be resumed. German demobilization was proceeding rapidly and the possibility of resumption of the war was not seriously entertained in Berlin or Paris.

By June, 1919, the situation had changed so considerably that renewal of the war appeared as a distinct possibility. For several weeks following the presentation of the peace terms at Versailles, the question of peace or war appeared to hang in the balance. The voice of the old war party was heard again in Berlin, the mailed fist reappeared after not having been seen since November, 1918, and the streets once more resounded to the tread of disciplined troops.

In January, 1919, the country was enmeshed in workmen's councils. The people were suffering from want of food and all classes hoped and looked forward to a speedy peace. The feeble government to all appearances was growing weaker day by day. Much had occurred between January and June. Order had been reestablished, the national elections had been held and the dominant position of the Majority Socialists was confirmed by these results. The solidarity of all the conservative elements behind the Ebert government brought about the reestablishment of an organized military force. In November and December, 1918, old army units had either completely disintegrated or had become so thoroughly impregnated with radical ideals as to be a source of danger rather than strength to the government. But all this was changed.

Complete and striking as this change in public feeling was, it came as no surprise to the armies on the Rhine. Their intelligence staffs had carefully followed the current of German politics, minutely scrutinizing the reorganization of the army and the renewed influence of the junker elements in national affairs. As early as April it was felt that Germany's signature to the peace treaty, the discussions of which had given an insight into its nature, might not be so easily secured as had been supposed in January. Coincident with this knowledge of the drastic terms of the Treaty, a return of the old feeling of national dignity was noted. An important factor in raising the morale of the people was the lifting of the blockade by the Allies. Berlin was equally aware with Paris and London, that Allied public opinion was no longer disposed to further warfare. Those German politicians who talked of

plunging their country into inevitable disaster counted upon the appearance of Bolshevism in France and England to prevent those countries from using their full strength abroad. The new regular army, the *Reichswehr*, was created from bands of volunteers, enlisted independently by energetic officers of the old army. When their value was proved by the Berlin riots in January, they were recognized by the government. These volunteer bands were thoroughly organized under Herr Noske, the new War Minister, and comprised by June the imposing number of four hundred thousand.

Though certain elements in the German State did advocate last resistance, other and more numerous groups were insistent upon acceding to whatever terms were to be imposed. To Germany as a whole it should have been apparent that her loss of munitions and railway material under the Armistice precluded the possibility of a defensive struggle, much less of driving the Allies from German soil. The wiser thoughts which prevailed assumed that signs of discontent in the enemy states would prove illusive in the future, as in the past. However fatal signing the terms might be, it was realized that to force an issue in June, 1919, would be to incur the destruction of Germany. When reply was made by Secretary Dutasta of the Peace Conference June sixteenth to the German counter-proposals, presented by Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, five days were given Germany to signify her willingness to sign the Treaty. This reply also warned Germany that in case of refusal, hostilities would be resumed at once.

Evidence of an approaching crisis in Weimar ap-

peared almost immediately, and simultaneously a decline in the chauvinistic spirit of the Assembly was noted, in striking contrast with the earlier spirit of resistance. Nevertheless, the preparations of the Armies of the Rhine to advance and occupy other German territory were in nowise abated, and by June 20, 1919, all was in complete readiness for the move.

At this time the Third Army had been materially reduced by sending the National Army divisions and National Guard divisions back to the United States for muster out, leaving practically only the regular divisions to make the advance and at the same time hold the territory already occupied. On the Left Bank the 3rd Division was billeted around Mayen, while the 4th was farther down the Rhine in *Kreis Ahrweiler*. On the Right Bank, the 1st and 2nd Divisions garrisoned the American section of the bridgehead, while the *Kreises* of Coblenz were held by units of army troops.

The advance would be made on the assumption that Germany would sign the Treaty if a sufficient show of force were made by the Allies. The forward movement was to be carried out simultaneously by each of the Allied Armies under the general instructions of Marshal Foch. The American Army was to advance in a northeasterly direction in conjunction with the French Tenth Army on its right and the British Army on its left. The right of our army was to follow a line marked by the towns of Oberlahnstein, Limburg and Lauterbach. The left boundary of our zone was to be marked by the line of Linz, Siegen and Brillon. The head of our advance was to be made by the Third Corps, composed then of the 1st and 2nd Divisions. The 3rd Division, which till now had belonged to this

Corps, was assigned to duty in the rear. As we had no cavalry available at this time, the French put their 2nd Cavalry Division at our disposal to close the gap on the left, between our forces and the British. As the Third Corps advanced to its objectives, the 3rd Division would follow and garrison the territory back to the Rhine; the 4th Division would occupy both sides of the Rhine, garrisoning industrial towns and guarding railways and bridgeheads; while Army Headquarters would remain at Coblenz. In general the zones allotted the Allied Armies were based on strategic rather than political considerations.

It is interesting to note in connection with the proposed advance, that the American Army was planning a return visit to the home of the Hessian mercenaries of American Revolutionary fame. These troops had been raised in the vicinity of Cassel, contingents coming from Giessen and Marburg. After one hundred and fifty years, our troops were to carry the war into the heart of the very country which in 1776 had lent itself, according to the practise of that period, to further the cause of an alien king. As early as June eleventh, it was learned that the German authorities were pulling back their war material from the territory adjacent to the Allied outposts. On June seventeenth, the intelligence section announced that the great training camp of Sennelager in Westphalia was being evacuated and that its war material was being moved back one hundred and fifty kilometers from the Rhine. It therefore seemed clear that serious resistance would not be offered short of the Elbe line. A copy of the proclamation of the *Oberpräsident* of Hesse-Cassel to the people of his province, obtained June twelfth, gave

instruction for all officials to remain at their posts and for the population peacefully to accept the awaited occupation. That was reassuring as to what was anticipated.

A proclamation had been prepared and issued by Marshal Foch for the population and an order to facilitate the work of the armies. In the interest of the civil population a lengthy New Instructions to Troops was drawn up by the Commanding General, Third Army. Furthermore, it was intended that the *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province should warn the population that existing orders and regulations remained in force. On June twenty-second the Cabinet headed by Scheidemann, which had taken a strong stand against signing the peace terms, was deposed by the National Assembly at Weimar. That action signified that Germany would accept the inevitable. On June twenty-third the Peace Conference at Paris was officially notified that Germany was ready to sign, and on the same date the armies revoked all orders which had been issued to govern the proposed advance. The American divisions which had moved forward to the demarcation line of the bridgehead were withdrawn to their former billeting areas and control of civil affairs reverted to its former status. The actual ceremony of signing the Treaty took place at Versailles June twenty-eighth.

CHAPTER XI

UNDER THE RHINELAND AGREEMENT

THE period of supreme authority of the Allied Armies in the Rhineland virtually came to a close January 10, 1920, with the declaration of peace between the Allied powers and Germany. In the final acts which put the Treaty into effect, America was not represented, the United States Senate not having ratified the Treaty. Although in a legal sense the Commanding General of the American Forces in Germany still continued to retain the powers vested in him by the Armistice, he deemed it advisable in the interests of unity among the Allies to put the ordinances of the High Commission, created by the Rhineland Agreement, into effect in the American Zone. This arrangement seemed the only way out of the difficult situation caused by the declaration of peace. The Allied governments, through their representatives on the Council of Ambassadors at Paris, had taken the position that the High Commission must be recognized in all its powers everywhere throughout occupied Rhineland. This view-point was not held by the American General or, as it developed later, by the government at Washington.

The end of a military government is usually an involved and difficult matter, generally coterminous

with the evacuation of the territory held by the occupying forces. The present case was in a measure analogous to that in the Philippines in 1900-01, when the army turned over its control to a civil commission. In both cases our government believed it inadvisable to continue indefinitely a strictly military government.

The Rhineland Agreement set forth in the Appendix was signed at Versailles June 28, 1919. It was a separate and distinct pact from the Treaty, being an agreement between the United States, Great Britain, France and Belgium on the one hand, and Germany, on the other. Under it the Armies of Occupation were to have a totally different status. International law, broadly speaking, places upon a commanding general the preservation of order, punishment of crime, and the protection of life and property within the territorial limits of his command. His power is as great as is his responsibility. A reading of the Armistice clearly shows that each army was to act as the representative of its respective government in the conduct of affairs with which it was charged. Provision was made in the Treaty, Articles 428-431, for the occupation of German territory west of the Rhine during three periods of five, ten and fifteen years, to be continued yet longer in case Treaty terms were not complied with by Germany. The German government agreed to maintain the troops of occupation in the same manner as during the Armistice, Article 249. The Agreement was entered into by the representatives of the five states mentioned, acting under powers conferred upon them by their respective governments and authorized in Article 432 of the Treaty: "All matters relating to the occupation and not provided

for by the present treaty, shall be regulated by subsequent agreements, which Germany hereby undertakes to observe."

Under the provisions of the Agreement, the High Commission was made the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated Powers within occupied territories, except insofar as the Treaty provides otherwise. Specifically the Rhineland Agreement gave the commission power to issue ordinances for the maintenance, safety and requirements of the Allied and Associated Forces. It could, in case necessity arose, suspend the civil administration in the Provinces, *Bezirks* and *Kreises*, and in addition take any other steps necessary to adopt German civil administration to the needs and requirements of military occupation. The Agreement authorized the Commission to declare a state of siege in the whole or in any part of the territory under its jurisdiction. It further provided that the High Commission could negotiate with the German government for its housing, that its cost and expenses should be a charge against Germany, that its personnel would be exempt from German direct taxes and that its members would have diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Nevertheless, the military authorities were empowered when public order was disturbed or threatened to take such temporary measures as might be necessary to put down insurrection or to restore order, to requisition in kind, and to demand services in the manner laid down in the Hague Convention of 1907. They were to retain exclusive jurisdiction over the members of their respective forces and persons accompanying them. Individuals who committed offenses

against the persons or property of the armed forces of the Allied or Associated Powers were made amenable to military jurisdiction.

When the Rhineland Agreement was drawn up in Paris, the eventuality of non-ratification of the Treaty by any one of the belligerent powers had not been foreseen. France, England, Italy and Belgium ratified the Treaty within a reasonable time, but desiring American cooperation, particularly in the plebiscite areas and on commissions, they put off a formal declaration of peace from week to week. In the latter part of December, when the divergence of opinion in the United States Senate became so great that early ratification became improbable, the Allies decided to put the Treaty and Agreement into effect without further delay. The Allies accordingly signed the Treaty, which was supposed to bring peace to Europe, January 10, 1920. Germany had signed the Agreement at Versailles on completion of the Peace Treaty in July, 1919.

It is hardly necessary to state that both the Commander of the American Forces in Germany and the American Commissioner of the Rhineland Commission—not the High Commission—found themselves in an extremely peculiar legal position. The Agreement was essentially a product of American thought. The principles enunciated in it were largely originated by Mr. Noyes. Peace had been declared and the Allies were bound by their pact with Germany to put the Agreement into force. America, still at war, her forces on German soil, certainly could not technically recognize a pact which her Senate was unwilling to ratify. Under the Agreement and in equity the zone held by our troops was entitled equally with the Allied

Zones to the mitigation of strict military government. There was, and is, a question whether the Allied governments under the circumstances had a legal right to put the Agreement into effect, for it was clearly stipulated that the United States, as well as the other countries named, should be represented on the Commission. Non-ratification had made it impossible for the American Commissioner to attend the sessions in any but an informal capacity. Objection by Germany to government of the occupied territory by the High Commission without the participation of the United States would have introduced a difficult legal question. However, believing that the American point of view would still receive most careful consideration, and knowing that the ordinances of the High Commission would lift many restrictions formerly enforced by orders of the various armies, Germany made no objections.

The position of the American Zone was the stumbling block to amicable agreement among all parties. War Department instructions made it known that ratification by the Senate was not to be anticipated; therefore a complete recognition by us of the authority of the Commission in territory occupied by us would have been presumptuous. The announcement of the approaching declaration of peace at Paris aroused both the Commission and military authorities to the gravity of the situation that would be brought about. Negotiations were in progress when the Supreme Council at Paris, in its session of December thirtieth, passed a resolution announcing that the jurisdiction of the Rhineland High Commission would extend to all Rhenish occupied territories, including that held by

American troops. Mr. Wallace, the American Ambassador to France, who was present informally at the sitting, stated that he would refer the resolution to Washington for instructions. The French, Belgian and British Commissioners under the influence of that resolution, felt that they could not shift their standpoint by entering into an agreement of the nature of a compromise. The Commanding General of the American Zone, always desirous of maintaining Allied unity, found himself in a most embarrassing position. In an effort to find some legal way out of the difficulty, he referred the matter to a committee composed of his law officers. After careful study of the ordinances of the High Commission that were awaiting publication, this committee stated that even publishing them as military orders would clearly constitute an act anticipating ratification. Nevertheless, he decided upon that course and so recommended to the War Department. On January second he telegraphed the Ambassador at Paris, stating his intentions, and asking whether they had the approval of the State Department. He further sent a telegram, January fifth, to the Adjutant-General, asking for specific authorization. Mr. Noyes also telegraphed the State Department, outlining the compromise which the American Commander had proposed to the High Commission and strongly urged the Secretary of State to assent thereto.

A record of this incident made by one of the participants reads as follows:

“The gravity of the situation was fully realized by all and many conferences were held by the High Commission and Mr. Noyes, our representative at the time on the old Rhineland Commission, but without results.

Finally M. Tirard, President of the High Commission, requested General Allen to meet the Commissioners in his office in the High Commission Building. The meeting took place at six-thirty p. m. and the situation was thoroughly discussed. As there seemed to be no solution possible it was suggested that General Allen refer the matter to his government. To this the General replied substantially as follows: 'Gentlemen, the political situation in Washington is such that I do not wish to ask at this time for a decision of this nature, and I shall not do so. I appreciate fully the difficulty of the situation here and the necessity of our presenting a united front to Germany. If I err in my decision in this matter, I shall err on the side of peace. Therefore I shall permit the publication of your proclamation in the American Zone and shall publish all ordinances and decisions of the High Commission as far as it may prove practicable to do so, as my orders. I believe this will insure uniformity of administration throughout the occupied territory.'

"Every one present was visibly impressed by General Allen's statement and Sir Harold Stuart, the British High Commissioner, with great emotion said: 'General Allen, it is hard for me to express my admiration of the broad statesmanlike view you have taken of this question. Both personally, and as British High Commissioner, I wish to express my high appreciation of your decision and should like to propose to my colleagues here that in consideration of your action, the voice and opinion of the American unofficial observer on the High Commission be given equal weight and consideration with that of the High Commissioners.' Sir Harold's remarks were warmly approved by his French and Belgian colleagues and his proposal was quickly adopted."

Peace was declared at Paris before replies could be received to those telegrams. The High Commission on that date, January tenth, had to begin the assump-

tion of its duties by publishing its proclamation of general authority over all the occupied territories and its lengthy series of ordinances largely drawn up by its predecessor, the Rhineland Commission. The High Commission was composed at this time of Monsieur Tirard, representing France; Sir Harold Stuart, representing England; Monsieur Rolin-Jacquemyns representing Belgium; and Mr. Noyes, present at its sessions in an informal capacity. The ordinances or code of laws replacing existing orders of the various armies were accepted and published as military orders in the American Zone for the guidance of all. As it could not be admitted that the commission was supreme in the American held territory, the proclamation to that effect was permitted publication without any approval or disapproval by the Commanding General. The next day the President of the High Commission in behalf of himself and colleagues, sent the American Commander a letter expressing appreciation of the spirit of conciliation shown by him.

Considerable uncertainty among the Germans arose soon after these documents appeared, as to whether the army or the commission was in control. The variance between the proclamation which was not approved and the ordinances which were approved was too striking not to be observed, and requests for information reached the Civil Affairs Officer from both the *Oberpräsidium* and the *Regierungsamt*. They were informed that decisions would be made from time to time as incidents required, and not on hypothetical cases.

Answers to the telegrams to Washington came three days after the decision was made and after action was

taken. That of the Adjutant-General was very brief, simply stating that the War Department approved the recommendation to put the ordinances into effect in the American Zone. That of the State Department was also favorable to the compromise proposed, but stipulated that no measures should conflict with the terms of the Armistice. This agreement between Monsieur Tirard and the Commanding General on January eleventh, was to serve as a temporary solution of the difficulties. Further negotiations were to be resumed when a reply to Ambassador Wallace's telegram asking Washington for instructions was received. This telegram was now at hand, but it gave no indication that America would make any further official recognition of the High Commission. The Supreme Council at Paris, confronted by an insurmountable obstacle in carrying out its resolution of December thirtieth, that the jurisdiction of the High Commission extended to all occupied territory, receded from the position it had assumed and recognized the authority of the American Army under its war powers. This recognition of the continued validity of the terms of the Armistice simplified the relations between the High Commission and the Army. There was no reason for changing the compromise. There was no reason why the High Commission should not now take over the duties assigned by the Rhineland Agreement and which it had assumed by virtue of the publication of the ordinances. It was thoroughly understood that the American Commander was still the supreme authority in the territory occupied by his troops and that the transference of certain powers to the High Commission was an act of courtesy revocable if emergency required.

On January fourteenth he published a circular letter to his command, directing all officers and men to comply with the arrangement made and to conduct themselves as though the Senate had ratified the Rhineland Agreement. There was still a question as to how far the American General could transfer to other shoulders the responsibility for public order. There were other practical difficulties centering around the respective duties of the civil affairs officers and the Commission's representatives in the *Kreises*, and it was not clear how many of the duties of the former could now be abandoned or turned over to the latter. After a number of conferences with the unofficial American Commissioner, the American Commander put in writing the steps he would take to conform the administration of the American Zone to that of the rest of the occupied territories. Very few deviations were made from the text of the ordinances, and it was intended that the High Commission should assume in the American held territory the same position as in the others.

On January thirty-first a code of instructions and regulations in conformity with the ordinances was carefully drawn up and published in a Civil Affairs Bulletin which served as a general guide for the American representation on the Rhine. On October 21, 1921, Headquarters American Forces in Germany published the following order: "1. All duties heretofore performed by military officers in charge of Civil Affairs for the *Kreises*, located within the American Zone, will be performed in the future by the representatives of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission located in the various *Kreises*; 2. Military courts will

continue to operate as heretofore." The result of this order was that the army officers who had been serving as *Kreis* officers were mustered out of the military service and for the most part accepted duty under the American Department of the High Commission. From this time on, Civil Affairs at Military Headquarters was divided with the Commission, until finally it was subordinated to Colonel David L. Stone, assistant to the American Representative at the High Commission.

Thus one of the most critical phases of the relations of America to the Allied Powers, in the Rhineland aftermath of the war, passed into history. The policy of non-interference so consistently maintained by the heads of the State and War Departments was largely responsible for the minimum friction developed in this exceptional impasse. That same policy served to increase the standing of their dual agent throughout the period of America's stay on the Rhine and undoubtedly gave him prestige he never would have had otherwise.

CHAPTER XII

THE AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY

UNDER orders of the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces, the Third American Army passed out of existence, July 2, 1919, and the staff and troops remaining in Germany were officially designated as the American Forces in Germany, effective July 3, 1919. The blue circular shoulder patch, with a superimposed red *O* containing a white *A*, which had been the insignia of the Third Army, became that of the American Forces in Germany, and all officers and enlisted men were directed to wear it.

Lieutenant-General Hunter Liggett was in command of the Third Army on the date it was dissolved and its Headquarters transferred to the Service of Supply in France. Major-General E. F. McLachlin assumed temporary command of the American Forces in Germany until the writer arrived from Paris and assumed permanent command, July 8, 1919.

It had been decided by President Wilson in consultation with General Pershing in Paris that our permanent force of occupation should consist of what was practically a small reinforced brigade of approximately seven thousand, five hundred men. There were others who thought that one of our war divisions would have been better adapted to the conditions. The

summer and early autumn was a period of constant troop movements. In the latter part of August the 1st Division, the last of the combat divisions of the Third Army, departed for the United States, but it was not until October that all of the auxiliary units had left the American area. In July the 8th Infantry, a regiment of war strength, arrived to form the bulk of the American Forces in Germany, which also comprised the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Field Artillery, 7th Machine Gun Battalion, Provisional Cavalry Squadron, Company A of the 1st Engineers, 1st Field Signal Battalion, Quartermaster, Ordnance Motor Transport and other auxiliary units. A provisional battalion of four companies, sent from France to guard the large surplus stocks left by the Third Army also fell under the authority of the forces of occupation until absorbed by them in February, 1921. Troops of the 38th French Division took station in the American bridgehead on the departure of the 1st Division, but remained only a few weeks, when the 8th Infantry relieved them, placing the necessary guards on the perimeter of our bridgehead.

The United States government, through its Chief Executive at Paris, had agreed to furnish a contingent of troops for duty in Upper Silesia and elsewhere during the plebiscites that were to take place after the ratification of the Treaty. Accordingly a provisional brigade of infantry, sometimes called the Silesian Brigade, arrived in the American Zone in November, 1919. This brigade, with Headquarters at Andernach, was composed of the 5th and 50th Regiments of Infantry, a Machine Gun Battalion, and certain auxiliary units. Pending its departure for Upper Silesia



Lieutenant-General Liggett

and the other plebiscite areas, this brigade took station in the American area, under control of the Commanding General of the American Forces in Germany, to undergo a course of training. After the failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty, there could be no further thought of participating in the plebiscites, and the Provisional Infantry Brigade became an integral part of our forces, remaining as such until it was disbanded at the end of 1921.

The combat troops of the American Forces in Germany, with this increment, were organized into two brigades—in fact into a division, though not so called. The Commanders were Brigadier-Generals F. W. Sladen and W. H. Sage. Brigadier-Generals W. H. Johnston and H. C. Hale subsequently commanded the Silesian Brigade.

In September, 1920, an air service detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frank M. Andrews, arrived from the United States. It was composed of thirteen officers and eighty-eight men. New barracks, shops and hangars were constructed for them at Weissen-thurm of the sun-dried bricks made there from volcanic ashes.

After December, 1920, no replacements were received and there was a steady flow of men back to the United States on each transport. Some were returned because of approaching expiration of enlistments, some as undesirable, a few as general prisoners, and still others because of marriage. During the latter part of 1921 the reduction ordered by the War Department was in progress and a large number of men were sent back, while some three thousand more were to be returned early in 1922.

On December 31, 1919, the total strength of the small army—for its independence and quota of auxiliaries of nearly all descriptions made it such—was 842 officers and 17,986 men. One year later the returns showed a reduction to 622 officers and 15,887 men; and on December 31, 1921, the total strength was 465 officers and 8,245 men.

The successful administration of an army of occupation requires the study of manifold matters. Very important among these are the establishment and maintenance of a high standard of discipline and its concomitant, a superior morale. These depend upon properly qualified leadership and a full recognition by the individual that every consideration is given to his welfare. It is highly important also to cultivate a just pride in the status of the soldier, and to inspire in him a desire to excel. In the occupation earnest effort was made to inculcate in each individual the necessity of making himself worthy of his country, not only in the eyes of the Germans, but in those of his colleagues—French, British and Belgians.

Whatever significance history may assign to our occupation it can not fail to record the superiority of our soldiers and the part this played in determining the estimate placed upon the American administration on the Rhine. The American authorities were ever mindful that largely by the conduct of its soldiers, Europe would appraise the American people. They also believed that the development of an exceptionally high standard of military efficiency of the small army, both in field and garrison, would strongly suggest America's capacity to do likewise with vastly larger forces.

Separated by thousands of miles from the supporting and restraining influence of his home and his country, among a people whose customs were different from his own, and whose language he could not speak, the soldier was forced to find his own amusement, unless it were provided for him. Under such conditions men are too prone to seek the recreation that is nearly always available—liquor, loose women and gambling. Due to the depreciated state of the German currency and the consequently big pay of the soldier, these temptations were doubly available. The relaxation of the war strains also increased this desire for recreation. This situation made it imperative to keep all elements busily engaged, whether in military training or in sport, and in the evening to provide some kind of wholesome amusement.

The First Section of the General Staff was charged with the supervision of the discipline and morale of the command and all activities concerning those matters. In the performance of these duties the head of this Section, G-1, was assisted by the following welfare organizations, the activities of which he coordinated: Young Men's Christian Association, Salvation Army, American Library Association, American Red Cross and Young Women's Christian Association. The Knights of Columbus and the Jewish Welfare Board withdrew their personnel from the American area with the disbandment of the Third Army. The aid rendered by the above organizations was of great importance in maintaining the high military standard demanded of the command, and they must be given a full share of whatever credit may be accorded the American representation on the Rhine. These welfare

workers were semi-militarized; they wore uniform, a special one for each organization; their movements were controlled by the military authorities; and they were subject to military orders and regulations. They were as satisfied to be considered an integral part of our representation as the American Commander was to claim them.

Through the maintenance of club rooms, reading and writing rooms, bowling alleys, restaurants, the obtaining of theatrical performances and moving pictures, in providing material and prizes for athletic sports, and in organizing and directing them, these organizations added greatly to the contentment of the men. It was largely through the assistance of the first named association that sports were developed to a point that gave the American Forces in Germany such a measure of success in competition with the more numerous forces of France, England and Belgium. Julius Cæsar was accustomed to have a field laid out for sports with the establishment of each camp. The wisdom of that practise was fully recognized by the several armies on the Rhine more than nineteen hundred years later.

The Provost Marshal's office also fell under the supervision of G-1. The strength of the military police was decreased gradually from two battalions, August, 1919, until finally the entire American area was policed by five officers and two hundred men. That does not include the German police. With the arrival of the Provisional or Silesian Brigade, containing many untrained, undisciplined recruits, it was necessary to increase the military police by the 246th Military Police Company brought up from Brest, France. Later it was decided to turn over to the German police

some of the duties performed by our own. By the end of 1921 all traffic posts had been turned over to the German police, who handled them in a satisfactory manner. On special occasions, however, our police assisted them by taking over direct routes of travel.

In the early days of the American Forces in Germany most of the crimes on the calendar were committed by our young men on the Rhine, who were learning to be real soldiers, but by strenuous efforts of the organization commanders and the American police, composed of trained soldiers, a noticeable improvement soon took place. The Commanding General introduced a system whereby offenders were to be tried at once for their offenses. They were to be confined only in exceptional cases. They could be fined and restricted to their barracks, but kept available at all times for fatigue and police, as well as for all military duties. This practically eliminated barrack and regimental guard-houses. In their places a general disciplinary barracks was established, where those who failed to observe confinement in their companies and frequent offenders were sent. At those barracks such strict discipline and severe training were carried on that upon rejoining their companies these offenders stood out among their associates by reason of smartness and precision of drill. There was no humiliation nor degradation, no idling nor inferior guard service. The new system tended to raise the morale of the man and make him a better soldier and citizen.

For serious offenders the German military prison was used, but for the most part this institution incarcerated only German offenders who were utilized as laborers in the various military organizations.

The service of military intelligence in the American Forces in Germany was conducted by the Second Section, G-2, of the General Staff and dates from the dissolution of the Third Army. By the very nature of the occupation this service was more important and extensive than the actual size of the command would ordinarily demand. It was largely modeled on that of the American Expeditionary Forces and was in a considerable measure the continuation of that of the Third Army. In a large part it comprised the same officers and men. The activities of this organization extended to the enemy order of battle, military, political and economic information, the German press, radio intelligence, secret service, counter espionage, circulation maps, censorship in all its phases, public meetings, and the publication of the *Amaroc News*.

Beginning with a force of thirty-seven officers and two hundred and seventeen men, it was reduced by the end of 1900 to twenty-two officers and sixty-six men. The coming into effect of the Treaty which lifted censorship and restrictions on circulation permitted a further reduction; but as the activities of this section had little specific relation, as suggested, to the number of troops, it remained relatively much larger than the other staff sections.

It developed that this section was not only valuable in keeping the American representation informed as to the conditions in our area, but it secured matters of value to the American Delegation at the Peace Conference, the intelligence division at Washington, the intelligence services of the associated forces on the Rhine and American military attachés in Europe. News intercepted by the Signal Corps whether from

Moscow, Berlin, Copenhagen, Paris, England or the United States, was translated when necessary and with other political and military information was collected and published in frequent bulletins. Translations and studies of important new military books and regulations, reviews of the press of various countries and special reports on such questions as the Ruhr and Upper Silesia were of paramount importance in orienting the American representation. The *Amaroc News*, inherited from the Third Army, continued to be a unique and valuable feature of our holding. It not only served well its primary purpose of keeping the forces informed of local and home matters, but it eventually assumed some importance in the eyes of the European press.

The German Military Commission, which maintained relations with G-2, was the outgrowth of the early necessity of maintaining touch with the German forces and supervising deliveries of German war material. In each of the towns of Coblenz, Cologne and Mayence there was a German staff officer, known as the bridgehead officer, whose duties were the delivery of war material as stated and the maintenance of communication between the respective headquarters of the several armies and the neutral zone opposite. This Commission finally became important in the necessary relations that developed with unoccupied Germany—in securing passes for Americans desirous of traveling there, in the repatriation of Germany and Czechoslovakian prisoners of war from Siberia, German war prisoners from France and passage of American Red Cross units to Russia.

The combat intelligence sections maintained in the

smaller tactical units were developed under G-2 into highly proficient auxiliaries for their respective commanders. This proved a most important schooling element in the fundamental training of troops for war.

In training the American Forces in Germany it was believed that they should not only constitute a highly efficient military unit, but that by their high standards of discipline, military bearing at all times, appearance in ceremonies, and prowess in equitation and sport, they should prove well worthy of their country. The Third Section, G-3, of the General Staff was charged with formulating the policy that would govern in these matters and in coordinating all activities connected with them. In the domain of field training the conditions were favorable, due to the powers possessed by an occupying force and to the fenceless rolling country of a varying type. Other advantages were that the units were at increased or war strength and the supply of live ammunition, that would have deteriorated by storing, was more than ample for all purposes. In the final problem of the progressive annual training and maneuvers, an entire division assaulted a hostile position, made as near like war as possible, under every conceivable semblance of battle. Live ammunition was fired over the heads of the assaulting lines by the artillery, machine gunners and infantry in a manner unknown before the World War.

In the general plan of defense, drawn up at Mayence under the personal supervision of Marshal Foch, assisted by Field-Marshal Wilson and the heads of the holding forces, each of the armies of occupation had its prescribed rôle assigned it. While there was little possibility that Germany would make an attack upon



Marshal Foch and General Allen at Coblenz

the Allied Forces at this time, it was considered the part of good judgment to be prepared for such an eventuality. In any event, the actual and theoretical application of this plan afforded excellent opportunity for exercising military capacity, both on the terrain of the bridgehead and in the office.

Competitions in military events, sports and horse shows with the other occupying forces were most helpful in maintaining a high standard of efficiency. In the target competitions in the four armies, involving shooting with rifle, automatic rifle, machine gun and pistol, the Americans won each year in every event, except that of the machine gun, in which they were second to the French. In the horse shows the British were entitled to first place, with the Americans close competitors. In racing and steeplechasing, the British, and later the Americans, made a formidable competition with the French. The Belgians were always plucky competitors.

All activities relating to the important matters of supply and transportation were supervised and coordinated by the Fourth Section, G-4, of the General Staff. The various supply services, such as pay, ordnance and medical, operated under it. After the dissolution of the Third Army, the disposal of the large stocks of surplus supplies left in the American Zone became an important activity of G-4.

The War Department Liquidation Committee established a branch in Coblenz and G-4 represented the Commanding General in all matters connected with the disposition of these supplies and of enemy war material. The representative of the Liquidation Commission was appointed by the Secretary of War and was called the General Sales Agent.

Early in 1919 it was planned by G-4 of the American Expeditionary Forces to use Rotterdam and the Rhine River for the supply and evacuation of the units of the Third Army. Activities at the former place were confined chiefly to the movement of supplies, including the shipment of ordnance material to the United States. In March, 1919, the base port was enlarged to include Antwerp and was given the title of Base Section No. 9, becoming generally known as the Antwerp-Rotterdam base. However, as it was later found desirable to use Brest and the other American base ports in France, Rotterdam was abandoned. When activities at Brest as an American base ceased in the summer of 1919, Antwerp became our only port in Europe, under the name of Port of Antwerp.

This port operated at times under G-4, and at others directly under the Chief of Staff. Through this port the first direct supplies from the United States to the American Forces in Germany were received in January, 1920. Previous to that time all supplies required by the American Forces on the Rhine had come from the stocks of the American Expeditionary Forces or were purchased in France, Belgium, Holland or England. Our activities at the Belgian port were gradually lessened by reason of the improvement in economic conditions in Germany, which permitted certain supplies to be requisitioned from that country, and still later by purchases made in the local markets. In the latter part of 1921 it was decided to make no further local purchases, but to requisition from the German government the needed supplies as far as it was possible to do so. There was no outlay of money incident to transportation in the

occupied territory, as the German government under the Armistice and the Berlin Treaty, November, 1921, was required to furnish it. This also lessened activities at Antwerp.

Much of the cargo shipped between Antwerp and Coblenz was sent by barges. These were towed down the Scheldt River to Hanswert, thence by canal past Rotterdam and Emerich to the Rhine, under special contract with the Belgian Ministry of Transportation. The hatches were sealed at Antwerp and Coblenz and the Dutch customs authorities were permitted to open them only in the presence of an American officer.

The Port of Antwerp had much to do with the repatriation of Polish-Americans from Dantzig and of Czecho-Slovakians from Siberia to Trieste, all of which fell under our supervision. Representatives and personnel were sent from Coblenz to the European ports and the accounts were settled by the Antwerp base port. Eight army transports called at Dantzig and carried 12,018 American subjects of Polish origin back to the United States; and twelve transports carried 36,500 Czecho-Slovakians from Siberian ports to Trieste, bringing with them 10,000 tons of cargo. The total cost of this transportation amounted to \$1,049,361.

The presence in the American area of railway operating troops materially affected the attitude of the German railway employees toward strikes ordered by labor leaders in occupied Germany. The knowledge that the Americans could operate the railways sufficiently to maintain their communications had a salutary effect. These troops, under the Chief Engineer Officer, took over and operated two stretches of rail-

way up to the time of our departure from Germany, thereby getting experience that would be decidedly valuable in a period of necessity.

Shortly after the end of the war steps were taken leading to the establishment of a broad plan of education of the American Army, and in September, 1919, this work was placed under the War Plans Division of the General Staff at Washington by virtue of the two million dollar appropriation for that purpose. The first schools under the direction of the educational and vocational training office in the American Zone opened January 4, 1920. There were unit schools, grammar schools and night schools, with teachers drawn from the commissioned and enlisted personnel, and also a school for instruction in the higher academic and commercial subjects under the direction of the educational section of the Young Men's Christian Association. Finally, there were so many schools established and with such success that the Commanding General decided that every branch of military activity should serve as a school of its kind—that the entire American Forces in Germany should be a school.

Up to the end of 1921, 1,309 men had graduated from the various educational and vocational training schools as follows: General and Commercial schools, 296; Mechanical, 278; Signal Corps, 129; Engineer Corps, 20; Quartermaster Corps, 222. There were other graduates in the cavalry, ordnance, medical, agricultural and unit schools.

This brief sketch of the activities of the American Forces in Germany does not permit detailed accounts of the important and highly meritorious services ren-

dered by the medical, signal, ordnance and other elements of the occupation. Their work was on a parity with that of the line troops and the staff.

The keynote of Headquarters policy toward the personnel was citizenship. The training throughout had for its object the establishment of such customs and habits of body and mind as would induce the individual when released from military service to take his place as a worthy citizen in whatever community he might find himself. The advantages under which this policy was carried out were many and it is believed that the results were commensurate with them.

CHAPTER XIII

THE INTERALLIED RHINELAND HIGH COMMISSION

DUE to American initiative and support at the Peace Conference, a new organ in connection with Armies of Occupation was created by virtue of Article 2 of the Rhineland Agreement: "There shall be constituted a civilian body, styled the Interallied Rhineland High Commission and hereinafter called the High Commission, which, except insofar as the Treaty may otherwise provide, shall be the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated Powers within the Occupied Territory. It shall consist of four members representing Belgium, France, Great Britain and the United States."

The appointment of each Commissioner was made by his government with the approval of the other governments. The French Commissioner was President of this body, which had its seat in the American Zone at Coblenz, also the capital of the Rhine Province. Deputy High Commissioners, though not mentioned in the Agreement, were duly designated, and two general secretaries, one English-speaking and the other French-speaking, were appointed to attend all sessions. Each Commissioner or his representative was also present at all sessions. Decisions were adopted by a majority vote, each Commissioner having one vote. The President could cast the deciding vote in case of a

tie. Should a Commissioner be dissatisfied with a decision he might appeal to his government, but in urgent cases such an appeal would not operate to delay the execution of the decision. The results of the meetings were recorded in minutes which were duly communicated to those concerned.

Questions which came before the High Commission were studied in advance by one or more of the Permanent Committees of four, comprising one each from the technical advisers of the departments of the four countries represented. This committee system greatly facilitated the work and for the most part the Committee views were accepted with little discussion by the Commissioners. The Permanent Committees were: Administrative, Coal, Communications, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Legal, and Requisitions. As originally constituted, the High Commission consisted of the following High Commissioners and Deputies:

Belgium—Baron Rolin-Jacquemyns, Monsieur Fernand Cattoir.

France—Monsieur Paul Tirard, Monsieur Amedée Roussellier.

England—Sir Harold Stuart, Mr. Malcolm Arnold Robertson.*

For reasons previously stated, the United States could have no High Commissioner, but Mr. Theodore B. Noyes, who had taken a very prominent part in initiating this supreme Rhineland body and in drafting its first ordinances, became the American representative with the agreement of the Commission and the approval of the State Department. The legality of the

*He became later the British High Commissioner.

organization, without official participation by the United States, being ignored, Mr. Noyes proceeded to organize his department in a manner analogous to those of the Commissioners and to attend all meetings of the Commission. While technically he did not vote, his opinions at times had practically the same value as if they had been votes.

At the request of Mr. Noyes, and in order to keep in touch with the activities of the High Commission, the American Commanding General assigned an officer of his staff, Colonel David L. Stone, as military adviser to the American representative. Mr. Day was his deputy. In brief, this represented the organization and status of the High Commission at the beginning of its duties.

The authority of this Commission extended throughout the occupied territories, including the four bridgeheads of Cologne, Coblenz, Mayence, and Kehl, the Belgian holding, and all German territory on the Left Bank of the Rhine. As previously stated, it had technically no power in the American Zone. Its fundamental rôle was declared to be "to secure the maintenance, safety and requirements of the forces of occupation." Around this declaration of a triple duty all activities and discussions of the Commission centered. It was given power to issue such ordinances as might be necessary to carry out that mission. Civil administration remained in the hands of the German authorities, under the authority of the Central German government, except insofar as it might be necessary for the High Commission to adapt that administration to the needs and circumstances of military occupation. The High Commission was empowered to declare a



Baron Rolin-Jacquemyns, Belgian High Commissioner

state of siege, or martial law. In this case the military authorities would assume control, but they were to act jointly with the High Commission in the issue of decrees and proclamations and in interventions in civil administration. The ordinances of the Commission had the force of law in criminal and civil jurisdiction and in administrative matters affecting the forces of occupation. German laws could be suspended or modified to meet the requirements of the triple duty imposed on the Commission by the Agreement. The Commission demanded that new German laws be submitted to its scrutiny before being published.

Under actual conditions there were three varieties of laws effective in the occupied territory: First, ordinances of the High Commission applicable both to the occupying forces and the civil population; second, German laws which applied to foreigners not attached to the occupying authorities and to German nationals; and third, laws of the respective occupying countries applicable to their nationals in the Rhineland.

Insofar as the Germans in the Rhineland were concerned, the ordinances became an integral part of their laws, and German courts in interpreting their own laws necessarily had to take the Commission's enactments into consideration. As a matter of fact, the ordinances took precedence over all German laws, annulling the provisions of those which were in conflict with them.

The following ordinances and instructions published by the Commission on assuming authority constituted the bases of the new code: Ordinances: No. 1, Legislative power of the High Commission, orders

of the military authorities and operation of German laws and regulations in the occupied territories; No. 2, Criminal and civil jurisdiction and offenses relating to the occupation; No. 3, Movement of persons, postal, telegraphic and telephone communication, restrictions on the press and public meetings, possession and trading in arms and ammunition; No. 4, Extension of the ordinances to the Kehl bridgehead; No. 5, Procedure to be followed in settlement of industrial disputes; No. 6, Powers and duties of the Interallied Rhineland Railway Commission.

Instructions: No. 1, Use of the Allied forces in occupied territories for the maintenance of public order; No. 2, Duties of German authorities in the matter of police and security; No. 3, Notification of appointment of German officials; No. 4, Notification of diseases; No. 5, Exemption from the jurisdiction of courts; No. 6, Supervision and inspection of prisons; No. 7, Permits to carry arms and ammunition.

The legislation enacted under the above headings was in a large part the result of the experience gained by the forces of occupation during the Armistice. In a modified form it embodied many military orders issued to the population, and to the German authorities charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of order and of public utilities. While these ordinances favored non-interference in German administration, disobedience of their provisions or of military orders by a local official might bring about his removal from office or even expulsion from occupied territory. If an official appointed by German authorities proved to be undesirable, his appointment was nullified. In criminal cases military personnel of the holding coun-

tries could be punished only by military tribunals, while members and employees of the High Commission could not be tried by any court in the Rhineland without the consent of the Commission. In civil suits, members of the military forces or personnel of the Commission in their private capacity might be cited before German courts, but if the findings were considered unjust such persons could appeal to the High Commission.

With very few exceptions the ordinances and instructions issued by the High Commission were applied in our Zone. An early exception, however, was a seemingly insignificant one, which authorized the Commission to decide upon and select the premises intended for the residence of its members, officials and employees. This ordinance was but natural, by reason of the Commission's declared supremacy in the Rhineland. It was intended to settle once for all the disputed question of billets, particularly in the congested city of Coblenz. The American Commander could not agree to divided authority in this apparently unimportant, but nevertheless troublesome matter. It was finally agreed that the ordinance in question should apply everywhere except in Coblenz. The passage of this ordinance showed how deeply concerned the members of the Commission were in this subject, and induced the American billeting officer to increase his vigilance in seeing that there was complete justice without discrimination.

In May, 1920, Mr. Noyes was informed by the State Department that as the Treaty of Versailles had not been ratified by the United States, it was considered advisable that the American civilian representative be

withdrawn. A telegram from the State Department, May twenty-first, informed General Allen that by agreement with the Secretary of War, he should assume the duties to be given up by Mr. Noyes. At a session on June second the President of the Commission expressed regret that the American representative was to depart, and also sincere appreciation of his disinterestedness, good faith and devotion. Upon the assumption of this dual rôle under the two Departments it was necessary to maintain two separate offices, yet closely allied. Colonel Stone was appointed a delegate of the Commanding General, with duties similar to those of the Deputy High Commissioners. Like them, he attended all sessions of the Commission—an impossibility for the newly appointed representative by reason of his duties as head of the American Forces.

While the Rhineland Agreement was being drafted the German government requested permission to appoint an official to cooperate with the High Commission and to constitute the agency through which the population of the occupied territories might address the Commission. This official would not only represent the federated States directly concerned in the occupation—Bavaria, Hesse, Baden, Birkenfeld and naturally Prussia—but also the entire *Reich*, and he alone would be authorized to deal with the Commission. This request was repeated July 11, 1919, and was then granted with certain reservations made by the Allies. The German government was informed that the appointment of such an official—not provided for in the text of the Rhineland Agreement—must be previously approved by the Allies; that this approval might be

recalled at any time; that his competence could extend only to those matters which came under the authority of the Central government; and that the High Commission reserved the right to enter into relations with any local authority whatever.

Herr von Starck was designated the *Reichscommis-sar* or German Commissioner. In view of the fact that normally the occupied country was governed by the laws of the national government and five federated states as well, the German Peace Delegation at Paris requested that the High Commission consult the German Commissioner before publishing its ordinances. The Allies agreed that such a procedure might be useful, but refused to agree that there would be any obligation to follow it. In 1920 and 1921 he was consulted before publishing several ordinances, but the rule was not general and subsequently his opinion was heard chiefly in support of his protests.

The German note of July 12, 1919, regarding the interpretation of the Rhineland Agreement, assumed that after ratification of the Treaty, administrative or supervisory officials would no longer be attached to the German authorities as had been the case during the Armistice. This was admitted in the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers, which stated that the High Commission would maintain fixed representatives charged with the duty of maintaining relations between the local German authorities, the local military authorities and the Commission itself. Accordingly, a representative was appointed in each *Kreis*, or administrative district, who was also charged with transmitting orders of the High Commission. His duties were defined in nineteen ordinances, seven in-

structions and two minutes of the Commission, even before December 31, 1921.

Undoubtedly certain later enactments of the Commission violated the spirit of the reply just referred to. Moreover, these *Kreis* officers frequently exceeded the powers accorded them and too often their unauthorized acts were approved by the Commission.

The German authorities insisted on a strict interpretation of the Rhineland Agreement and the reply referred to above limiting the duties of these officials to insuring the observance of the ordinances and instructions of the Commission. They protested generally that certain ordinances conferred administrative powers of extraordinary and decided importance, that the promise not to have supervising officials attached to German authorities was violated, and that the *Kreis* representatives were not empowered to supervise and forbid meetings, to suspend newspapers and to regulate the carrying of arms. Regardless of the ulterior motives which may have prompted the views and acts of certain of the High Commissioners, truly representing their countries, there was the ever-present obligation and authority to safeguard "the maintenance, security and requirements" of the armies. To accomplish this they insisted that the ordinances giving increased powers to the *Kreis* officers were absolutely necessary.

Specifically, the German Commissioner alleged that the representative of the Commission in the district of Ludwigshafen required that all local meetings, in addition to political ones, be notified forty-eight hours in advance; that at Kreuznach and Langenschwalbach, the representative demanded the right to participate

in meetings of the *Kreis* assemblies; that at Trier, Euskirchen and Cochem the representatives required detailed reports on a number of purely economic matters from the local authorities; and that at Kreuznach and Trier the representatives gave direct orders affecting the police and threatened dismissal of both police and customs officials. The High Commission in reply to these protests stated that they were unfounded and that they were formulated solely to bring to discussion the powers of these *Kreis* officers. As a result the High Commission defined at length the powers of its representatives along the lines of the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers mentioned above, but considerably extended them.

Although the German authorities protested against the general extension of the powers of the representatives of the High Commission in all the zones, there were comparatively few protest cases up to 1922 in the Belgian Zone, and none with respect to the conduct of the representatives in the American and British Zones. There were many in the French Zone. This fact may be attributed in part to the natural animosity between the French and Germans and to the tendency of the French authorities to maintain a closer supervision in local affairs than did the others, and also to their encouragement of the Separatist sentiment. The policy of the Americans and British was to limit the duties of the *Kreis* representatives to those of liaison officers, as had been agreed with the German Peace Delegation; that of the French, and to a lesser degree that of the Belgians, was continually to extend their authority and control, as evidenced by the new ordinances, for which those two countries were principally

responsible. The persistency with which the French High Commissioner maintained the views of his government, and the decisive vote held by him, gave a dominating influence in this important matter, as well as in almost all others coming before the Commission. Possibly the greatest restraint to complete French domination was the independence of the American representative in his authority over a large section of the controlled territory.

A striking instance of interference in local administration took place during the Communist disturbances at Speyer in September, 1921, when the chief representative of the High Commission in the Palatinate, on his own authority, relieved the *Regierungspräsident* and the Chief of Police. He published a proclamation and decree stating that he was constrained to assume responsibility for public order and that the police accordingly were put under command of the French authorities. The French Town Major of Speyer was given command of all the police of the district, while the city police were dismissed. Although this action was not justified by either the Rhineland Agreement or any of the ordinances or instructions of the High Commission, the President of the Commission drafted a letter which he proposed sending to its Palatinate representative commending him for his prompt and decisive action. This act was strongly resented by the other members of the Commission and instead the representative in the Palatinate was informed that it was not within his competence to take measures to restore order, but that such a duty devolved upon the military authorities acting in accordance with Article 13 of the Agreement.

The Commission authorized certain railway officials to carry arms. Somewhat later the Director-General of Communications and Supplies of the Allied Armies suspended the order. This incident, unimportant in itself, indicated the attitude of certain French elements toward civilian control. The offender was duly informed by the Commission through military channels, contrary to the wishes of the French High Commissioner, wherein he had ignored the authority of "the Supreme Representative of the Allied and Associated Powers."

In October, 1920, the British High Commissioner, Sir Harold Stuart, tendered his resignation. He had taken an important part in the organization of that body and was as noted for his frankness and impartiality as he was for his intelligence and wide administrative experience. His departure was a great loss to the Commission and called forth expressions of regret on all sides. It had developed without any collusion or previous discussion that his views and those of the American representative had been in accord upon almost every question of policy that had arisen. His successor was Mr. Malcolm Arnold Robertson, later Sir Malcolm Robertson. Colonel Rupert S. Ryan became the new British Deputy.

During the operations which resulted in quelling the Ruhr Revolt in April, 1920, the German government had sent more troops into the neutral zone than were authorized under the existing agreement. While it was contended by Germans that only the minimum of troops necessary to restore order was employed, the contention was not admitted. After much discussion at Paris the French government in retaliation

directed the French Army of the Rhine to seize and occupy Frankfurt and Darmstadt. England did not participate and Belgium tardily sent only one battalion. This was the first of the occupations of additional German territory and though it did not continue long, it was the prelude to various others in the succeeding years.

The French Commanding General requested the High Commission on the occasion of this advance to declare a state of siege in the Mayence bridgehead, claiming that such was necessary to maintain the security of his army and its communications. The request was granted and the first instance of martial law, after the Treaty had become effective, was declared April 6, 1919. The French Commanding General reported that the state of siege was of a restricted character and that the non-military orders issued by him prescribed only such measures as were necessary for a proper supervision of German officials and public utilities, for the prohibition of strikes and unauthorized meetings, and for the establishment of military courts for the trial of civilians. The large numbers of troops brought up to the Rhine at this time and their disposition gave incontrovertible evidence that the occupation of the Ruhr was envisaged. With the ending of the state of siege in the Mayence area, August twentieth, the last difficulties which had arisen from the political upheaval following the von Kapp affair were settled insofar as the High Commission was concerned.

In the latter part of 1920 the German authorities developed a disposition to oppose the authorities of occupation, to contest their demands and delay com-



General Hutchinson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, General Allen
and Sir Harold Stuart

pliance with them, and even to obstruct the execution of ordinances and orders. This obstructive policy was believed to have been inspired by the Berlin government. In any event, this unwarranted attitude became especially evident immediately following certain speeches made in the Rhineland by members of the German Cabinet. The chief offender was the head of the National Property Administration, a service constituted by the German government to meet the requirements of the Allied Forces in funds, housing and military instructions. The High Commission had authorized this organization to assume its duties for the purpose of cooperating with the authorities of occupation and supplying the needs of the armies. This organization demonstrated its obstructive policy by refusing to make repairs to certain military buildings and its failure to construct others when demanded. Incidents of its flat refusal to meet the legitimate demands of the military authorities were reported from the four zones. As Article 8 of the Rhineland Agreement provided that the German government should place all necessary facilities at the disposal of the occupying forces, the High Commission enacted Ordinance 69, authorizing requisitions to be made directly on the burgomasters or others whenever the National Property Administration failed to supply the needs of the armies. The advisability of excluding that organization from the occupied territory was also taken under consideration. The policy of obstruction culminated in a series of systematic refusals to obey orders received from the military authorities. As a result of this, the President and three officials of the organization were expelled from the territory, charged

with wilful refusal to comply with lawful requisitions. That put an end to further obstruction.

The ordinances and instructions first published by the High Commission were considered sufficient to meet existing legislative requirements. From the beginning the British and American representatives earnestly strove to limit the number of ordinances, believing it wiser to solve problems as they arose and by the application of existing ordinances when possible. They believed that the numerous ordinances being enacted would befog rather than clarify, and in any event that the German population would never become acquainted with them. The Belgian and French Commissioners, probably influenced by their national characteristics, seemed to desire a separate ordinance for the many situations that arose or seemed imminent, and as usual their views prevailed. In 1920 the number of ordinances increased from six to sixty-seven; in 1921 from sixty-seven to one hundred and two; in 1922, from one hundred and two to one hundred and twenty-seven. Instructions and modifications of ordinances increased at a corresponding rate, until there were numerous enactments bearing upon many separate subjects, some of which could well have been incorporated in general acts.

The action of the Commission toward the press was expressed in ever increasing penalties: In 1920 forty-two publications were excluded, suspended or prohibited; in 1921 such action was taken with respect to fifty-five, and in 1922 there were ninety-four that were penalized.

In early December, 1922, the Conference of Amba-

sadors imposed a fine of one million gold marks upon the Bavarian cities of Passau and Ingolstadt, because of attacks* upon representatives of the Interallied military Commission of Control. On December eighth the High Commission was informed by the same Conference that if the fines were not paid within two days the Commission itself should make the collection in the Palatinate, or seize the equivalent from revenues received by Bavaria from the Palatinate. The Commission immediately prepared a draft ordinance, providing that all moneys received from Palatinate duties and taxes, or from the administration of state property, particularly from state forests, should be sequestered. The Departments of Finance, Customs and Forests and all personnel connected with them, were made subject to the authority of the High Commission. In another ordinance a committee was designated to carry out the plan, but inasmuch as the fine was paid on the prescribed date, the ordinances proved unnecessary.

This ultimatum was considered by the Germans an adroit move, intended to create discord between the Palatinate and Bavaria on one hand and between Bavaria and the *Reich* on the other. It was Bavaria and not Germany that was called upon to pay the fine and tender the apologies. Had the plan been carried out, the Palatinate might have been estranged toward Bavaria for allowing the penalties to be imposed on an innocent part of the country. The inference of the Conference of Ambassadors that Bavaria was an independent state, was quickly resented by the German government which in reply took occasion to state that

*These attacks were made elsewhere in Germany—not in Occupied Germany.

the Constitution did not permit a federated state, such as Bavaria, to carry on a correspondence or negotiations with a foreign government. The French press at this time frankly stated that the intention of seizing pledges in the occupied territories for non-payment of reparations was the first step toward carrying out the policy of making German debtors pay direct to Allied creditors and that productive pledges at the disposal of the Allies were easily available. The events of the following year—including the occupation of the Ruhr—would seem to confirm the intended exploitation of the Palatinate as an indication of a more extensive plan.

CHAPTER XIV

THE VON KAPP EVENT AND THE RUHR REVOLT

FROM the time of the revolution in Germany, November, 1918, there had been recurrent stories of imminent riot and revolution, particularly in Berlin, until the Allied authorities on the Rhine had become callous to such rumors. Serious difficulties in Germany wherever they might be were a source of anxiety to the Rhine holdings and in consequence it was necessary to follow carefully political developments in both occupied and unoccupied territories. In the early days of March, 1920, the political situation in the *Reich*, always menacing, became unusually tense. The Right claimed that the coalition government was impotent and demanded new elections, while the Left, unrepresented in the Cabinet, was pressing for its privileges under the Weimar Constitution. The press of all parties was giving vent to disquieting recriminations in an unprecedented degree.

When the Central authority became aware that a monarchistic clique in Berlin was planning an unconstitutional overthrow of the government, it issued orders for the arrest of Doctor von Kapp and several of his coadjutors as principal instigators. Most Germans were surprised when the *Putsch* actually happened on the night of March 12, 1920. The

order of arrest simply hastened the event. The revolt was accomplished through the agency of the two Marine Brigades which had been brought from the Baltic Provinces against their will and with much difficulty, and which had been put in garrison at Doeberitz near Berlin. An ultimatum to the government was issued from that garrison demanding the formation of a new Cabinet, the replacement of Defense Minister Noske by General von Luttwitz, and amnesty for von Kapp and the others whose arrest had been ordered, under the alternative of having Berlin occupied by the Marine Brigades.

After having been in session nearly all night the Cabinet rejected the ultimatum. Before morning it had become evident that the troops in and around Berlin, as well as the Security Police, could not be depended upon. All were therefore withdrawn and at about five A. M. the Cabinet left Berlin in automobiles for Dresden, thence later for Stuttgart. The government did not resign and its last act before leaving was an appeal to the laboring classes throughout the whole of Germany for a general strike in protest against this *coup d'etat*.

The new government was set up in Berlin by seven A. M., March 13, 1920. Its first proclamation announced Doctor von Kapp as National Chancellor and Minister President, General von Luttwitz as Supreme Military Commander and Minister of Defense and it declared that "a new government of order, freedom, and action" would be elected. It is thus seen that even this ephemeral monarchistic government recognized rights of franchise. Events moved rapidly. A general strike was called and obeyed to such a degree as

to have been described as the most complete in history. Gas, water, electric and street-car services were suspended and newspapers ceased publication. Plundering and street fighting took place in nearly all the large cities, particularly in Berlin. The Left deemed this an opportune time to improve its position. The von Kapp government found opposition from all parties save the extreme Right, while the general strike so paralyzed its activities that administration was impossible. In the meanwhile the coalition parties had agreed to hold general elections at an early date. On March seventeenth von Kapp issued a statement that as the old government "has fulfilled the most important political demands" of the new, he considered his mission accomplished. He therefore resigned his duties, and like most of his followers, fled the country or sought safety in hiding.

The old government returned to Berlin, but found that the result of its departing appeal, calling a general strike, had caused a new danger most difficult to control. Not until March twenty-third was the strike officially ended in Berlin. Conditions continued serious in Saxony, Thuringia, and Mecklenburg and especially so in the great industrial region of Westphalia, bordering on the Rhine. The Communists secured control in the former districts, while the efforts of the proletariat to secure control in the Ruhr Basin constituted the Ruhr Revolt.

While Coblenz remained outwardly calm during this period, it was in a state of restrained excitement. As the details of the Berlin occurrences and the widespread disorders became known in the occupied territories, the Rhinelanders recognized that there

were certain advantages in the enemy occupation. The precautions taken against rioting by Coblenz merchants boarding up their stores proved unnecessary. Our Headquarters, fortunately, was permitted to keep up telephonic communications with the American Mission in Berlin, whereas the latter was cut off from Washington. As a result we became intermediaries between the State Department and Berlin, and likewise between our Paris Embassy and the German capital.

A protest strike in the entire occupied territory was called for March fifteenth. The labor leaders instituted negotiations with the American and Allied authorities with regard to this strike. They were told that as long as the requirements for the maintenance and safety of the troops were provided for and no public disorder occurred, the authorities would not interfere. In the American area the workers in a number of industries walked out, while in Coblenz the street-car conductors and hotel waiters took active part in the strike. There were, however, no large demonstrations in the American Zone such as occurred in Cologne, Mayence and Aix-la-Chapelle.

The German officials of the Rhine Province took no official action toward this *Putsch*. The *Oberpräsident* and his assistants were noncommittal, while other officials would express their views only in private conversation. Apprehensive lest the labor parties would demand of the officials a statement as to their position, an executive session was called by *Oberpräsident* von Grote, but before any decision was reached von Kapp's government had collapsed.

During this very serious period a steady stream of

information flowed into the *Regierungsgebäude*—our Military Headquarters. Our intelligence section had become exceptionally efficient. Its trained operatives and agents maintained constant communication with similar services of the Belgian, British and French forces, with the American officers attached to those forces and with our various military attachés in European states. This section was in continuous telephone, telegraph and courier service with the American Mission in Berlin, with the American Embassy in Paris, with German officials, and, of course, with all the several agencies of the High Commission.

The von Kapp affair served to bring out in strong relief the difference of policies of the holding countries. All recognized that with no ulterior motives other than peace and restoration, the American policy was independent of any intrigues that may have seemed desirable by other countries. It was rumored and given credence in certain French quarters that England was apprised of the inevitable von Kapp movement or something similar and believed that by its encouragement British interests would be well served if it proved successful. It was claimed that England's far-sighted policy envisaged trade advantages in Germany as against all other countries.

The British in turn claimed that France was so blinded by fear and hatred of Germany, that what she saw in the von Kapp event was not an impending return of the Hohenzollerns, as she declared, but rather a valuable opportunity for the furtherance of her cherished scheme for the partition of Germany.

With disorder in the *Reich* as a pretext, the French would first seize Frankfurt on the Main, an actual

occurrence very soon afterward, and then the Ruhr Basin. This would be but a prelude to the division of the German state into smaller ones. The isolation of Prussia could thus be accomplished with the result that its former economic, political and military supremacy would not in the future menace French interests. According to this view the hegemony of Europe, as visualized by Napoleon, would be possible. According to the British view, France's attitude was reckless and would inevitably threaten Europe with chaos.

The Belgians by reason of their military pact with France were largely influenced by that country, but reluctantly supported its German policy.

The Germans and their government, more desirous than ever of securing American good-will, maintained that they had nothing to conceal from us and offered to furnish us any desired information. They strongly declared that France's claim of Germany's intent to return to a monarchy was false. Furthermore they fostered the hope that the long cherished split in the Entente was at hand.

The American course of action was to welcome information from whatever source—whether from our former war partners or from our enemy with whom we had not yet made a treaty of peace—and carefully and impartially to analyze it as an element necessary for a proper estimate of the complex situation. Opinions at the High Commission, unless the welfare of the American Zone were at stake, were expressed by us for the most part only when they were asked for. The State Department was indeed so parsimonious in giving instructions to the Rhine representation that



ORDER OF BATTLE

11 A.M., NOV. 11th, 1918.

Disposition of Allied and Enemy Armies at the time of the Armistice, and position of American Divisions in the Line. The locations of the Principal American Operations are also shown

Below are listed, under each Operation, the various Points which figured most frequently in Despatches

ALSINE-MARNE CHATEAU-THIERRY BELLEAU-WOODS CROIX-ROUGE-PART FERRE EN TARDENOIS FISMES VAUX SOISSONS	ST MIHIEL APREMENT SEICHEPREY MONTSEC PONT A MOUSSON MATTONCHAPPEL VERDUN	MEUSE ARGONNE GRAND PRE MONTFAUCON ROMAGNE DUN-VAUX-MEUSE BUZANCY BEAUMONT	YPRES LYS KEMMEL NEUVE EGLISE POPERINGHE ARMENTIERES	SOMME ST QUENTIN CANAL AMIENS COMBLES PERONNE
--	--	---	---	--

STATISTICS BRANCH GENERAL STAFF
HQRS., A.O.S., A.F.F.

we were doubly cautious in trying to express American sentiment on some of the important measures that arose at this period.

The collapse of the short-lived von Kapp government was by no means an end to the grave troubles confronting the new government which an undoubted majority of Germans wished to see continue Republican. The general strike, called March twelfth, found a rather lasting application in the great industrial Ruhr district lying across the Rhine opposite the Belgian and British Zones. This Westphalian region has long been known as one of the most radical in Germany. The natives, as well as the foreign laborers from southeastern Europe, were quick to take advantage of the ill-advised attempt of von Kapp and his associates. In continuing the strike they endeavored to establish a Soviet government or a dictatorship of the proletariat. Workmen's Councils were formed and also Workmen's Guards, which replaced the suspended police. For the most part the constituted authorities continued their duties under the control of these councils. A Central Council was located in Essen, but most of its secret leaders operated from Hagen.

As the *Reichswehr* failed to leave the Ruhr when ordered out by the Workmen's Councils, a Red Army was organized to accomplish this result by force. This loosely organized mass succeeded after savage fighting, in which the losses on both sides proclaimed the struggle a battle, in driving the *Reichswehr* and the Security Police from the area, some of them taking refuge in the Belgian and English Zones. The arms of the Red Army were obtained by capture or from the homes of the workmen, and consisted chiefly of

rifles and machine guns, with but few trench mortars and cannon. While the fighting was going on the Red administration held the reins of government, suppressed all attempts at resistance and maintained a certain degree of order in the population. Negotiations with the Berlin government were unavailing in spite of the concessions offered to the workmen.

Finally under the newly formed Cabinet in Berlin, an ultimatum was sent to the Central Workmen's Council in Essen, demanding that all Red troops be disarmed by noon March thirtieth, with promise of amnesty to those who complied. The leaders declined to comply, threatening to flood the mines and blow up the industrial plants. However, as many were willing to accept amnesty, negotiations were resumed under an extended time limit. The extreme radicals called another strike, but this was not observed by the more conservative elements. The lawless elements, in bands up to several hundred each, drifted away from control and set up such a period of pillaging and looting that the New Workmen's Guards, formed under terms of the agreement with Berlin, asked for the return of the *Reichswehr*.

The last phase of the Ruhr Revolt, an uprising that made a severe demand on the government, witnessed the advance of the *Reichswehr* and the restoration of order, with comparatively little additional fighting. Essen, the stronghold of the Reds, was occupied April sixth and large numbers of the rebels took refuge in the British territory the same day. By April fifteenth the Ruhr Revolt, which had lasted more than a month and had produced a casualty list of several thousands, was suppressed. By the end of the month most of the workmen were disarmed.

Although this uprising did not extend into occupied territory, its influence on the entire Rhineland and the questions it raised as to policy of the holding countries were so important that a succinct statement of fact concerning it seems desirable. Such disorders as were witnessed in that highly industrialized basin made occupation seem a worthy compensation to the Germans in certain parts of the Rhineland. The *Reichswehr* and the Reds, who were forced at times into the Belgian and British Zones, were disarmed and interned. While close touch was maintained with the progress of this revolt, it did not seem to be a matter in which the Allied authorities should take part.

The French, however, insisted that the revolt had been provoked by reactionary German elements and that the concentration of troops in Westphalia, ostensibly for its suppression, was directed at the Allies and involved danger to the security of the occupying forces. The advance of the *Reichswehr* into the neutral zone in excess of the number authorized by the Versailles Treaty was not denied by the German government, but it claimed that the excess was slight and was absolutely essential to suppress the uprising. That was a fact. Around this point the discussions between the occupying authorities revolved for some weeks. The British and Americans held that the German government had a right to use such force as was necessary to suppress a revolt that imperiled its very existence, and further, that it was in the interest of all constituted European governments that order be restored without delay in Germany. In this view the Belgian High Commissioner also concurred.

The question had assumed such importance, and reports of the additional forces varied so greatly, that

it was considered advisable to secure first-hand information by sending into that region reliable highly qualified agents. The Washington government had become interested in this matter and was endeavoring to follow it through our Ambassador in Paris. He in turn was utilizing the American representation on the Rhine to help secure dependable information. On April fifth the German Chancellor communicated the following to the American representative on the Rhine with the request that it be forwarded to Washington: "The German government obligates itself to withdraw all troops in excess of the authorized strength as soon as operations in the Ruhr Basin for the reestablishment of the constitutional authority have been concluded. The German government has already sent a statement to Paris, the fourth of this month, that it expects to be able to do so within a week. Mueller." This appeared conclusive as to Germany's intent to withdraw its troops at the earliest moment.

The *Reich* had requested permission to send additional troops temporarily into the Ruhr, a request that all the powers concerned, excepting France, were inclined to grant. France stated that she would permit such action only on condition that she occupy Frankfurt, Darmstadt and near-by towns as a guarantee that the additional troops would evacuate the neutral zone as soon as the emergency had passed. Germany rejected the French condition, but on April second informed France that additional troops had crossed into the Ruhr from the near garrisons and were engaged in suppressing the insurrection. French approval of this move was requested and refused. On April third France despatched a sharp note to the German government, and on April sixth at four-forty-five A. M.

French troops occupied Frankfurt and Darmstadt. Homburg and Hanau were seized later. Other than two minor engagements between cavalry patrols, and the capture of a battalion of security police, which had remained in their barracks on the departure of the troops, the occupation proceeded without special incident. The following day, however, the Moroccan troops became nervous in the presence of a large assemblage and fired into it, killing six and wounding thirty-five. As a result of this a general strike was called in Wiesbaden, but it failed to materialize. Martial law was established in the Mayence bridgehead and continued until May second.

This occupation raised a storm of protest in Germany as it was believed it was preliminary to the seizure of the Ruhr. This view was supported by the arrival in the Rhineland at the time of two French divisions, several separate infantry regiments and much heavy artillery and strong air forces. The placing of a large part of these troops in the region west and north of Bonn convenient for an advance into the Ruhr further confirmed this belief. The British flatly declined to permit them in their Zone. Doubtless the attitude of the British government and the American, however silent it may have been, prevented the seizure at this time of the industrial heart of Germany. A study was made also by the French of a farther advance up the Main River, toward Erfurt, for the purpose of separating Southern Germany from Northern Germany. Belgium showed reluctance in following France by sending tardily only one battalion to participate in this Frankfurt occupation.

An investigation by the French having shown that the German troops had been reduced to the authorized

strength in the neutral zone within Westphalia, and possibly influenced by other causes, the French troops returned to their bridgehead. This withdrawal without incident was followed shortly afterward by the return of most of the additional troops sent up from France to their permanent French stations.

During this eventful period in April, 1920, the independent status of the American troops was yet more definitely established. In the latter part of March the House of Representatives, moved by the stirring events on the Rhine, requested by resolution: "The extent of the authority exercised over American military forces now stationed in German territory by Field-Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, now in the occupied Rhine Provinces, and how far their activity may be directed without express orders from the President of the United States." The President answered: "Replying specifically to the remaining question in the resolution of the House of Representatives, I will state that Field-Marshal Ferdinand Foch has no authority over the United States troops in German territory, nor can any one direct their activities without express orders from the President of the United States. It should be stated further that under his general police powers General Allen has full authority to utilize his troops for the police of the occupied district, the preservation of order, and to repel any attack which may be made upon him." This was the first decisive declaration made by our government as to the status of our troops. It was sent to the American Commander April fifth for his information and guidance, yet it did not change the policy he had been following.

CHAPTER XV

THE GERMAN COMMISSIONER

WHILE the Rhineland Agreement was still in embryo, the German government requested permission to appoint an official to cooperate with the High Commission and to constitute the channel through which the population of the occupied territories might address this high body. This official would be the supreme representative of the German Republic and of the federated states concerned, and he alone would be authorized to deal with the High Commission. This request was repeated, and on July 29, 1919, it was granted as stated by the Allied and Associated powers with certain reservations.

During the Armistice, and even after the Treaty became effective, a number of Germans charged with offenses committed during the war had been arrested by the Belgian and French military authorities of occupation. Some of these had been tried by military courts in the occupied territories and sentenced to fines and imprisonment, while others had been taken into Belgium and France and there brought to trial. On January 20, 1920, the German Commissioner protested against this procedure and requested the Commission to bring about the immediate release of the persons arrested. He contended that in arresting

individuals charged with offenses committed during the war, the countries participating in the occupation were acting without legal authority, that the arrest in German territory of German nationals for offenses committed abroad was a matter for the German authorities only, and that when the arrest of a "war criminal" was desired, formal application therefor should be made to these authorities. He contended further that there was no authority for the removal of such persons from German territory for trial in a foreign country.

In reply to a number of similar protests, the High Commission informed the *Reichscommissar* that arrests made during the Armistice were not within its competence and that the question of those made after peace was effected would be referred to the governments concerned. The High Commission then gave instructions that no further arrests would be made, but as the military courts were not inclined to surrender their jurisdiction many difficulties attended the release of those already arrested. Numerous requests for permission to arrest alleged offenders in the American area had been submitted to American Headquarters by the French and Belgians, but they had always been denied. The American stand was based on the agreement of the Allies that alleged war criminals should be tried by the German courts at Leipzig and that, therefore, Article 228 of the Treaty no longer applied.

The French military authorities had made various requests of the German authorities in the fall of 1920 to hand over to their jurisdiction Germans charged with offenses against their forces of occupation. As

none of these requests had been complied with, the High Commission informed the German Commissioner in February, 1921, that he would have a period of ten days in which to furnish an explanation of the delay. His reply was unacceptable. The attacks on French soldiers continued to increase, the offenders taking refuge in unoccupied Germany, where they were assured immunity. In view of these facts the High Commission formally requested the German Commissioner to inform his government that its failure to comply with the demands of the Allied military authorities made under Article 4 of the Rhineland Agreement, and above all, in systematically subjecting replies to delays for which there was no justification, would force the Commission to take measures to secure satisfaction. It might be necessary again to assume control over the movements of persons between occupied and unoccupied territory, and it might be decided also to ask the respective governments for his recall. Later the Commission warned the German Commissioner that if the German authorities failed to turn over the accused persons within five days, the Commissioners would ask their respective governments to withdraw consent to his appointment and possibly even to suppress the office of the *Reichscommissar*. The period of five days passed without any delivery of the accused persons. The Commission thereupon addressed a note to the British, Belgian and French governments, recommending they recall their approval of the appointment of Herr von Starck.

During the discussions leading up to the despatch of this note the French High Commissioner insisted on the abolition of the office, claiming that the work of

this Commission could be better done through direct relations with the central government and with the states having territory comprised in the occupied area. This arrangement did not appeal to the other Commissioners and Monsieur Tirard did not press his contention. Anticipating the action of the Allied governments, the German Commissioner resigned, leaving his deputy, Doctor von Brandt, to act pending the appointment of a successor.

Without delay, the German government proposed the name of Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg. On July twenty-seventh the Conference of Ambassadors informed the German government that its proposal would be accepted, provided the following conditions were complied with: 1. That the new Commissioner should loyally cooperate with the High Commission, refrain from inciting systematic obstructions to its measures, and exert his influence toward bringing to an end the inimical attitude and lack of courtesy toward the authorities of occupation. 2. That certain secret associations be dissolved. 3. That the German government undertake to surrender the offenders demanded by the High Commission and also to abstain from taking secret steps to nullify the judicial measures adopted in the execution of the Rhineland Agreement.

The German government accepting these conditions, the Conference of Ambassadors duly informed the High Commission and requested that no objection be raised to the proposed appointment. Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg arrived in Coblenz in September, 1921, but a few days before his arrival the French High Commissioner invited attention to the fact that the



Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg

German government had again refused to deliver an offender against the ordinances. He further proposed a recommendation to the Allied governments that their approval of a successor to Herr von Starck be withdrawn. The other High Commissioners pointed out that the German contention in the case in question did not fall within the purview of the Rhineland Agreement and that it was susceptible of argument on both sides. It was finally decided to make no objection to the assumption of office by the new appointee.

This whole incident, the resignation of the German Commissioner and the appointment of a successor, shows an interesting phase of French policy in the Rhineland. His office was an inherent obstacle to the furtherance of the Separatist movement and to the commercial and political penetration by the French. Its activities were largely directed toward keeping alive a national spirit in the occupied areas and in opposing the spread of French influence. It was generally believed that in realization of those facts the French High Commissioner from the beginning had sought to bring about the abolition of the office. That he did not succeed was due to the stand taken by the British Commissioner and the American representative, who considered that the presence of a German Commissioner was highly useful in carrying on the occupation in the spirit of the Treaty and the Agreement.

In the course of the negotiations at Versailles in June and July, 1919, the German Peace Delegation protested against the provision of the Rhineland Agreement which authorized the High Commission to compel obedience to its ordinances by German officials

under penalty of removal. The German Delegation further requested that dismissal, if necessary, should take place through the German Commissioner, who would be responsible for the examination of the case. These requests were not admitted at Versailles, while at Coblenz the High Commission claimed the right to dismiss officials whenever necessary for "securing the maintenance, safety and requirements" of the occupying forces. In pursuance of that principle, the Commission enacted Ordinance 29, setting forth not only its right to remove officials, but also to veto appointments. The German Commissioner immediately protested, claiming that the appointment of officials was a right which had not been abridged by the Agreement and that the right of veto assumed by the High Commission was an interference in the administrative sovereignty of the German government. Exception was taken, especially to the provision that officials might be removed who failed to conform to the ordinances of the High Commission. The German Commissioner claimed that German officials were bound to submit only to instructions of German authorities superior to them and that it was not within the competence of the High Commission to prosecute them for following such instructions.

Naturally, the request for the withdrawal of Ordinance 29 was not complied with. Under its provisions twenty-three officials were removed in 1920 and 1921—sixteen at the request of the French authorities, four, at the American, two, at the Belgian, and one, at the British. During the same period the appointments of twenty-eight officials were vetoed by the Commission—nineteen at the request of the French, nine, at the

request of the Belgians and none at the request of the Americans or British. From these figures it appears that the French and Belgians exercised closer supervision over German affairs than did the other two holding countries. This difference engendered greater friction and in consequence necessitated still more requests for removals and vetoes.

During the latter part of 1921, and later, there was an increasing tendency on the part of the German authorities to appoint officials who were not natives of the Rhineland. The reason assigned for this was that many officials had lost their positions through the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, Posen and part of Silesia, and that the Rhineland, preponderantly Catholic, should have appointments from among the Catholic officials of these ceded regions. The authorities of occupation, however, were of the opinion that this influx of non-resident officials was intended to maintain Prussian influence, rather than to placate the Catholics. The veto of the appointment of a large number of school-teachers from East Prussia and Silesia was justified by the Commission on the ground of prevention of the spread of reactionary ideas among the children of the Rhineland.

Based on "the maintenance, safety and requirements" of the Armies of Occupation, the High Commission early enacted an ordinance bearing on censorship and the press. Under its provisions, it was found necessary to exclude, suspend, or prohibit forty-two publications in 1920, and fifty-five in 1921. In the first named year, proceedings were taken at the request of the French in thirty-four cases, of the English in four cases, of the Belgians in three cases, and

of the Americans in one case. In the second named year, the numbers were as follows: French, forty-five; English, six; Belgians, four; Americans, none. These figures show that most of the requests emanated from French authorities. This resulted, in a large measure, from the systematic campaign against the French troops of occupation. Almost all the evils of the occupation at that time were attributed by the Germans to the French, while the other armies were noticed comparatively little. The colored troops,* constituting an important element of the French forces, were a favorite subject for press attacks, and these were responsible for a large percentage of the press suspensions, prohibitions and exclusions. The German Commissioner received a full measure of reproach for not having exercised a greater restraining influence in all these cases. As chairman of the Advisory Council for the occupied territories, he found himself compelled to present complaints drafted by that council against the requisitioning of large tracts of arable land for military purposes, against the increasing restrictions on the press and the rights of holding meetings.

When the Commission, at the request of the French military commander, drafted an ordinance requiring the German authorities to make a census of means of transport which the armies might desire to requisition in case of a declaration of siege, and also of factories and public and private undertakings which might be applied to the manufacture or repair of military material, the German Commissioner protested and re-

*See Appendix.

quested that it be canceled. He alleged that the taking of such a census was beyond the purview of the Rhineland Agreement, that it could not be justified by the possibility of a declaration of siege, and that it must be considered as a preliminary war measure. The Commission replied that there was no intention of applying the measure in contravention of the Hague Convention. Subsequently the Belgian military authorities under this ordinance called upon the German metal foundries for statistics concerning the amount of motive power used, description of the machinery, a list of raw materials consumed, together with their origin, finished products and tools on hand, statement of monthly production, and a list of the personnel employed. While the High Commission admitted that the demand was legal under the ordinance cited, it stated that some of the information requested was more economic than military. The Belgian High Commissioner undertook to adjust the difference.

In July, 1921, at Moers in the occupied territories, a French motor-bus collided with a tram-car of the Crefeld Tramways Company. The French military authorities conducted an investigation and decided that the tram-car was responsible and fixed the damages at twenty-two thousand marks. The French Commanding General thereupon sent to the Tramways Company a letter, the concluding paragraph of which stated: "The payment of this indemnity will be made without delay at the treasury of the Director of Automobile Services of the Army of the Rhine at Mainz." The order was complied with and the money paid, but the German Commissioner filed with the High Commission a protest contending that under the

Rhineland Agreement the military authorities had no power to enforce payment of their demands by military order. The military authorities, in answer to the request of the Commission for information, contended that the question of civil compensation was administrative in nature, and that decisions in such cases should be made by the military authorities. The staff officer writing to the High Commission in the name of the French Commanding General, closed his letter with this language: "I have the honor to inform you that I can admit no discussion of the validity of a decision taken with full knowledge of the case."

It was pointed out by the High Commission that that body alone was charged with the duty of making the laws to govern in such cases. The French High Commissioner contended that the order in question was not obligatory, but was in the nature of a writ or summons, and that the payment made by the Tramway Company was a voluntary and not a compulsory payment. He also announced that it would be impossible for him to agree to a criticism of the French military authorities and that it would be impossible also for him to agree to a decision of the Commission reversing the action taken in the case. In spite of this flagrant act no remedial action was taken, but after a long discussion a letter was drafted that might cover future cases. This letter envisaged and emphasized the necessity of an international council of justice which was subsequently created.

In June of 1922 the *Reichscommissar* complained by letter of the arrest and sentence of certain local officials who had collected information and evidence against members of the French Army of Occupation.

The Commission referred the letter of complaint to the French Commanding General, who stated that he did not consider it necessary to refute the German Commissioner's charges and made no comment with respect to the specific cases, except to correct minor parts of the information furnished by the Germans. The High Commission thereupon replied to the *Reichscommissar* that the cases to which he referred had formed the subject of judicial proceedings which were not within the competence of the Commission and that there existed in the French Zone of Occupation judicial facilities for appeal, of which those concerned might avail themselves at their discretion.

The decisions were not always against the *Commissar*, for a few weeks later the High Commission upheld his protest against its representative in the French Zone who had requested elaborate and detailed information regarding German railway employees.

Perhaps one of the most interesting personal cases that came before the High Commission, showing French policy and the rôle of the *Reichscommissar*, was that of Doctor Momm, President of the Wiesbaden *Bezirk*. The Commanding General of the French Army requested his removal and that of the Chief of Police of Wiesbaden, for failure to insure public order on the occasion of demonstrations against the assassination of Doctor Rathenau, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs. The French High Commissioner, supporting this request, laid before the Commission a number of disagreeable events connected with Doctor Momm's administration. Nevertheless, all these seemed insufficient, in the opinion of the other Commissioners, to remove a governor of a large area. The

attack of the mob, resulting in the killing of two and the wounding of several, was clearly unpremeditated and was directed against the police who, with Doctor Momm and other officials, represented the Monarchist party in the eyes of the people. It was a matter that properly concerned only Germans. No Allied soldiers were injured or threatened, nor was the safety of the occupation in any way jeopardized. The German press claimed that the French authorities were moved by political considerations, hoping thereby to gain the approval of the population. Immediately petitions supporting the action of Doctor Momm and the Chief of Police and protesting against their removal as a violation of rights guaranteed by the Rhineland Agreement, reached the High Commission. There was only one opinion expressed by the Germans in connection with the proposed removal.

The Belgian and British High Commissioners expressed the opinion that the evidence submitted did not warrant removal on the charges presented. The French High Commissioner disagreed and with some passion asserted that it would be impossible for the French authorities of occupation, civil or military, to cooperate with Doctor Momm. He stated that in view of the publicity given these charges, and in view of the protests made by German officials, organizations and press against the proposed punishment, loss of prestige and further administration of the area would be most embarrassing unless the charges were sustained. He further asserted that the unanimity of German opinion was not natural and spontaneous, but was the result of improper activities of the German Commissioner. The other High Commissioners were

not convinced. They did, however, realize the impossible situation in which the French High Commissioner and the French military authorities found themselves as a result of this Wiesbaden affair, and the necessity of taking some action to relieve it. It was decided, therefore, to send for the German Commissioner and request him to explain the situation to his government, with the request that Doctor Momm might be transferred elsewhere and his place given to a more acceptable official.

The Commission decided at that time to remove Doctor Momm, should the Prussian government fail to act—not on account of the Wiesbaden charges, but because of his inability to cooperate with the French officials. A limit of eight days was given in which compliance would be made. The peremptory character of the ultimatum was fully understood by the German Commissioner, but he nevertheless apparently received the suggestion of a transfer favorably. At the expiration of eight days he appeared before the Commission and requested to express first, with some formality, the position of the Prussian government, then informally his own. The Prussian government would make use of the earliest convenient moment to transfer Doctor Momm, replacing him with an official more acceptable to the authorities, but it would be unable to do this until sufficient time had elapsed to prevent the German people from connecting the transfer with the Wiesbaden incident and the charges following it.

In his more formal statement, Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg said that the Prussian government would be condemned by its own people if they connected the transfer of these officials with the charges against

them, that it would be very helpful if the officials were acquitted or the proceedings dropped, and that he would make all possible effort toward accomplishing the desires of the High Commission. He hoped that the High Commission would appreciate and sympathize with the difficulties of the Prussian government and himself in these circumstances.

The High Commission, through the British Commissioner who was presiding, stated that the communication was incorrectly characterized as an ultimatum, that on the contrary it was an effort made in a spirit of accommodation to dispose amicably of a very difficult situation. While professing to understand and appreciate this statement, the German Commissioner did not appear to believe that he could convince the Prussian government accordingly. As a result of the informal discussion, it was decided that Doctor Momm should have a leave of absence for three months, beginning August sixteenth, during which time a new president might be appointed. Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg undertook to transmit this suggestion and report the result of the negotiations within four days.

At the expiration of the four days a representative of the German Commissioner appeared before the High Commission and read a terse statement to the effect that the Prussian government would transfer the *Regierungspräsident* of Wiesbaden to another post at the earliest practicable moment, but that it was unable at the time to grant him a leave of absence. The Commission thereupon dismissed Doctor Momm from office.

These incidents bring out in bold relief the char-

acter of some of the many matters with which the High Commission had to deal, presumably under the provisions of the Rhineland Agreement, but which in previous occupations had been settled by the military authorities without the intervention of any such civil organ. Placed between the Scylla of public opinion of his own country and the Charybdis of the dominating elements of the High Commission, the *Reichscommissar* played a rôle that must have been as little satisfactory to himself as it was to the opposing interests. His own nationals expected him to display influence with the Commission beyond the limits of possibility, while the latter demanded that he exercise a power with the German government and the Rhinelanders that was equally impossible.

Many other matters similar to those mentioned would not have arisen had there not been a conviction that the French authorities under the Poincaré administration were resolved to hold the Rhineland, regardless of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

PROBABLY no subject mentioned in this book has been of greater interest to the Allies and Germany than the agitation for a Rhenish autonomous state. No just appreciation of this movement can be had without some historical knowledge of its background. The Rhenish territory occupied by the Allies was part of the Holy Roman Empire, and at that time was divided into a number of clerical and lay principalities, each of which maintained its own forces and levied its own taxes and customs. Until the nineteenth century, the Rhineland with the adjacent territories of Hesse and the Palatinate remained primarily an agricultural country. That portion occupied by the Americans comprised the archbishopric of Treves, including most of the Moselle Valley and the city of Coblenz and the principalities of Sayn and Wied. During the French Revolution Napoleon extended the frontier of France to the Rhine, abolished the Holy Roman Empire by decree, joined the states on the right bank of the river into the Confederation of the Rhine, and annexed the territory held by the Americans in 1918 to France under the designation of the Department of the Eifel. Following the overthrow of Napoleon, and in accordance with the Treaty of

Vienna, the western part of Germany received its present form of government, the Rhineland going to Prussia. Since then the changes have been few and insignificant. Yet, under such a disposition of territory, geographical conditions have been continually warring with political ones.

The occupied territory comprised the Rhine Province and the Province of Hesse-Cassel, both belonging to Prussia; the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt, lying on both banks of the river, with the important cities of Mayence and Worms; and still farther south the Bavarian Palatinate, with Ludwigshafen, Speyer and Landau separated from the rest of Bavaria by the States of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt.

Since the days when most of the Rhineland was governed by the Archbishops of Cologne, Treves and Mayence, it has remained a Catholic country. Lutheran Prussia's talent for organization and the national German spirit developed in the 'seventies, have been responsible for maintaining such relations as have existed. During the reign of William II, the Rhineland, together with Westphalia, assumed such an important share in the economic evolution of that period that it became the wealthiest region of Germany. While this was taking place the Catholics were consolidating themselves politically into the Center party to oppose the anti-Catholic policy of Bismarck; and during the same period the growth of Socialism and democracy were phenomenal. These developments were opposed to Prussian domination.

The first manifestation of the Separatist agitation occurred simultaneously with the Revolution, at the time of the Armistice. Since then it has passed

through various phases. Whatever form it has assumed, it has incurred the vituperation of practically all elements of the population which desired a strong German state. It was but natural that wherever it was believed that any foreign interest was favorable to the movement, or was exercising even a benevolent neutrality toward it, the chances of success were accordingly diminished.

Following the abdication of the Emperor in November, 1918, the Socialists organized a government with Herr Ebert as provisional President and issued a statement proclaiming their intentions of calling a national election at an early date. In the first few months of the government neither Lutheran nor Catholic church escaped abuse by the new regimen along with all other old institutions. The Clerical or Center party not only faced disestablishment, but loss of its revenues and private property as well. Its leaders in the Rhineland became alarmed, and as an alternative to such a fate began to consider the creation of a separate Rhenish state, in which the predominating Catholic interests might be safe-guarded. In the meantime responsibility and the menacing Spartacist movement caused the Ebert government to realize the necessity of establishing a unified government of all the moderate elements. The elections for the National Assembly followed in January, 1919, with the result that of the nearly three and a half million votes in the Rhine Province, the Center party received a decided plurality, but not quite a majority. The dominant thought of the Centrists at this time was to see the Rhineland take its place in the *Reich* along with Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Saxony. As a party, how-

RECAPITULATION

NUMBER OF SEATS

PARTIES

UNITED SOCIALIST PARTY	173
CENTRUM PARTY	68
GERMAN NATIONAL PEOPLE'S PARTY	67
GERMAN PEOPLE'S PARTY	66
DEMOCRATS	39
BAVARIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY	20
COMMUNIST PARTY	15
BAVARIAN PEASANTS LEAGUE	4
DEUTSCH-VOELKISCHE LIBERTY GROUP	3
GERMAN HANOVERIAN PARTY	2
LEDEBOUR PARTY	2

TOTAL REPRESENTATION :

459

REICHSTAG REPRESENTATION

DECEMBER 31, 1922



PRESIDENT

ever, they disclaimed any intention of favoring a neutral state independent of the rest of Germany or an autonomous one dominated by any foreign state. The elections seemed to have quieted the Separatist agitation for a while, excepting that which was carried on in the columns of the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, edited by Herr Frohberger, an Alsatian by birth and a Catholic priest.

The announcement of the peace terms the middle of May was followed by a wave of depression that reached all classes. It was evidently felt by the Separatists that a Rhine republic would appear at this moment to the people as a panacea of most of their ills. Many industrial magnates believed that a Rhenish neutral state would add to their business interests by diminishing the war burden that would otherwise fall upon themselves.

Doctor Rathenau informed the writer that at this time the big industrialists of the Rhineland and Westphalia would have been won over to the cause of an autonomous state had the French Rhine policy been more conciliatory, and that they were opposed to the enormously big tax burden that would fall upon them for a war which they had never approved. Their attitude probably partly accounts for the large supply of funds in the hands of the Separatists, but it also served to estrange the working classes and to align the Socialist parties against the movement. Recognizing the failure of the Tripartite Agreement, and in consequence of her threatened security, France again took up the pre-Treaty thought of the Rhine as the political frontier. A benevolent attitude toward movements tending further to weaken Germany, such

as the creation of a buffer state, appeared desirable to French generals, statesmen, politicians and a very large group of the people.

Thus the despair of the Rhinelanders as to their future and the French anxiety for security served to hearten the Separatists, who considered the moment opportune for realizing the desired release from Prussian control. The large Catholic population was favorable, though not approving such methods as were employed in the Palatinate. How far the Allies, and particularly their forces on the Rhine, would sympathize with a Separatist movement was a weighty question for its supporters.

France had special reasons for believing that the Palatinate was sympathetic toward her. Speyer and Landau had been under her sovereignty in the days of the Holy Roman Empire, and in the earliest days of the occupation individual Germans there had manifested friendship for France. Friction between these Francophiles and the loyal Germans increased until General Gerard, commanding the Eighth French Army, considered it necessary to issue a proclamation May 22, 1919, forbidding the molestation by Germans of their fellow citizens who showed sympathy for *la France victorieuse et bienveillante*.

The political happenings in Bavaria in May resulting in a reign of terror and the seizure of Munich by the Spartacists induced the conservative elements to view a separation from Germany as preferable to a continued union with an anarchistic state. On the night of May twenty-first an unsigned proclamation appeared throughout the Palatinate calling upon citizens to form a neutral republic with economic union

with the Saar Basin: "There will be three frontiers—a political frontier, a military frontier and a tariff frontier. There is but one road to safety from this situation of despair: formation of an independent neutral state without loss of territory, with economic union with the Saar Basin. We desire to remain German throughout—German institutions, German customs, German administration,—but . . ."

Several days later there were demonstrations in Speyer, Landau and Zweibrücken in the Saar, but general popular approval of the movement was withheld. The leaders presented a petition urging President von Winterstein to recognize an independent republic, claiming that General Gerard would support and protect such a movement. In a comparatively short time after these events the unwilling President von Winterstein was expelled from German territory, and other government officials who had shown themselves particularly hostile to the Separatists were arrested by French troops.

This action of the French military authorities was the subject of a protest by the head of the German delegation of the Armistice Commission at Spa, General von Hammerstein. One paragraph of this protest reads as follows: "At the present time when the plenipotentiaries of the German government and the Allied and Associated governments are assembled in Versailles for the purpose of bringing about a conclusion of peace, the German government can not conceive of so flagrant a violation of self-determination as that of General Gérard, in which he has the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, Marshal Foch, and that of the French government."

The movement, however, never assumed such proportions as warranted the attempt made by the agitators to oust the existing government. The agitation was continued for a neutral Palatinate by an illustrated paper, *die Pfälzische Woche*, which the Germans considered to be subsidized by the French.

The Commanding General of the Interallied Armies, General Mangin, on May 22, 1919, requested assistance of the American Commanding General in the establishment of a Rhenish republic that would be proclaimed shortly at Wiesbaden. The new republic was to be of an essentially conservative character, with Catholics and agricultural interests predominating. While it was contemplated that it would remain a sovereign state within the *Reich*, it could be entirely independent later. Fifty supporters or agents were to come to Coblenz at once to begin active work in our area. American military authority was compelled, therefore, to make a prompt decision of policy toward this movement, nominally headed by Doctor Dorten.

Under provisions of the Armistice, the countries on the Left Bank of the Rhine were "to be administered by the local authorities under the control of the troops of occupation." The decision of the Allies on entering Germany was that the local authorities referred to were the officials chosen under the then existing German law and not the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils that were in actual authority in many places. Furthermore, Marshal Foch authorized elections throughout occupied territory for the German National Assembly January nineteenth, and one week later for the Prussian National Assembly. But, when the Prussian government issued a proclamation ordering elections for

municipal officials, the matter was referred to the Marshal and his decision was: "Upon proposal of the Allied authorities of occupied territory, I have decided not to grant the order of the Prussian government calling an election for the entire renewal of the municipal council of Rhenish Prussia." The local authorities were accordingly notified that these elections would not be held. Having refused the German people the right to change their officials by orderly elections, there was still more reason to prevent such change by revolutionary means.

Pursuant to this policy and having requested the officials to remain in office, General Mangin was informed that we must refuse to recognize revolutionary movements of any character, and that if workers for a Rhenish republic entered the American area, regardless of whether they be of French or German nationality, they would be treated on the same basis as other agitators. General Liggett added that he had no authority to deviate from these instructions which had been laid down for him by higher authority. He was sustained by General Pershing who telegraphed him as follows:

"H. A. E. F., May 22, 1919.

"C. G. Third Army.

"With reference to telephone conversation *re* possible political agitation by outsiders in territory occupied by the Army of Occupation, the Commander-in-Chief approves the action already taken by you and he further directs that you refuse to allow French or any other political agitators to operate in the territory controlled by you, no matter by whose orders they may claim to be operating or desire to be permitted to operate.

"McANDREW,
"Chief of Staff."

Despite our non-participation, the Republic was proclaimed in a long document posted in Wiesbaden May 31, 1919. It declared "an independent Rhenish Republic within the boundaries of the German nation, composed of the Rhine Province, Old Nassau, Rhenish Hesse, and the Bavarian Palatinate." It further added that "the provisional government of the Rhenish Republic will take the place of the central government of Prussia, Hesse and Bavaria respectively." It was signed by the Labor Committee of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Nassau-Rhenish-Hessian Labor Union and the Wiesbaden Labor Committee.

The posting of the proclamation met with prompt resistance in several places where the sheets were torn down. The people claimed they had never heard of the Labor Committees which signed the documents. The press the following day announced the names of the Cabinet of six members, with Doctor Dorten as Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. None of the persons mentioned was of any special prominence, and their names in no way tended to gather public opinion around the standard of the new republic.

On the afternoon of June 2, 1919, the President of Wiesbaden, Herr Meister, was summoned to French Headquarters and informed by the commandant of the city that he should submit to the orders of the new provisional government. He replied that as a Prussian official he could not submit to such a government and asked that he be relieved from office. His request was granted and Herr Springorum, one of his assistants, succeeded him; but as the French failed to renew their demands for recognition, the old government remained in control. During the evening a telegram

was sent out from Wiesbaden over the French military wires announcing the formation of the Rhenish Republic. This telegram aroused considerable discussion in the Allied press as well as in the German:

“Mayence No. 11523B. This morning Rhine Republic was proclaimed in all cities without difficulty. Provisional government presided over by Doctor Dorten is at present installed at Wiesbaden and is obeyed. This event, which ends annoying uncertainty, appears desirable to majority of population. Doctor Dorten has addressed message to Marshal Foch, to the Conference, and to all Generals commanding armies of occupation for their respective governments.”

The Rhineland seethed with discussions the following week relative to this move. There were strikes in protest and a general sentiment of disapproval of any such government as had been outlined in the proclamation. Finally all the political parties of the Rhineland, less the extreme Left, headed by the Clerical, made a formal signed protest against the Rhenish republic.

Discussions of the movement were as violent and bitter in Berlin and Weimar as on the Rhine. Two prominent deputies of the Center at Weimar found their continued presence untenable because they had a conference with General Mangin at Mayence; Herr Frohberger was compelled to retire from the editorial staff of the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* at Cologne; and the Prussian government contemplated changing the higher officials of the Rhine Province. The rumored change of *Oberpräsident* von Groote and Doctor Mömm of Treves, if ordered by edict from Berlin, would have been strongly opposed by the American

authorities. The former was a Rhinelander by birth, and both had served the American Army with faithfulness, tact and due regard to the interests of their own people.

The collapse of Doctor Dörten's project was inevitable. On the morning of June fourth, with his Cabinet and Administrator Pinot of the French Army, he appeared at the government building in Wiesbaden, where he was informed that France would preserve a neutral attitude in a purely German question. Thereupon Acting President Springorum, who was also present, unceremoniously escorted Doctor Dörten to the street, and the populace handled him and his Cabinet without gloves. The new republic, once an object of fear on the part of Prussia, now became an object of contempt and ridicule.

Following his summary expulsion from the Wiesbaden government building, Doctor Dörten disappeared from sight and the front pages of the press. It was realized, however, that he considered his eclipse only temporary and that his agitations were being continued surreptitiously. On July fifteenth it was reported that President Ulrich was conspiring with General Mangin to establish a republic consisting of both Hesses and the Palatinate. The President personally replied to an interpellation at Weimar, admitting his visit on General Mangin, but disclaiming anything beyond the adjustment of administrative difficulties.

About one month later Doctor Dörten was arrested in Cologne by German police who claimed that his presence would incite a mob. The British disapproved this act, but directed him to leave the city and return

only by permission of the Military Governor. During the debates preceding the ratification of the Weimar Constitution August 3, 1919, the Center or Clericals strongly urged the creation of the Rhineland as a sovereign state, but they also shared the prevailing German belief that Doctor Dorten's movement savored entirely too strongly of foreign intrigue. Later in August, Doctor Dorten, who had violated American regulations by his speech at Kylburg in the American Zone, and had escaped arrest by flight, was invited through the agency of his captured colleague to come to Coblenz. Here he was interviewed by American officials. He claimed to have been ignorant of our regulations, and stated that his movement was purely German in character and was aimed solely at separation from Prussia, that his proclamation June first was issued to stimulate the demand for a plebiscite, and that his procedure was perfectly constitutional. He added that General Mangin, while not personally unfavorable to the Separatists, had officially stated that the French military authorities would observe a strict neutrality. He was told in concise terms that no revolutionary acts would be permitted in our Zone and that he must have a pass before again coming into it. This restriction was removed later.

The Separatists in the latter part of August again became active in the Palatinate and also in the little principality of Birkenfeld, entirely surrounded by the Rhine Province. In the former, force was employed and hand grenades used in seizing the post-office at Ludwigshafen. Finally French troops were called out and the attempt to form an independent Palatinate was again foiled. The French military government

investigated the occurrences and placed the blame on the slain officials who were declared to have been overzealous and untactful in handling the mob. In view of the repeated charges from German sources that General Gérard had instigated the outbreak, it is proper to quote the reply of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to the protest of the German delegate of the Armistice Commission: "The French military authorities of the Palatinate endeavor to use scrupulous and strict neutrality between the different German political parties in occupied Rhenish territory. The French Military authorities are guided by the sole desire to maintain order. Their relations with the German population are guided by this consideration alone."

Returning to Birkenfeld, whose suzerainty belonged to the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg prior to the November Revolution, the French officer in charge of civil affairs was one of the principal political actors in its agitations. General Mangin publicly authorized municipal elections throughout Birkenfeld on September twenty-eighth. That illegal authorization, however, was revoked; and before the decisive defeat of Separatism took place in Birkenfeld in the elections that followed, there was a notable change in the personnel of the French administration on the Rhine.

The French government officially announced October 8, 1920, that the General Fayolle Group of Armies, the Tenth and the Eighth, would be combined into the French Army of the Rhine under the command of General Degoutte. Generals Fayolle, Mangin and Gérard were given assignments elsewhere. The relief of these generals who had achieved great distinction—espe-



Generals Degoutte, Johnston and Allen

cially the first two—in the war and popularity in the nation, caused bitter attacks against the French government particularly from the Conservative and Royalist press. It was publicly stated that the action of the government in removing General Mangin was due to his activity in furthering the Rhenish movement for independence. It was furthermore hinted in a leading French journal that the action was due to repeated protests by the American delegation to the Peace Conference against French policy in the Rhineland. This charge was immediately denied by our delegation.

The German press, keenly alive to any possible dissension in the Allied ranks, magnified the relief of the French generals into a matter of national importance. All seemed to assume that the Rhenish movement, without French support, was terminated, and that the unity of the German peoples would be threatened no longer. Mere suspicion that a foreign power stood at the elbow of Doctor Dorten was sufficient to estrange the Rhenish people from the cause of Separatism, even though they had ardently desired an autonomous state. The attitude of the Center in convention at Cologne, September sixteenth, clearly indicated that that party could not be counted upon to aid in any movement that did not fall under the provisions of the new Constitution. It declared that Rhenish autonomy should be granted only in connection with a territorial reorganization of the nation.

Although the French attitude toward the Separatist movement did not change, Separatism did not develop any real strength in 1920 and 1921. With the occupation of the Ruhr, the agitators again became very active. Prior to this event a policy of peaceful

penetration had become paramount with the French. Our refusal to permit a change in the government in the American Zone, except by constitutional means, and the opposition of all but a very small minority of the inhabitants, were the fundamental reasons for the check of the Separatist agitation. The movement, like its chief German instigator, had fallen into disrepute. Its principal exponent now became *die Rheinische Republik*, published in Cologne by Herr Joseph Smeets, a German of questionable reputation who had been incarcerated by the Belgians, but had since entered into more or less friendly relations with the French authorities.

On December 4, 1921, Smeets organized a meeting in the French area at Bonn, which was attended by several hundred persons who were addressed by Smeets and others, including several Frenchmen and one Belgian. The next day the German authorities arrested Smeets for having failed to appear in court to answer a charge of insulting a policeman. On the same day the High Commission met in extraordinary session under telephonic instructions from its President, Paul Tirard, who was at the time in Paris. The French Deputy High Commissioner requested the immediate release of Smeets, and that all proceedings against him be quashed. No action was taken. Monsieur Tirard hastened back to Coblenz and called another meeting, whereat he insisted upon Smeets' release, stating that the French government and public opinion were unusually interested. After much discussion the High Commission ordered that pending its definite decision Smeets be released. The storm of protest following this action served Herr Smeets as a

welcome means of advertising. The Commission finally decided to permit his trial, provided that no sentence be executed without its permission. A sentence of three weeks was imposed. On March 3, 1922, he was again tried for insulting the German President and this time sentenced to five months' imprisonment. This sentence also could not be executed for the same reason. Herr Smeets was thus encouraged in his boldness, knowing that he was immune from the laws of justice of his own country. The decision of the High Commission in this matter was the least worthy act of its existence within the knowledge of the writer. Not only did it infringe upon its own ordinances but it gave immunity to a German subject, tried for offense against his own nationals on German soil, by a legally constituted German court. Political expediency could hardly be carried beyond the developments connected with this exceptional case, which is set forth in the appendix.

Toward the end of 1922 the Separatists displayed increased activity under foreign protection and the ever-increasing economic crisis. The Dorten faction was contented with insisting upon an immediate referendum, while the Smeets group came out with a flamboyant manifesto, urging the Rhenish population to separate from Prussianized Germany and to form a republic oriented to the West. Reports from Paris concerning a permanent holding of the Rhine and the seizure of the Ruhr added to the zeal of their activities. When the latter event became a reality, the Separatists made the most of it, and American representation on the Rhine ceased.

Apropos of the reported visit of Doctor Dorten to

Monsieur Poincaré in Paris in February, 1922, the French Premier is alleged to have stated: "There is such a close bond of reconciliation between the Catholics of the Rhineland, Alsace-Lorraine and France, that it must lead to permanent friendship. This will be the future fundamental idea for France's guiding principles in the Rhineland. The movement must assume a more united aspect and the French nationalist idea, which appears at times, must be discarded. The main value must be laid upon the cultural relations with the western powers which are required for an independent Rhenish Republic."

The attitude of France toward this movement, as demonstrated by the acts of its representation on the Rhine, and the conviction of the Germans that the French government was using every possible means to consolidate its power in the Rhineland and eventually to make the Rhine its permanent military frontier, were directly and indirectly more productive of discord between those countries than all other causes combined. France was far more interested in security and continental prowess than in the reparations of her devastated regions, while Germany was more solicitous concerning its rich western domain than in the financial terms of the Peace Treaty.

CHAPTER XVII

SANCTIONS

FROM the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles to the early part of 1921, the Allies had been pressing the German government for compliance with the terms of the Treaty, particularly with reference to disarmament. The Boulogne Conference in June, 1920, had resulted in specific directions to Germany relative to the reduction of its military forces and the destruction of war material. In July of the same year the Spa Conference had forced Germany against its protest to agree to the demands of the Allies regarding disarmament and the delivery of coal. They receded, however, from the stand on war criminals and agreed that Germany should try them before its own courts and that the reparations question should be postponed until another conference at Geneva—which was never held, owing to differences between England and France. While recognizing the many difficulties under which the enemy country was struggling, the Allies believed it had been unduly dilatory, and that measures of coercion were necessary. France had despatched several sharp notes to Germany, insisting on compliance with the disarmament demands, including that of the so-called self-defense organizations, but the results achieved were considered unsatisfactory. Ger-

many claimed to be doing all that was possible to fulfil the terms of the Treaty and of the agreements made under it. The *Reich* on its part also pressed for the definite fixing of the amount of reparations that it would have to pay.

As a result of the Conference held in Paris in January, 1921, the Allies issued further instructions as to disarmament and informed Germany that it would have to pay a total of two hundred and twenty-six billion gold marks within a period of forty-two years, and also twelve per cent. of its exports. In case of non-acceptance certain military and economic sanctions were to be imposed. The German government was disposed to accept the disarmament terms, but immediately announced that the reparation demands were impossible of execution.

A further conference was arranged to meet in London on March 1, 1921, whereat Germany might present counter-proposals. These were made and rejected without discussion, as being unreasonable. Germany was then given four days in which to accept the Paris demands or submit new counter-proposals. Backed by all the principal political parties, the German government decided to submit new proposals, but resolved to reject the Paris terms. The Allies refused these proposals as it had done before and on March seventh declared the Conference terminated.

In the meantime the Allied forces had been moving into position. On March eighth the French, British and Belgian troops advanced into the neutral zone and occupied the cities of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort—the Rhine ports of the great Ruhr-Westphalian coal and industrial district. The French had

brought up large numbers of troops from France for the new occupation. The Belgian contingent was decidedly smaller. That of the British was limited to a detachment of cavalry, some aviation and several tanks, all of which were shortly withdrawn. The advancing troops met with no opposition, and the population preserved a correct and peaceful attitude. A state of siege was proclaimed, but only minor restrictions were imposed.

A French general was placed in command of all troops in the newly occupied territory, causing dissatisfaction to the Belgians, who claimed that it was a violation of the London Agreement. The matter was soon settled by allotting Duisburg and Ruhrort to the Belgians, who constituted with them a new bridgehead under command of General Ruequoy, the Chief of the Belgian Army of Occupation. At last this country's "slight by the Big Four" of the Paris Conference in denying it a bridgehead was adjusted.

The German press and people failed to manifest much excitement over the application of the military sanctions. The government sent a note of protest to the League of Nations, adopted a plan of passive resistance, and declined to make the March reparations payment. The stand taken by the German delegation in London was enthusiastically approved by the people. An interesting side-light on the London Conference was afforded by the reported statements made by Foreign Minister Simons, who had been the leading German representative there. He claimed that his delegation was optimistic over the result, that the Allies had made a blunder, that his country had offered to pay for five years practically what the Paris Con-

ference demanded, and after that time further payments could be discussed and settled. He believed that if he, Aristide Briand and Lloyd George had been able to settle the matter between themselves, an agreement would have been reached. "But with Foch there, in that atmosphere and in the present state of French public opinion, a reasonable understanding was impossible. Lloyd George tried his best to compromise, but Briand was too strong. The former was much disappointed over the negotiations."

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris and Brussels were ordered to Berlin, presumably recalled, but later they were returned to their posts. The occupation of the three Rhine ports named gave control of all coal shipped from the Ruhr district by way of the Rhine River. The High Commission, in the execution of its duties to provide for the safety of the armies of occupation, published Ordinance No. 76 giving the military authorities, in their discretion, the right to impose censorship over the telephone and telegraph systems and to censor press reports concerning the movement of troops.

Subsequently Monsieur Tirard proposed that the High Commission institute negotiations with the military authorities relative to an extension of its jurisdiction to the newly occupied territory, which became known as the Düsseldorf-Duisburg-Ruhrort bridgehead. The proposal was approved by the High Commission, but was disapproved by the Conference of Ambassadors. The military government was continued although modified by the legislation of the High Commission.

On May 8, 1921, the High Commission was in-



Paul Tirard, French High Commissioner, General Allen and General Mondacq

formed by the Supreme Council that the following economic sanctions would be imposed and that the Commissioner should study them with a view to reporting immediately on their application: 1. The duties collected by the German custom service on the external frontiers of the occupied territories were to be paid to the Reparations Commission. 2. The duties would continue to be levied in accordance with the German tariff. 3. A line of customs posts on the Rhine and on the perimeters of the bridgeheads was to be temporarily established. The tariffs as to both imports and exports to be applied on this line were to be determined by the High Commission in conformity with the instructions of the Allied governments.

The High Commission enacted Ordinance No. 77, which established special regulations for the operation of a Customs Department, an Export and Import Department, and an office for the prevention of the flight of capital. This ordinance and others dealing with the sanctions were issued under authority of the decisions of the Allied Conference in London in March, 1921, and not under the Rhineland Agreement. But it was not until April eleventh that information was received from the Supreme Council, approving the proposals of the High Commission.

The fact that the United States had not participated in the military operations evoked expressions of appreciation from the German press. The Germans had learned, however, that while the Americans might not participate in new measures against their country, they would not become involved in any disagreement whereby Germany could evade its obligations. During this period of political activity of very great interest

to the welfare of Europe and of exceptional concern to the Rhineland, the American representative was in frequent communication with the State Department and the American Ambassador to France, with reference to the form the economic sanctions would take, and our attitude toward them. The interest of the Washington authorities was shown by a despatch sent by the Secretary of State on March eighth, directing that the Department be kept closely informed of the Allied advance into German territory, of any military or civilian action or any ruling of the Rhineland High Commission which might affect the United States, and of any other matters of interest in the American district. Such information had already been telegraphed, and thereafter the State Department was kept constantly informed of developments in connection with the sanctions. In like manner the War Department was advised of all matters relating to the military situation that might in any way affect the status of our troops.

As the economic sanctions required the establishment of a line of customs posts between the occupied and unoccupied portions of Germany, the question of the American area again assumed much importance. Neither the Supreme Council nor the High Commission could exert any authority in the American occupied territory, except with American consent. It was foreseen that the United States would not participate any more in the economic sanctions than it had done in the military ones; yet, unless some arrangements were made, whereby the customs barrier could be placed on the eastern border of our Zone, these sanctions could not be effective. Were the American

bridgehead to constitute a gap in the proposed line, not only would it render the Allied plans abortive, but it would present to the world obvious evidence of disagreement that might have far-reaching consequences. Impressed with this thought, and influenced by the success of the policy adopted in January of the preceding year, the American representative sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, March ninth, somewhat as follows: "If the sanctions of the London Conference are to be considered solely as temporary penalties, it would not be wholly inconsistent for the Commander of the Forces of Occupation under Armistice conditions to permit their execution in the American Zone by the High Commission. This refers only to the Rhine bridgehead customs, as none of the customs posts of the Rhine Province contiguous to Holland, Belgium and France are in the American Zone. As delicate as is our position, it would be unfortunate for the general welfare to make a change in our status now. The Commission fully appreciates our difficulties and is most considerate of our views. As in the past, I will make the Commission's ordinance my orders, as far as they are compatible with Armistice conditions."

Although the High Commission did not receive approval of its proposals until April eleventh, a preliminary customs organization was already in operation in the Mayence bridgehead by the end of March. About seventy-five French customs officials, who had arrived in Coblenz prematurely, wandered about aimlessly while awaiting assignment. In the meantime the American representative had informed the High Commission that while he would not participate in the

establishment of customs posts in his area, that such posts could be placed on the perimeter of the Coblenz bridgehead and that he would furnish guards for them, solely for the maintenance order.

It was not until March twenty-third that the telegraphic suggestions indicated above were approved by the Secretary of State in a telegram, in substance as follows: "In response to your various telegrams on the subject of Allied custom control in the American area, you are informed that although this government will take no part in the enforcement of penalties decided on by the Allies, it does not wish to put unnecessary obstacles in the way of such enforcement. This government therefore perceives no objection to the placing of Allied custom collectors at the request of the High Commission in the bridgehead of the American area, if you consider that this will in no way endanger the safety of the American Forces of Occupation, nor interfere with the authority vested in you under Armistice conditions." Secretary Hughes further stated that the Secretary of War had been informed of this telegram.

Necessarily, the erection of such a customs barrier had a harmful influence upon the industry and trade of the Rhineland, but not to the degree proclaimed by the Germans. A very careful study of the probable influence that would be exerted on American trade under the system of sanctions was made and forwarded to the State Department. While it was officially stated in the instructions from the Supreme Council that the sanctions were to be temporary measures, a different view was held by certain commissioners and their deputies. The efficiency of the

economic sanctions as a means of raising revenue was doubted by the Commission members and the military commanders. Wide differences developed as to the organization of the customs régime, and not less than nine ordinances regulating the customs organization and the questions of import and export were published.

As soon as the line of customs posts was established, the German government protested that it was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, that the industries of the occupied territories would be ruined, and that reparations payments would be correspondingly diminished. Special objection on three counts was made to the necessity of securing licenses for shipment of merchandise into and out of the Rhineland: 1. It caused great delay to shipments and therefore reduced the amounts of imports and exports. 2. Licenses for the importation of luxuries or other unnecessary articles from allied countries could be issued freely. 3. In order to encourage trade of the Rhineland with Allied countries and especially with France, licenses for imports from Germany and neutral countries could be issued at discretion.

These fears of the Germans proved to have been justified. When specific complaints of favoritism were taken before the High Commission, it was admitted that discriminations in favor of the trade of Allied countries were being made. The practise was justified on the ground that the customs régime was one of penalties and that the more effective it proved in that direction the greater would be the pressure exerted on Germany. The American representative held that as the sanctions were imposed to constrain Germany to

accept the terms of the London ultimatum, that once these terms were accepted there was no longer reason to harm the trade of the Rhineland; and furthermore, that the sanctions should then have been lifted. If there had been any ulterior thought in all this matter of bringing the Rhineland into an entente customs régime and of assisting the cause of Separatism, the administration by the High Commission of the customs sanctions had proved fatal to it. By the exercise of the policy of favoritism in granting licenses, which was admitted, clearly the adjacent entente territories could direct the Rhineland trade to themselves to the injury of other countries. The High Commission decided to take over the German alcohol monopoly in the occupied territories, placing it under the Customs Managing Board and the Economic Committee of the High Commission. All stocks of alcohol were put in bond and could not be sold or otherwise disposed of without licenses from the Economic Committee. As many difficulties and much confusion arose from this change, a special sub-committee was appointed to deal solely with questions relating to alcohol. The average annual consumption of alcohol in the Rhineland for drinking purposes had been three million liters; yet, from April twentieth to May twenty-seventh, 1921, licenses were granted by the alcohol committee for the importation of twenty-three million liters for the same purposes. In a word, within five weeks licenses had been granted to import foreign alcohol, chiefly French and Belgian, sufficient to supply the country for nearly eight years.

The Commission took cognizance of an article in the *Rhineland-Westfälischen Zeitung*, charging brib-

ery and favoritism in the customs administration. This journal insinuated that corrupt agents were authorized, through whom permits could be obtained. An explanation was demanded through the German Commissioner. In answer to his reply, the High Commission stated that a careful investigation of the Bad Ems office, the central agency of the new customs, by secret service agents proved that the insinuations of bribery and corruption were without foundation. The Commission admitted, however, that private agencies for securing licenses for a compensation did exist, but that their services were not obligatory. Favoritism was frankly avowed.

August 13, 1921, the Supreme Council sitting in Paris decided to remove the sanctions by September fifteenth, contingent upon the acceptance by Germany of the following: "The constitution of an Interallied organization which will collaborate with the competent German authorities for the examination and delivery of licenses for the importation and exportation of goods to and from firms in the Occupied Territory of Germany as defined by the Treaty of Versailles; the sole object of this organization being to insure that the operation of the German system does not result in setting up discrimination contrary to the provisions of Articles 64 to 267 of the Treaty as far as the Occupied Territory is concerned."

The French and Italian customs experts, and to a certain extent the Belgian, were of the opinion that the executive body called for by the Supreme Council should exercise the same authority as the German officials in the examination and delivery of licenses; while the British expert believed that the new organ-

ization should limit itself to an investigation of licenses granted by the German authorities, to the end that the government concerned might take steps to prevent discrimination contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace.

In order to safeguard the interests of our nationals, the American representative suggested to the High Commission that we have representation on the Committee of Allied Experts and on such other committees and boards as might be created for the purpose of preventing discrimination against Allied commerce. This suggestion was readily accepted. The newly arrived British expert, convinced that the French view would prevail and believing that the question was more political than economic, returned to London. The French proposal in its application simply substituted for a control of import and export licenses, heretofore applied as a punishment, an equally effective control applied under an enforced agreement. The Allied body was set up to avoid discrimination, but when set up, it assumed complete control over the whole of the imports and exports of the occupied territories. It is needless to say that the operation of the new organization definitely increased the ill-will, which in the interests of all nations, should have been abated. In its acceptance of the abolition of the sanctions by the Supreme Council, the German government insisted that the new organization should refrain from interference with German executive powers. The High Commission drafted a tentative ordinance, Articles 1 to 7, repealing all measures whereby the punitive customs régime was established and enforced, and providing for a period of transition to a new system. Article 8 provided that all expenses incurred in

connection with the application of the sanctions should be borne by the German government. The British High Commissioner stated that he considered it wiser to secure the consent of Germany before incorporating such a provision. These differences, and the fact that the French government refused permission to have its representative meet the German expert officially or unofficially in a session of the Committee of Allied Experts to decide upon the new system, delayed the lifting of the sanctions beyond the date agreed upon, September fifteenth.

On September twenty-eighth the High Commission received a telegram from Monsieur Briand, President of the Supreme Council, stating that the sanctions would be lifted September thirtieth, and requesting that all necessary measures be taken for that purpose. Another Ordinance, No. 98, largely similar to the tentative one, was then promulgated, and the Committee of Allied Experts began its duties under the French plan, the sanctions presumably being removed.

Thus ended a painful experience in which political expediency and commercial greed were paramount, and in which the French view-point prevailed as usual. It must not, however, be supposed that there was a reversion to the normal—that the sanctions were wholly eliminated—for the Committee of Allied Experts continued its work at least to the date of departure of the Americans from the Rhine in February, 1923. The American and British experts considered that the adopted customs policy was never in accord with justice or the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles. The best that can be said of it is that it was human; it certainly did not comport with the wisdom or the magnanimity of conquerors.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOME MATTERS BEFORE THE HIGH COMMISSION

PERHAPS the outstanding characteristic of American representation on the Interallied Rhineland High Commission was its disinterestedness—recognized alike by Allies and Germans. The United States had no territorial or political purposes to serve through its representative on the Commission nor, in general, its representation on the Rhine; moreover, our economic and financial interests were comparatively small. Both Mr. Noyes and the Commanding General of the American Forces, who succeeded him in June, 1920, were unofficial observers and reporters. The fact that the American general had under his jurisdiction a definite part of the occupied territories gave him influence incommensurate with his State Department designation.

When the Treaty came into effect it became his delicate duty to determine how conflicting authority in the American Zone might be harmonized. The other nations participating in the occupation were at peace with Germany, while America continued technically at war. Those nations forthwith began to apply and to be governed by the Treaty and the Rhineland Agreement, while we continued in occupation under the Armistice Convention. The Rhineland Agreement did

not provide for such a confused state of affairs nor did it provide for the contingency of an occupying power's failure to sign the Treaty.

This Agreement was intended to give the Commission jurisdiction over the whole of the occupied territory, including the American Zone, while the Armistice Convention gave the Commanding General jurisdiction to govern the American Zone. There was no document, however, that defined the powers of these authorities as between themselves. In the early stages the American General announced that insofar as it was practicable the area under him would be governed by the same laws and ordinances and in the same manner as the other areas were governed. That decision made necessary a larger participation in the deliberations of the High Commission than the position of unofficial representative authorized. His utterances with respect to the American Zone were necessarily official. The High Commission was pleased with the solution of the embarrassing problem that arose when it assumed authority, and announced that the views of the American representative would have the same weight as though he were an official member.

A guiding principle of the American policy was set forth in Article 5 of the Rhineland Agreement, which authorized the Germans to govern themselves without interference, except when military occupation made interference necessary. The Rhineland Agreement and the government to be established by the civilian commission was reluctantly accepted at the Peace Conference in Paris. As the occupation continued, efforts were made by the High Commission and by military authorities to extend control beyond the limits of the

Treaty and the Agreement. American effort was consistently directed toward restraining such excess, at the same time rigidly exacting from the German authorities and people obedience to newly established laws and ordinances. Disobedience or defiance of constituted authority on the one side and harsh measures in excess of treaty-given right on the other, inevitably would create a perpetual ill-will between the nations concerned. Our influence was exerted continuously toward compounding differences and preventing such an unhappy result.

One of the first ordinances published by the High Commission provided that without its consent no judicial proceedings should be instigated against any person in the occupied territories for any administrative or political act done during the period of the Armistice. This ordinance prevented the Germans from prosecuting Doctor Dorten for treason. On July 24, 1920, armed police from Frankfurt in unoccupied territory entered Wiesbaden in occupied territory, seized and abducted Doctor Dorten, a well-known Separatist. As this was a violation of the authority vested in the High Commission as "the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated Powers," it took strong and immediate action. The President of the *Bezirk* of Wiesbaden and the Deputy Chief of Police of the city of Wiesbaden were dismissed from their offices and expelled from the occupied territory for supposed guilty knowledge and probable complicity in this affair.

The American Representative requested the presence of the German Commissioner and told him that this abduction was flouting the authority of the High

Commission and would probably result in serious consequences if the German government did not immediately cause Doctor Dorten to be returned to his home. He also strongly suggested that the German government would be well advised to make due apology to the Commission. This suggestion was received with ill grace by the German Commissioner, who artlessly stated that a sovereign state had jurisdiction over its citizens in its own territory. He finally accepted the disinterested counsel and took suitable action. Doctor Dorten was returned and on August 6, 1920, Herr von Starck appeared formally before the Commission and stated that by direction of his government, he expressed to the Rhineland High Commission regret that, contrary to the ordinances in force in the occupied territory, the apprehension of Doctor Dorten had taken place. Thereupon the American representative suggested to the Commission that as the German government had made proper amends, and that since it did not appear that the Wiesbaden President was directly concerned in the transaction, he should be reinstated. This matter was discussed, opposed and delayed for nearly three months, when the *Regierungspräsident* was restored to duty.

The High Commission maintained a local representative in each *Kreis* as previously stated and as contemplated by the First Versailles Note. He was to have no duty in supervising German authorities in the local administrations, but would help in coordinating the relations between the German elements, the local military authorities and the Commission itself. When the plan for the organization of the occupied territories was first discussed, one of the High Commis-

sioners announced his intention of having military officers perform this service, reporting through the military hierarchy, so that reports would reach the Commission through the Army Chief of Staff. This was in harmony with military occupation of the old system which had no concomitant civil institution such as the High Commission. The American contention was that the High Commission was a civil body and that peace having been declared, its local representatives should be civilians. The British Commissioner stated that his representatives in some instances would be military officers, but that all of them would be under the sole control of the Commission and in no sense under control of the military authorities.

After much discussion it was decided that the *Kreis* representatives, whatever their status, military or civilian, should be under control of the Commission in the performance of their duties, and that if they were military persons, they should be subject to military authority only for discipline. These representatives were the eyes and ears of the High Commission in the outlying districts. In certain areas they were officers and more disposed to promote the interests of the military authorities than of the Commission. Had the contention prevailed that they should report only through military channels, however correct it might have been in theory, much delay would have resulted and many matters of importance to the High Commission would never have come to its attention. Experience demonstrated that fact.

During the Armistice period, that is, up to January 10, 1920, each of the armies issued orders for the control of civil officials and the population. In some sec-

tions this control was exercised in minute detail. The first Versailles Note stated: "It is the intention of the Allied and Associated authorities to regard the various decrees issued by the military authorities in the occupied territories as having lapsed after coming into force of the Treaty of Peace. Nevertheless, it belongs exclusively to the High Commission to decide on the necessary transition measures." In reality, the High Commission was informally organized several months prior to the ratification of the Treaty, and had prepared a number of ordinances for promulgation the very date of the signing, January 10, 1920. Despite this, argument was made that while all military orders inconsistent with these ordinances should be deemed to have lapsed, all of those military orders which were not inconsistent with the ordinances should be considered still in effect. At its third meeting in January the High Commission decided that all military orders had lapsed and invited the Army Commanders to make suggestions at the earliest moment as to matters which should be covered by new ordinances. In spite of this ruling, the Commission had its attention invited again and again to the fact that the military authorities in certain zones were enforcing their orders in control of the population. It was repeatedly argued by the French and Belgian Commissioners, particularly the former, that the military authorities had the power to issue orders for the government of the population in cases not covered by the Commission. It was interesting to the American representative, a soldier, to see this civil body declared the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated governments, yielding its explicit powers to the military.

authorities; and still more interesting, to find himself defending the rights of the Commission against the encroachments of his military colleagues. The American contention, always contrary to the arguments referred to, eventually prevailed and became the accepted policy of the Commission. In making this contention the American representative could act with good grace and certainly without arousing any suspicion of selfish ends, because his forces continued under Armistice conditions and were not, therefore, subject to any provision of the Rhineland Agreement.

In the First Versailles Note, paragraph twenty-one, it was stated: "Freedom of communication by letter, telegraph and telephone will be reestablished between the occupied territories, and unoccupied Germany, subject to a general reservation of the rights of the High Commission." After the Treaty came into force the Military Commanders frequently requested the High Commission to give them the power of postal censorship over large areas of the occupied territories, asserting that this was necessary for the safety of the Armies. The first application was from the French Army and was considered in the session of February 4, 1920. The request was for authority to institute a general censorship in the populous districts of Wiesbaden and Ludwigshafen. The French Commissioner in supporting this request stated: "General Degoutte says that his command is in danger; that he can not be responsible for the safety of the army unless permitted to take necessary measures to foresee and forestall these dangers."

The American representative took the position that a postal censorship was a lazy way for an intelligence

police to do its work, and that it would be at the expense of the convenience and liberty of the people and would do more harm than good. A special censorship over the mail of a particular person or persons should be authorized by the High Commission whenever a necessity was shown to exist, but no general censorship should be instituted, except when the Commission found it necessary under Article 13 of the Rhineland Agreement to declare a state of siege. In this case control would pass to the military commanders, who could then govern as they saw fit. Although some of the forces of the occupying powers found great difficulties interposed in the execution of their duties and were, therefore, more disposed to sterner measures than we, yet the American contention prevailed. This historically new policy in military holding, comprising a High Commission, initiated by the Americans and expressed in the Rhineland Agreement, could never be wholly acceptable to some of the directly interested powers. Neither did it accord with the unexpressed unauthorized policy that was evidenced by daily acts.

Under the provisions of one of its ordinances the High Commission examined all new German laws prior to their going into effect in the occupied territories. Whenever the maintenance, safety or requirements of the armies apparently would be prejudiced by any such act, it was forbidden or modified as occasion required. On March 4, 1920, a newly enacted law concerning Workmen's Councils in industries came before the Commission. It provided for an advisory council in every business organization, which should have rather extensive rights to examine into the affairs of the company and to advise concerning the relations be-

tween employers and employees, both being represented. This was one of the body of new German laws more or less socialistic in tendency. It was strongly argued that the Commission should forbid the application of this law in occupied territory. The power of the Commission to forbid or control German laws was, as previously stated, limited to the needs and circumstances of military occupation and could be used only for the maintenance, safety and requirements of the armies. It was claimed that this law was an experiment and its application would result in disorder to the prejudice of the safety of the armies.

The American contention was that the safety of armies would be more prejudiced by the anger aroused should the Commission interfere in the application of a law which the German people regarded as highly beneficial and even necessary for their welfare. Possibly the reason for opposing this very democratic law was that its application near the frontiers might cause trouble in the Allied countries. After much discussion it was decided that inaction had greater merit than interference.

From the beginning the High Commission required that German authorities notify it of the appointment of German officials who were to serve in the areas held by the Allies. Along with the notification, certain information concerning the appointee was also required. It was claimed by certain members of the Commission that if the appointee were a Pan-Germanist, that fact alone was sufficient to cause a veto. The first conspicuous case to come before the Commission was that of Herr Momm, appointed *Regierungspräsident* of Wiesbaden. It was said that this appointee had very pro-

nounced Pan-Germanist ideas and that his son-in-law had been a U-boat commander. Doctor Momm's conduct while serving as President of the Treves *Bezirk* had been most satisfactory to the Americans. The American representative contended that being a Pan-Germanist was merely being a patriotic German and that such an attitude should not be a sufficient reproach to justify a veto. Naturally, in the interest of weakening Germany and of encouraging Separatism, it would have been desirable to install in all the important offices individuals who were known to favor an autonomous state of the Rhineland.

This matter came up for consideration March 5, 1920, prior to which date no question had ever been put to vote and all decisions had been taken unanimously. The Commission decided by a vote of three to one not to oppose the appointment of Doctor Momm. The French representative expressed his regret, stating that under instructions from Paris he was compelled to record his opposition. In order not to break the solidarity in decisions of the Commission, this case was reconsidered and ordered postponed. It did not come up for discussion again until April sixteenth. Then the French High Commissioner expressed deep regret that his recommendation and that of the French Army should not be accepted by the Commission. In order to prevent the matter from appearing on the minutes as having been decided against the French vote, permission to withdraw his recommendation from the agenda was granted.

For a long time this action of the Commission regarding appointees by the German government served as a precedent, but later when the attitude of

the Commission became more and more pronounced in its hostility toward Germany, Pan-Germanist views sufficed to bring about a veto of an appointment.

The German Commissioner, the *Reichscommissar*, represented, as previously indicated, not only the central government, but also the several German states, the territories of which, in whole or in part, were occupied in accordance with Part XIV of the Treaty. Herr von Starck, the first appointee, was of the old-school Prussian type, not particularly tactful and much given to legal arguments and to asserting that the decisions of the Commission could not be carried out. Yet he was of great assistance to the Commission to which he was accredited. His activities, however, greatly impeded the Separatist tendencies, so earnestly encouraged by certain of the Allied authorities. A case was steadily made up against him, largely through his inherent inability to conform to the requirements of his office. In the end reasonable opposition could not be made to the request that the Allied governments should withdraw their consent to his appointment.

From the beginning it was obvious nevertheless that it was not so much the official as the office that was envisaged in the opposition. Finally, when this view was openly espoused and debate was made that the office should be abolished, the American representative set forth his views concerning the necessity of continuing it. He contended that inconvenience and confusion would attend any effort to transact business separately with the *Reich* and the six other states concerned; that the local officials of the Commission through whom these states would be compelled to

approach the Commission would be disposed to decide on their own responsibility questions of grave concern; that such decisions had already caused the Commission serious inconvenience; that the helpful discussions of questions important to the good relations between the Allied authorities and the German population, so often held between the German Commissioner and the Commission, or the Commissioners individually, would be possible no longer; and that the work of the Commission would be multiplied beyond reason if parallel correspondence were carried on with seven separate states.

Herr von Starck had to resign, but the Allied governments, after a full discussion of the matter with all the arguments before them, consented to the appointment, under drastic conditions, of a successor—Prince Hatzfeld-Wildenburg. In the many discussions bearing on this matter, it was fully understood that separate relations with the seven states would seriously affect the unity of the Central German government and would be a decided encouragement to the Separatists.

In the general railway strike in early January, 1922, the railway men had not observed the provisions of Ordinance Number 53. This required that before any strike affecting public utilities take place the High Commission should be notified in order that a board of conciliation might attempt to bring the parties together. Before the strike order went into effect, the railroad officials and the leaders of the workmen gave the Commission assurances that there would be no disorders and that every train required by the military authorities would be operated. Nevertheless, representatives of both sides were called before the Com-

mission and duly informed that they had violated the ordinance referred to and that the strike was forbidden. After repeating their assurances, relative to disorders and the operation of all trains required by the military authorities, as well as all through trains, the leaders declared that they would lose their positions if they now attempted to recall the order issued for the strike. The High Commission further informed the representatives of the employees that a certain consequence of the strike would be the arrest and punishment of the leaders, that a probable consequence would be the requisition of the railway personnel, and that if disorders arose, a state of siege would be declared. When the workers withdrew one of the Commissioners announced that he was then ready to declare a state of siege. As there was no disorder and none threatened within the meaning of Article 13 of the Agreement, the American representative opposed any kind of a declaration of martial law.

It was then urged that the railroads of the occupied territories be placed under military authority through the exercise of a general requisition of all railway personnel and equipment. This was also protested by the American authority, who contended that such a requisition could be justified only to supply the needs of the armies which were not menaced, and that the Commission had no authority to enact any ordinance or publish any order except "to secure the maintenance, safety and requirements of the Armies." He contended that nothing in the Treaty, or in the Rhineland Agreement, or in international law justified the Armies of Occupation in taking control at this stage of

the railways and operating them. The requirements of the Armies were small compared to those of the very large civil population concerned. A very ingenious argument was advanced that all transport should be deemed military transport for there was no freight train which might not be carrying military property, and no passenger train which might not be carrying military personnel.

When it became evident that the Commission was resolved to carry out the drastic policy approved in the discussions, the American representative reluctantly stated that he must reserve to himself liberty of action to determine on his own responsibility whether the orders of the Commission or his own views on this matter would be enforced in the American area. Only this attitude prevented a probable declaration of a state of siege and assuredly a requisition of all railway personnel. This latter act would have been at variance with the word and spirit of the magna charta of the High Commission, and it would have been the initiation of a permanent military control of all rail transport—the militarization of all the railways of the Rhineland.

The Council of Ambassadors, May 17, 1922, regardless of the High Commission, ordered the destruction and modification of certain strategic railways in the occupied territories and the neutral zone. The proposal on which this decision was based came from the Interallied Military Committee of Versailles, presided over by Marshal Foch. The decision was taken by virtue of Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty, which forbids the upkeep of all permanent works of mobilization in the occupied territories and in the fifty

kilometer wide neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine. It was further decided that the execution of this decision should be entrusted to the Interallied Railways Commission sitting at Wiesbaden, which should act directly under the Conference of Ambassadors. The question was first brought officially to the attention of the Commission by the Belgian High Commissioner, who objected to the decision on the ground that the Commanding General of the Allied Armies on the Rhine, under whom the Railways Commission operated, performed his duties under the provisions of the High Commission, the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated Powers in the occupied areas. The American representative, agreeing with Baron Rolin-Jacquemyns, invited attention to the well-known provisions of the Rhineland Agreement regarding its supremacy and also to Answer IV of the Peace Conference to the German note. This stated that the High Commission was especially charged, together with the military authorities, with jurisdiction over the Rhineland railroads, and in making its decisions had to consider not only military exigencies but likewise the economic interests of the country. The American representative incorporated his views at length in a communication addressed to the President of the High Commission. The British and Belgian Commissioners supported the views expressed in this letter and requested that it be forwarded to the Council of Ambassadors. They also expressed their intention of sending a copy to their respective governments, declaring full accord with it. The French Commissioner stated that he did not share the views of the American representative, and that,

while agreeing that the High Commission should have been consulted, he did not wish to be put in a position of joining in a criticism of Marshal Foch's Committee. He would not, however, object to transmitting the American letter, provided he, as French High Commissioner, could send one expressing his views. A careful investigation in the American Zone showed that a section of about twenty kilometers, from Ringen to Badendorf, and another of about eighteen kilometers, from Gelsdorf to Rech, had very high economic values and very little strategic importance. The American representative wrote to Ambassador Herrick at Paris, our representative at the Council of Ambassadors, setting forth the supremacy of the High Commission in the Rhineland, asserted on a number of occasions by the Council of Ambassadors itself, and the fact that the proposal contemplated action by the Railways Commission regardless of the legitimate control by the High Commission or of the Allied Military Commander in three of the occupied territories, or by the American Commander in the Fourth.

Greater questions than that of jurisdiction were involved. Whether in the execution of the Peace Treaty, a policy of construction rather than destruction should govern, and whether the influence of the Military Committee, headed by Marshal Foch, and supported by the Council of Ambassadors, should supplant the civil authority duly invested in the High Commission. The French High Commissioner in endeavoring to support the view of his government was inclined to minimize the authority of the body over which he presided. He suggested that if the Commission were supreme in this question, it would be equally

competent to enforce authoritatively the general provisions of the Versailles Treaty in the occupied territory. It was obvious that this argument was biased by the ever-present thought that a stronger hand would be required eventually in carrying out French policy. That certain of these railways were strategic and should have been destroyed, there could be no doubt; that others listed were predominantly commercial and should be operated, is equally true. The preservation of the latter roads was of incomparably greater importance to Germany and to Europe generally than their destruction would be to the cause of security. It might be said that all railways are in a measure strategic, yet most of them have a far greater value in supplying the needs of an ever-increasing population for peaceful and economic purposes than for military ends.

The cases cited above are by no means exhaustive; they are simply suggestive. The list could be lengthened indefinitely. They serve, however, to show the different view-points of the governments concerned and suggest the serious events which followed in 1923. Placed as we were, without sharing the dangers and anxieties of the position in the same degree as did the other countries of both sides, our criticism of policies should have been, and was, accordingly tempered. Our participation in the discussions of the Commission, unless opinion was asked directly, was exercised only when principles were involved that bore on the administration of the American Zone, or were such that silence would have indicated an approval that would reflect adversely on the American version of the Rhineland Agreement or of international justice.

CHAPTER XIX

SPECIAL SESSIONS OF THE HIGH COMMISSION

ON DECEMBER 14, 1921, the High Commission began a series of meetings with delegations representing various activities in German life. The first meeting was with representatives of the chambers of commerce of the occupied territory; the second, with employers' associations; the third, with workmen's associations; and the last with representatives of the agricultural interests.

Each meeting was opened by an address from the President of the Commission, stating that last year similar meetings were held with delegations from the universities, the clergy and the press; that the object of the meeting was a practical one, to discuss the commercial and economic situation in the occupied territory and to advise with the various German interests concerning the best means to bring about a cooperation between the authorities of occupation and the Germans.

The President inquired how the depreciation of the mark affected trade, and by what measures the High Commission could assist the German people. He inquired whether the ordinance forbidding the sale of goods to foreigners in the occupied territory should be continued or rescinded; in what manner the High

Commission could help trade, facilitate transportation, by rail or by river, improve the condition of the working people and maintain public order. He asked if the workers were actively engaged and what the needs of industry were; if unemployment had been caused by the shortage of raw material, and in particular by the shortage of coal. He asked if it were a fact that shortage of coal was liable to cause cessation of work in industries; and if the rate of exchange directly affected the delivery of raw materials. He stated that it was not the desire of the Commission to enter into political discussions, but to take counsel with the Germans concerning practical measures by which it might be of assistance in an attempt to restore normal conditions. He emphasized the fact that discussion might be frank and unreserved.

At all the meetings the Germans asserted that they had been called together on very short notice and had not been given the agenda of the meeting, and that therefore they had been unable to prepare themselves for these discussions. They stated that the situation in the occupied territory caused by the sudden depreciation of the mark was in no way different from the situation in unoccupied Germany, and that the remedies should not be different; that these remedies were provided for by general German law which forbade foreigners in Germany making purchases except for the immediate necessities of travel; that these regulations should be continued in the occupied territory in the same way as in unoccupied Germany; and that the High Commission should not interfere. They said that the clearing out of German stores near the Holland border was exactly the same as the clearing out of

these stores near the borders of Belgium and France, all of which countries were greatly favored by the low rate of exchange. They said that the cheap articles had all been bought up by foreigners and that the Germans were obliged to pay increased prices, both on account of competitive buying with foreigners and because the new stocks brought in to replace the old ones were necessarily sold at greatly increased prices. They asserted that the feeling of the foreign merchants near the border was very strong, since the people of their own nationality would not buy their own goods but crossed the German frontier to buy cheap German goods. The President replied that the High Commission was not interested in the people of the border countries, but only interested in the people of the Rhineland.

In reply to a question by the Belgian High Commissioner, it was stated that it had been impossible in many cases to replace the stocks sold, but when stocks had been replaced the new goods were to be had only at very much higher prices. They urgently recommended that the High Commission should not interfere with the German regulations restricting the sale of goods to foreigners.

The German bankers asserted that unrest existed among the working classes and that higher and ever higher wages were being demanded in consequence of the depreciation of the mark. This depreciation, they said, resulted as much from international politics as from interior and exterior economic conditions, and was caused in a large measure by the inability of Germany and the Germans to meet their external obligations. The Belgian High Commissioner con-

tended that the depreciation of the mark stimulated the export trade of Germany. The Germans replied that it stimulated as well the demands of the workers for increased wages, and that the laws in force in foreign countries directed against the dumping of cheap German goods were so stringent that the tendency of the mark's depreciation to encourage export trade was offset; that in addition, they were forced to buy their raw materials with foreign currency, which was becoming more and more difficult for them to buy.

A German manufacturer stated that for the time-being Germans were not interested in the stimulation of trade; that they had all the orders they could take care of; but that they were much concerned with the ever-increasing demands for higher wages, and with the ever-increasing cost of raw materials, much of which must be bought abroad at prices which promised soon to be prohibitive.

Complaints were made against the Allied Control of Import and Export Licenses, which had continued in spite of the fact that the customs sanction was abandoned three months before. The Germans made strong complaint about the delays at the Bad Ems office. They said that after their applications had been sent to Ems and had been considered and acted upon, further time was wasted sending the papers to Coblenz for official stamp; they claimed that Ems was off the direct line of travel and that no worse place could have been chosen; that a minimum delay of eight days in granting licenses in the textile industry was required and this made business impossible, as the cotton market fluctuated daily.

Representatives of the steel industry at Solingen



General Allen inspecting French troops under his command

stated that fourteen days were required for import and export licenses for their products, and that this delay, owing to the fluctuation of the steel market, seriously injured their business. The President in reply stated that Ems had been chosen for the licensing office with regard to room and expense. He promised to make an investigation respecting the delays and to put into effect all possible remedies. The President called attention to the fact that the Germans still maintained a barrier line between unoccupied and occupied Germany—not a customs frontier but a line which required permission of the German government to cross. He stated that the Allied control of customs had caused much discussion in the press, but there had been no protest in the press against the German line. The Germans replied that this was true and the obvious reason was that this line was in the interest of Germany, that while the Germans could not control imports into the occupied territory, they did control the subsequent movement of these goods into unoccupied Germany. They asserted that the enforcement of the sanctions had proved that the economic situation of the occupied territory and the unoccupied territory was identical; that Germany was a whole and that economic policies must be dictated for Germany as a whole; that it was an economic necessity that the same rules be enforced through the whole of Germany; that the free lists maintained in Ems should be the same as those for the rest of the *Reich*; that no exceptions should be made at Ems in the interest of Allied commerce; and finally that the statement announced by the President of the Commission that the interests of Germany were considered at Ems was

very different from the practise applied there. It was urgently recommended that the High Commission use its influence to abolish the control of export and import licenses for the occupied territory, urging that if any control were maintained, that it should be sent to Berlin, but that it should disappear from the occupied territory; that if the Germans were to pay reparations they must export largely and, insofar as possible, restrict imports.

The President replying stated that the Ems office did not exercise a discrimination against German people, but that the Berlin government, when it had full control of import and export licenses, did discriminate against Allied people and in violation of the Treaty of Peace. The Germans called attention to smuggling, especially across the Belgian and Holland borders, and requested the cooperation of the military in case the inadequate police force should be unable to cope with the situation. They complained of transportation, especially of coal, and said that military requisitions of freight cars, frequently held in reserve and not used, was causing very great inconvenience. They complained of requisitions of hotels throughout the occupied area, particularly at watering places.

One speaker especially stressed the coal shortage. He said this shortage was not confined to the occupied territories, but affected the whole of Germany and was a direct result of the Peace Treaty and the decisions concerning Upper Silesia. Germany had to fulfil her treaty obligations; there was a surplus of coal in France; no solution could be foreseen on account of the Silesian settlement; brown coal was being used in

some measure; the question of coal and transportation could not be separated; there was a shortage of rolling stock; the occupied territory could not be considered separate from Germany as a whole; coal distribution was a matter for the German government; and that it was controlled by German laws and regulations which should not be altered or applied differently in the occupied territory.

The Germans further complained of the food situation; wages had been increased, were constantly being increased, but were always insufficient; the situation of salaried people and people with fixed incomes was desperate; prices were highest in the occupied territories; food, especially meat, eggs and milk had to come from unoccupied territory; milk was theoretical—there was no milk; there was a world shortage of potatoes; the crop in Germany was never so bad; the situation could be helped by the importation of potatoes from Posen, East Prussia and Poland, but the Polish authorities last year had interfered with, delayed and often forbidden such importations through their territory. Like interference was feared this year. The High Commission was asked to use its influence to help this situation.

Taxes were discussed. The Germans stated that taxes on earned and unearned income were seven times greater than pre-war taxes; that the lowest income paid ten per cent. and that a rich man with four hundred thousand marks income paid sixty-five per cent. income taxes—also surtaxes. Inquiry was made whether or not the rich actually paid their taxes, actually supported their government and actually bore their part of the burden that present conditions

imposed. The bankers and members of the chambers of commerce emphatically answered yes, but the workers intimated no.

The agricultural representatives complained strongly about the requisitions of valuable arable land for military purposes.

The most interesting session was with the workers. The first speaker, from Düsseldorf, proceeded at once to attack the sanctions applied last March. He said that at present there was very little unemployment, but that last spring there was a grave shortage of coal and that raw materials absolutely necessary for the industries of the occupied territories could not be secured from unoccupied Germany. In consequence there was much unemployment. For example, two hundred thousand working hours in one month were lost in the Düsseldorf area alone. Stocks of coal were again becoming exhausted. Germany's supply was short because France had received the coal, and the outlook for employment was bad. The depreciated mark had brought in a flood of foreign buyers who had emptied the shops, with the result that for the time being workers were busy replacing their supplies, but in a few weeks there would be much unemployment. Even now the workers' situation was bad, because the suddenly increased prices for the necessities of life were beyond their ability to meet. A worker from Ludwigshafen stated that the outlook for labor was bad in the district since the industries were already short of raw materials and they could buy no more, owing to the low value and the fluctuation of the mark. He requested that the High Commission use its influence to stabilize the mark.

The President replying said that good will between the nations was required; that all classes in Germany must make a strong financial effort, pay their taxes and support their government; otherwise, financiers in foreign countries could not have confidence in Germany; that unemployment was serious in France and more so in England; that many people in France and Belgium had no houses; that international cooperation and good-will promised the only solution.

A worker from Cologne said that the working people of Germany were aware of serious unemployment in America, England and France; that an international delegation of workers was studying conditions and remedies; that German workers were doing their best to aid in the work of reconstruction; that the condition of the workers in Germany was worse than that of the workers in the other countries named; and that the conditions in Germany resulted from the terms of the Peace Treaty which could not be fulfilled. German financiers could transfer their capital abroad but German workers could not escape the suffering brought by the Treaty of Versailles. He stated that the German working classes had got together to do all in their power to remove distrust and lack of confidence; that they had determined to refuse to manufacture war material; that the chemical industry of Germany was not a war industry and the Allied criticism of it was unjust; that the publication of a book entitled *The Riddle of the Rhine* had caused much distrust; and that if in isolated cases workers had acted contrary to the views he expressed, and particularly if they had opposed searches for arms, such actions did not represent the will of the workers of Germany.

A worker from the Ludwigshafen district said that the workers were assisting in the strict control of the chemical industry and would refuse to make war material; that the sanctions had caused unemployment, had affected the import of raw materials and that delays in licenses had caused railways to be congested; that the action of the authorities of occupation in many cases had caused bad feeling among the workmen. He cited instances. The authorities had demanded a detailed list of the names and positions of members in certain unions, particularly in the Belgian Zone. The workers feared their liberty of meeting would be challenged, several meetings having been forbidden lately. The Belgian High Commissioner promised that an investigation would be made. The workmen further stated that the High Commission had given its protection to Smeets, editor of the *Rhineland Republic*, an agitator for the separation of the Rhineland from Germany. That interference caused the workers grave concern.

Monsieur Tirard reminded the speaker that political discussion was outside the scope of the meeting. The worker replied: "But you asked us to state what was on the minds of the workers—what troubled them. This I am doing. What we workers want is freedom—freedom of meeting, freedom of movement, freedom from outside interference."

The President said that the German authorities in Bavaria, a month ago, had interfered with the workers' freedom of movement and meeting. The worker replied that this was true, but that the Bavarian government had been compelled very quickly to rescind those orders. The authorities of occupation continued

to take more and more houses; there was already a distinct shortage of houses as a result of the war. The condition was more acute in the occupied territory on account of the military garrisons. In peace times the Rhineland took care of seventy thousand troops; there were now twice that number. School buildings were being taken and schools were being closed; it was impossible for the working man to leave his children anything, but he hoped he could give them education. Through the requisition of schools, children were already one year behind in their education, and though the government had built houses for the armies, it did not appear that any of the old houses were being released. He said that the workers of the occupied territories are quiet when they have bread, work and a house, and urged that the Armies of Occupation be reduced to the lowest possible number as the best way of maintaining order.

The President stated that the strength of the Armies of Occupation was one hundred and thirty-five thousand, and that these troops were being kept here until houses were constructed for them in France and Belgium. The workers responded that these soldiers for the most part belonged to the working classes and that they should go back and help reconstruct France, rather than remain in Germany; that the workers wanted the French and Belgians to reduce their armies as the Americans and British had already done. He said the workers requested acts, not words. He urged that the colored troops be the first sent away; he said it was an insult that a race of the lowest culture, of no education, should be placed in a position of authority and billeted in the homes of a superior race;

that the Germans could feel no confidence as long as there were colored troops in the Rhineland, a danger to their women and a menace to public health and order.

The President replied that the removal of colored troops was not within the powers of the High Commission; that the stories of insults were exaggerated; that the colored troops were as well disciplined, if not better, than the others; that in the colonies colored troops mixed with the white population, causing no trouble; and finally, he regretted that a workman should introduce race prejudice into the discussion. The worker replied: "Working people as such have no race prejudice. They make no distinction of race in their work, but we do fear to leave our homes and go to our work, leaving our wives and daughters in our houses with these men. This question troubles us more than houses and more than food. We beg you to convey our sentiments on this subject to the governments you represent."

A workman from Bonn discussed the shortage of houses. He said that families of non-commissioned officers recently arriving made difficult conditions more difficult; that barracks were being built which workers had to pay for but which probably would not be required later. He said German workers had no sympathy left for militarism; that they were willing to rebuild the devastated areas in France and Belgium; that France and the Rhineland had been friends before the war, based on a similarity of tradition, and he hoped that the French would not destroy the sentiment on which that friendship was based. He referred to increased prices and decreased value of the mark and

said that the workers greatly feared what they had to expect from hunger and cold. The President remarked that the presence in the occupied territory of the troops of occupation was economically beneficial and that the dollars, pounds and francs spent there brought great prosperity to the Rhineland. The worker replied that this was true insofar as concerned a small number of the merchant class but was quite untrue insofar as concerned the working man, who was compelled to buy the necessities of life in competition with these dollars, pounds and francs.

A number of workers commented on the shortage of coal, the shortage of houses, high prices, the threatened shortage of work and the inability to pay their debts if they were constantly interfered with. It was suggested that if Germans demonstrated their good faith they could make foreign loans. Several workers responded that loans merely meant more debts which must be paid. Several of the workers asserted that the concerns of the Rhineland were the concerns of Germany, and that they were no greater and no different except as the presence of the Armies of Occupation made them so. They expressed the hope that some direct result might come from these meetings, but rather plainly indicated that they had slight expectations of such results.

At the close of the workmen's meeting, when the assembly was about to disperse, the man who had first spoken arose and said that he had not referred to the Smeets affair because he had understood that no discussion of political subjects was to be permitted. After noting that several political matters had been discussed he had circulated among the workmen and now

desired to present to the High Commission the formal protest of the workers present, representing the workers of the occupied territories, against the action of the High Commission in interfering with the German courts in their proceedings against Herr Smeets.

In all these sessions the Germans made it clear that in their opinion the actual purpose was in some way to impress upon the people of the Rhineland that there was a divergence of their real interests from those of the remainder of Germany, and that they should rely for relief upon the High Commission rather than upon the German government. The Germans apparently believed that the Separatist movement was being encouraged. In consequence of this belief a note of strong resentment was heard throughout all the sessions.

These meetings left a conviction that there was no substantial sentiment in favor of the separation of occupied territories from Germany, and that if these special sessions were intended as an embryonic Rhenish parliament, they fell far short of accomplishment. They were, however, important in giving an unusually good idea of what the Germans had uppermost in their minds, even if some of it were not agreeable. This parliamentary *ballon d'essai* was the last.

CHAPTER XX

THE YEAR OF CONFERENCES, 1922

THE political and economic situation in Germany at the beginning of 1922 was still dominated by the reparations obligations under the Versailles Treaties and subsequent decisions bearing on them. The Reparations Commission had replied unfavorably to Chancellor Wirth's statement that his government would be unable to make the next payments in full and that a moratorium was absolutely essential. The British and French Premiers had held conversations in London and had decided upon a conference at Cannes early in January, when reparations would be discussed in connection with economic reconstruction and the reestablishment of normal conditions in general.

The international difficulties which the Wirth government faced after it had proclaimed Germany's inability to abide by the London Agreement barely failed to bring about a Cabinet crisis. Efforts to include the German People's party, the strong party of the Industrialists, in the Cabinet were in vain. The government was also earnestly endeavoring to bring the parties of the Right and Left together in order to have an agreement on the question of taxation—the most important internal issue allied with the most important external one—reparations.

When the Cannes Conference assembled on January sixth, Foreign Minister Rathenau, the head of the German Delegation, reiterated the inability of his country to make the reparations payments falling due January fifteenth and February fifteenth. The guarantees he proposed were not considered sufficient. The dramatic ending of that Conference by the sudden resignation of the French Premier, Briand, prevented any important decisions being reached. The Conference ignored the recommendations of the Army Costs Conference and the question of the payment of actual costs of the American Forces. We were left in a position wherein all the assets of the common debtor had been seized by the other creditors. It would appear that we were to get our expenses by some direct dealing with Germany, or possibly not at all. The Reparations Commissions, however, granted Germany a temporary respite on the January and February payments on condition that thirty-one million gold marks be paid every subsequent ten days.

The difficulties of accord between England and France were scarcely surpassed by those between the Supreme Council and Germany. The meeting on February twenty-fifth at Boulogne, between the Channel Premiers, Poincaré and Lloyd George, was for the purpose of deciding upon another general conference, this time at Genoa. It was agreed that the Versailles Treaty would not be endangered, that France's right to use coercive measures would not be disputed, that Allied claims would in no way be abolished, that the Conference would be postponed until April tenth, and that the rights and privileges of the League of Nations would not be curtailed. Under such a protocol it

would be futile to think a conference would change the London plan of payments or otherwise improve conditions in the distressed states of Central Europe. Until a different sentiment prevailed in the Supreme Council and the Reparations Commission, which could determine the manner of payment but not the amount, conferences would follow one another in vain.

On February seventeenth a cablegram from the War Department announced the reduction of the American Forces by two hundred and three officers and three thousand enlisted men, much to the satisfaction of all Germans who hoped it might cause a reduction in the other holding forces. When such a reduction was proposed at the Army Costs Conference in Paris by the writer a few months before, the other interested representatives simply stated that their forces would be correspondingly increased. The French Rhine Army Commander expressed a desire to substitute French troops for the departing Americans. This was agreed to with the understanding that the limits of the American Zone remain unchanged, that the new troops be under the command of the American General and that Coblenz could be visited by French soldiers only by special permission.

The following is the substance of a letter written to the Secretary of State, March, 1922, by the author:

“The last reduction of the American Forces carried with it the question of the diminution of the area of the American Zone, for it was well known that the French could hardly permit us without protest to hold such a considerable territory with such small forces. On the other hand, much of our influence on the Rhine has been due to the fact that the High Military Com-

mand and the High Commission have been obliged to make their orders and ordinances comply with the requirements of this Zone, thereby producing a favorable reaction on the entire occupied territory.

“The French views relating to their Rhine holdings and their consideration for the rights of the Rhenish inhabitants are not in full accord with our views and practises and I might say also not with those of the other holding powers. While they want us to remain on the Rhine, they are not averse to having our territory reduced. They know well what our stay means to them; General Degoutte expressed it well when he stated that as long as we remained at Coblenz there would be no German aggression. Their entrance into this zone is therefore not military, but simply a continuation of their policy of making themselves masters throughout the Rhineland. There has never been a period since the Armistice when the moderating influence of American representation on the Rhine has been more necessary than now.

“In spite of my misgivings in respect to the introduction of French troops into this Zone, though under my orders, it is deemed the best available solution. In order to maintain our hold over this American Zone, it shall be made clear that our *Kreis* officers and provost courts—the outward and tangible proof of American control—shall continue their duties throughout this area.

“Possibly these details may be of little interest to the Department; still I deem them useful in giving a further picture of French activities. They now control the entire course of the Rhine from Strassburg to Ruhrort except the American area and the yet smaller holding of the British.

“You may feel that it was a mistake on my part to have permitted any French troops in this area, and so do I, but it was a question of retaining control of our entire territory, or of permitting these relatively few troops to come in under strong restrictions. The pop-

ulation will be grieved to learn that French troops are coming into this zone, but the burden and friction will be less by reason of the fact that it remains under our control. The French Commanding General seemed to be fully impressed with the thought that concessions made in the American holding would be attributed to French pressure and that such action would not help Franco-American relations at this time."

On March twenty-second another cablegram announced the President's decision to return all troops by July first, but nothing was mentioned at the High Commission regarding the American representative. On receipt of this order the three High Commissioners took up the matter with their governments, Monsieur Tirard going at once to Paris for that purpose. Three days later a telegram from our London Embassy announced that for reasons affecting State Department negotiations, "the Secretary of War directs that you withhold until further instructions formal notice to Rhineland Commission or other Allied authority of orders to withdraw the remainder of your forces although preparation to carry out orders which have been sent you should proceed without interruption." Evidently the Washington administration was finding difficulty in making a decision between what the situation on the Rhine claimed and what political exigency at home demanded.

In a letter to Ambassador Herrick, Premier Poincaré said: "The French government regrets very keenly that the Federal government has taken the decision to withdraw its troops. Their presence beside the Allies while recalling the common sacrifice in an heroic and glorious struggle for the triumph of justice and liberty, could only contribute to affirm in

the eyes of the whole world the essentially peaceful character of the occupation of Rhenish territory. It is in the same pacific spirit without any idea of domination while respecting the liberty of the inhabitants that the Allied troops after, as before the departure of the American troops, will continue an occupation which has no other aim than to guarantee the execution of the conditions of peace, especially the payment of reparations and the disarmament of Germany, and which contributes efficaciously to the maintenance of general peace." This was interpreted by our Ambassador to France to express not only sincere regret but likewise a strongly implied desire that our government change its decision.

In the meantime Monsieur Maginot, the War Minister, stated in a speech in the Chamber that France must have for her security thirty-two divisions complete with their auxiliary arms, transport, aviation and tanks—amounting to four hundred and seventy-five thousand. The minimum for her foreign theaters of operations is two hundred and five thousand, thus making her minimum total six hundred and eighty thousand. Maginot further stated that the native troops would be three hundred and five thousand and that the other three hundred and seventy-five thousand could be obtained in France. The later struggle in Morocco with the Riffs indicates that in a future estimate, a different ratio will be necessary. France has not ceased to limit her armament obsession to fear of Germany, but she foresees danger from Russia and the necessity of maintaining the North Sea, English Channel and Mediterranean routes in addition to her Oriental ones.

Replying to a note of the Reparations Commission on April ninth, the German government followed the course of the Chancellor's *Reichstag* speech. He stated that the situation had become even more acute as a result of the continued depreciation of the mark and predicted starvation and chaotic conditions in Germany that would affect all Europe unless some measures were adopted to prevent further decline of the rate of German exchange. He stated further that the necessary money for paying reparations obligations could be raised only by a foreign loan, that the levying of additional taxes was impossible, and that the outlined financial control was contrary to former promises of the Allies, etc.

The answer to this note by the Commission insisted on the original demands for additional taxes, and in general it was a flat rebuttal to the German reply. The German press noted the sharp character of the answer and expressed apprehension lest further sanctions be applied. This paper struggle between the Reparations Commission and the Berlin government developed into negotiations at Paris, whereat Doctor Hermes and State Secretary Bergmann represented the German government. The result was a second short moratorium under further restrictions, but providing for a foreign loan for Germany.

The much heralded Genoa Conference, with Soviet Russia represented, assembled April tenth under the presidency of the Italian Premier. The most striking matter connected with that conference was the surprise Treaty of Rapallo drawn by the Russian and German Delegates. Although nominally of an economic character, Allied circles looked upon this doc-

ument as highly political and as a first step toward a Russo-German Alliance. The far-reaching possibilities of the pact were duly recognized by the entire German press from the extreme Right to the radical Left. The indignation of the Allies and the Little Entente were expressed in a joint note condemning the secretly negotiated Treaty, charging Germany with bad faith and requesting the withdrawal of the German delegates from the Committee on Russian Affairs. A crisis and an abrupt ending of the conference were avoided only by direct negotiations with the German delegates which resulted in a German note accepting the Allied view-point.

Monsieur Barthou, head of the French Delegation, declared the Rapallo Treaty a violation of the Cannes Conference, and referred to the "mendacious statements" of the Germans. Chancellor Wirth repudiated this accusation and declared that the Rapallo Treaty was published in its entirety and that the stories of a supplementary military pact were pure invention. He also thanked Great Britain for countering all efforts to salvage the conference. This statement concerning the supplementary pact was confirmed to the writer by Doctor Rathenau in Berlin a few weeks before his assassination by members of a monarchical and anti-Semitic secret society. It is indeed doubtful whether any success was accomplished at Genoa toward "demobilizing public opinion in certain states."

The chief factor of all the conferences of the Reparations Commission of the Committees of Experts—in fact of the policy dominating the greater part of Europe—was the President of the Council of Ministers of France. It was he who brought about the Military

Agreement with Belgium, the defensive alliances with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, and who kept alert France's aggressive attitude toward the recent enemy. France held the chairmanship of all the important committees and commissions connected with the settlement of post-war measures and oftentimes held the deciding vote. Therefore when Monsieur Poincaré spoke, his words were impressive. His speech at Bar sur Aube, April twenty-fifth, proclaimed that France was not militaristic, but was simply insistent upon the letter of the Treaty. Nevertheless he intimated that the Allies would demand the full execution of the terms of the Treaty by May thirty-first, and that if they did not act France would take measures alone as provided by the provisions relating to sanctions. The right to act alone remains questionable.

The conferences and negotiations that continued with unabated frequency were of exceptional interest to the several representations on the Rhine. The question of the Rhineland was involved in all of them. The unwillingness of the Washington government to participate in completing the war task was considered a failure in a solemn duty toward Europe. European statesmen were learning of the potency of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in international affairs.

A cablegram arriving May second delayed the sailing of the 8th Infantry "on account of complications in quartering troops in the United States." This caused a belief that it was the President's intention to maintain some troops on the Rhine, since no such difficulty had been experienced previously in quartering troops returning from the American Forces in Ger-

many. General Degoutte sent a tentative plan outlining the relations between the French troops in our Zone and the American Commander. The latter's designation as "territorial commander" over the French assets was satisfactory. It was agreed that regulations governing the American troops would apply equally to the French and that the American courts would exercise jurisdiction over all cases between the German population and the soldiers of both countries. The 4th Brigade of Dragoons was the first contingent of the French Army to take station in the American area.

On June third a War Department cable announced that a force not to exceed one thousand two hundred officers and men would be retained on the Rhine. The members of the High Commission expressed great satisfaction over this decision, and the German Commissioner, in expressing his pleasure, mentioned the unusual fact of the authorities of an occupied territory desiring the continued maintenance of a foreign force within its confines. Probably the cabled recommendation from Paris demanded of General Harbord by the War Department had value in determining the Administration to continue the occupation: "At Coblenz I talked with High Commissioners of France, Britain, Belgium and with Commanding Generals of British and French Forces. All desire our troops continue in Coblenz as being the only impartial disinterested influence on the Rhine. Our occupation of Coblenz as capital and administration center and seat Rhineland Commission . . . has made us the great moral and restraining force in a situation still full of potentialities, jeopardizing the peace we fought for as well as our commercial interests in Europe."

In spite of the expressed unanimity of pleasure and satisfaction, the writer felt that the French High Commissioner had some qualms as to the decision by reason of the strong opposition to his proposals made at times by the American representative. To oppose French policies on the Rhine did not mean any more than it did at Washington, in discussing the Four Power Pact, that our sentiments for France and the French people had vanished. Unfortunately these gallant people too often show undisguised evidence of belief in the Biblical declaration, he that is not for me is against me. If by our participation on the Rhine we could help the cause of general peace, why should we be influenced as to remaining by the wishes or desires of a single state? The Rhine problem was not wholly French, otherwise we would not have been there; and if we were there for the welfare of various states we should not have attached undue importance to the wishes of any state in respect to our continuation or departure.

Perhaps the statement over the signature of Senator Brangier in *Le Matin*, July twenty-eighth, may not have represented the views of the majority of his countrymen, but it was at least very significant: "Let it [the debt] be discussed, but under one condition—that the *Reich* be dismembered into the states composing it. In this way only would Europe be assured peace. . . . That simultaneously with the reduction of the German debt, the German nation be split up into its constituent states." If such a move had been effected there would have been little hope of genuine peace in Europe. Such thoughts as these, along with the Rhine and the Bavarian agitations and the Ger-

man financial crisis, had produced the most critical situation in Central Europe since the signing of the Treaty four years before.

Certainly we did not want to send our soldiers to Europe again, and it was equally certain that we wanted a genuine peace in order that the trade to which we aspired might be realized. Possibly at that time, under the conditions of French public opinion, no German government could have made the concessions demanded by France and have survived.

The growing intention of France to seize additional territory was emphasized when Premier Poincaré made perhaps his most noteworthy speech August 21, 1922, at Bar le Duc, in the arrondissement of his birth. It was most aggressive and unconciliatory and was directed almost as much against the British viewpoint as against Germany: "It is under these conditions that we should for the moment refuse any new moratorium, or grant it only against positive guarantees; mines of the Ruhr and German state forests. We know that the British government has not accepted this view, which is that of the French government and which is that which the speaker maintains." This speech developed chills in the chancelleries of more than one European state. It was the declaration of a man who felt the solid backing of his country.

Less than three weeks later Monsieur Poincaré made another speech at Meaux on the occasion of the celebration of the Second Marne victory in which he stated that if France did not get her just reparations she would be ruined. He also reiterated his statement that if the Allies did not help her secure them, she would do it alone. This speech, taken with the failure



Premier Poincaré

of the Belgian delegates at Berlin to come to terms on suitable security for the proposed six-months' bonds, caused another sensation and a deep depression of the mark.

In spite of the many billions of paper marks issued by the *Reichsbank*, it was at times impossible to get one hundred dollars changed into that currency in any of the Coblenz banks. A subsidiary of the *Reichsbank* held that much, but at the call of our Finance Officer. To relieve the shortage of marks the *Reichsbank* decided to issue daily for a while eight billions of new notes. Notes of ten thousand marks became quite as common as were those of one thousand two years previously; moreover, the financial situation was growing worse at a rapid pace.

In the midst of the tension that accompanies such a financial status and with the forebodings of "productive pledges" that would undoubtedly include much of the Ruhr Basin, the celebration of the anniversary of the founding of Germantown, Philadelphia, by Mennonites from Crefeld in the Ruhr on October 6, 1683, took place with considerable circumstance. The names of the heads of thirteen Westphalian families, nearly all of whom were connected, were given in the German press as the founders of that suburban city.

When Germany proposed a law intended to suppress traffic in the mark with a view to halting its alarming depreciation, the Belgian High Commissioner strenuously opposed permitting the enactment to be effective in the occupied territory, and in this he was supported by Monsieur Tirard. To have refused its application, even in one zone would have been equivalent in a measure to nullifying the law for all of

Germany. Dealers and money changers would have carried on in that exempted zone to the detriment of the entire *Reich*. Such a prohibition would have been a violation of Article 5 of the Rhineland Agreement and would have set a precedent whereby the Commission could nullify almost any legislation that the German government might enact. It would also have been a step toward Separatism by creating a situation in the Rhineland different from that in unoccupied territory.

The Conference on Army Costs held at Paris in 1921 had also to ascertain the costs of the various boards and commissions which were borne by Germany. Request was made on the High Commission to furnish a statement showing what were the expenses of the representation of each state concerned. The only one who objected to complying with this request was the French Commissioner, who claimed that he was responsible only to his own government. Finally, at the one hundred and ninetieth meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors in October, 1922, the British Ambassador presented a proposal that each High Commissioner be asked to submit a report to his own government as to the expenses of his personnel and the possibility of effecting reductions, and that these reports be communicated by each government to the other interested governments. This compromise was accepted. Our Ambassador, Mr. Herrick, made a reservation, as he did not see fit to express an opinion on this very simple controversy until he had received instructions from Washington. Naturally, he was instructed to withdraw his reservation.

The whole matter could have been arranged

quickly, in a rational way, had proper frankness been existent, simply by having had a committee organized in the High Commission to investigate and report. Instead of that, reams of paper were expended on the subject and much time of many highly paid officials was devoted to obtaining this compromise which in the end failed to secure the desired goal. This incident serves well to show a procedure which, unfortunately, indicates the method of arriving at fruitless results by many of the conferences and commissions of 1922.

While Germany was insistent on its inability to meet the obligations imposed upon it, the Reparations Commission itself was suffering a stalemate. It was generally believed that new sanctions or requisitions would be made in the several Rhine holdings. My colleagues, as well as the German Commissioner, were desirous of knowing what policy in that case would be exercised in the American Zone. The question was of serious moment; but the writer believed for several reasons that seizures most probably would not be made in the American holding. In any event, he would make a decision only when the case was presented.

The Belgian delegates finally broke with the French, and the Reparations Commission decided upon a moratorium as to payments, both in money and kind, until the end of the year. Under that temporary relief the German government could live from day to day, but it was too late to stave off hunger and cold during the coming winter. The debased currency had put the price of most articles beyond the reach of many, especially of the salaried and middle classes. The resources of industry were largely exhausted and capital assets were insufficient to maintain a profitable

working capacity. Even without further Allied pressure, Germany's political and economic travail foreshadowed a period of great suffering.

As the year advanced it became more and more certain that France was resolved on taking aggressive measures involving productive guarantees, in spite of the disapproval, and in several cases of the opposition, of her war partners. It was indeed difficult to give our government an unbiased opinion as to whether the American representation should remain on the Rhine when the declaration of Bar sur Aube, Meaux and Barle Duc were about to be translated into acts. There were two wholly different aspects—a European one and an American one. That our stay did help in moderating the policy of some of the states there was no question, but whether it was sufficiently potent in preventing the increasing antagonism between France and Germany and in arresting the growing aggressiveness as to warrant remaining in such a highly charged atmosphere, was a very different matter. It might have happened that France would have simply informed the United States in the most diplomatic terms possible that as it had refused to sign the Treaty and was unwilling to collaborate officially with the European states in their trials, it would be advisable for the United States to leave the field wholly to active players. That would have produced a most disagreeable situation, even though the act had not been approved by any other of the war partners.

Our flag was maintained on the Rhine largely because all the directly interested powers strongly desired it, and a spirit of international comity seemed to demand that their requests should be granted.

There was above all a moral obligation to help settle the difficult post-war situation in which the Rhineland loomed large. If, however, conditions had so changed that our representation was threatened with entanglements and could no longer checkmate a policy that seemed bent on seizing its reparations regardless of continuing or increasing the dreaded unrest in Europe, quitting the Rhine merited the profoundest consideration. Adding to this, the unceasing demand of a large number of influential Americans that the President bring the last of our troops out of Europe, it can be easily seen that it would have been a very courageous administration to have failed to comply. A telegram from Washington about Thanksgiving Day, announcing that no more replacements would be sent to the Rhine answered the question.*

In December Lloyd George, as ex-Premier, wrote a series of articles for a prominent London daily, parts of which were strongly resented by the French press. Through the influence of one of the leading German parties of the Right, extracts from them were put up as posters in the American and British Zones. They created much interest and were supposedly intended to educate the working classes as well as to bring about dissensions in the holding countries. Although this might have seemed a reasonable way for the Germans to fight the Separatist movement, it was in fact not a skilful move. The High Commission discussed the matter and made public its decision, with quite a copious preamble, "that the above mentioned poster

*A stronger stand by our government, if taken a few months earlier, would have prevented that fruitless seizure of the Ruhr and the misery that followed it.—H. T. A.

must be removed and that no new posters will be permitted." The only ground on which the Commission could base its action in accordance with its own ordinances was that of public order. Although there was no disorder, these posters might have caused rioting. The text of the poster quoting Lloyd George's article was: "The Rhineland is in race, speech and culture German; and although the French claim they want to make a free, independent Republic of the Rhine, this would simply mean a state under French protection, practically an annexation of the Rhineland by France."

About this time European journals of nearly all nationalities reported from Washington that our government had formulated a plan to alleviate the post-bellum ills of Europe—the embryo Dawes Plan. This aroused the ire of a leading French daily, *Le Temps*, which oftentimes reflects the views of the government and caused it to publish the following: "A new flight of American projects descended in the night upon the somber pool of reparations. It is solemnly stated that the government of the United States will propose to reform the Treaty of Versailles, to evacuate the Rhenish territory, to reduce the German debt, and to take away from the Allies the general privilege they possess over the resources of the *Reich*, although the Allies would be requested not to ask for any remission of their debts to the United States. Finally the American bankers would grant Germany one or two small loans." New plans were unacceptable at this stage. Poincaré had burned his bridges.

The last important Conference of the year took place in London between the Prime Ministers of

France, England, Italy and Belgium. The complete failure and breaking up of this meeting cast a gloom over Europe. Great Britain's new Premier, Bonar Law, to avoid any further seizure of German territory, agreed to abrogate Balfour's letter and to accept Germany's Class B bonds in payment of France's debt to England; but Poincaré insisted on occupying Essen and Bochum and in establishing a customs cordon around the Ruhr coal. Mussolini agreed with France except as to the use of force. The Belgian Prime Minister, Theunis, largely agreed with the views of the British Premier, but always with the understanding that in the end he must follow the lead of the French Premier. Thus ended hope of any reasonable agreement between those countries, our recent war associates. The occupation of the Ruhr, in a manner to be prescribed by France, became a certainty.

The end of the year brought great unrest and unhappiness to a large part of Europe, it clearly indicated the severe blow that the Great War had delivered to civilization and it made evident the dangers that still threatened.

CHAPTER XXI

OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR, 1923

AS FAR back as July, 1921, the following substance of a communication, envisaging French intent, was sent to the Secretary of State, in the hope that it would have some value for him in estimating conditions in respect to the Rhine question. Sympathy for France and a desire to see her restoration and prosperity, as well as a full appreciation of what her civilization and maintenance as an important state meant for the welfare of the world, were never ignored.

In the early days of the High Commission there was a too general impression that it was a mistake to have such a civil organization and that the Supreme Military Command should be dominant in the Rhineland. Gradually the conviction became strong that the Commission was a duly organized institution, properly authorized to operate under its magna charta—the Rhineland Agreement. Then a strong effort was made to increase its importance, and above all to magnify the position of its President, the French Commissioner. That our commercial interests in Europe were directly affected by the Interallied Rhineland policy there could be no doubt. Furthermore, that policy, at the head of which was Monsieur Poincaré, was destined to keep Europe in a perturbed condition, pos-

sibly to the extent of bringing about hostilities which might again involve our country. Under such conditions the United States was necessarily an interested party.

Due to events that had been happening on the Rhine, with increasing frequency, it was evident that France had no intention of complying with the terms of the Versailles Treaty in regard to the time limits of holding the bridgeheads. Of this Germany was fully conscious and therefore the French efforts to conciliate the Rhinelanders on the one hand while increasing her hold on the country with the other, simply served to increase the hatred between the two countries. We did not want to see our trade interests sacrificed, and much less did we desire to see developing the ominous elements that presaged continued unrest in Europe. Since advising implied a certain amount of responsibility, we were reluctant to move in that direction, yet the United States could not otherwise exercise its beneficent influence. It was evident that all the states concerned wanted our assistance, and it was no secret that the failure of our country to participate in the Treaty, and particularly in the Tripartite arrangement, was a grievous blow to the Allies and greatly modified the French attitude on the Rhine.

Under the conditions of the Military Agreement between France and Belgium, the latter country felt constrained to follow the Poincaré policy, yet its Commissioner on the Rhine and that of Great Britain fully appreciated the disadvantages of a policy that increased hatred and prevented both physical and moral restoration. There was nothing to indicate that the counsel and wishes of their governments would have

any decisive influence upon the obviously determined attitude of France to hold all she then had and to continue her policy of weakening Germany. They believed the situation would grow more serious unless the United States utilized its well recognized position and influence to counsel toleration and induce restraint in those unhappy countries.

If France had the Ruhr, the Rhine and the Saar and could see the greater part of Upper Silesia under control of her ally, Poland, the dreams of European prowess of many Frenchmen would be realized, but there would be no real peace. France was holding the Rhine from Ruhrort to Switzerland, except the very limited Cologne and Coblenz bridgeheads. Her saber was much in evidence throughout that extent. With the temporary departure of a large part of the British troops to Upper Silesia, French soldiers had moved into Cologne, though they came under the command of the British General.

When the German government accepted all the terms of the ultimatum of the London Conference without reserve, it seemed that there was a moral obligation to lift the sanctions and such was the view of my colleagues on the Commission, except the French. The constitutional German government, if it were to succeed, needed help from France as well as from all the other co-belligerents. The story of the sanctions—particularly the economic ones—and their influence on German industrial and economic life had been duly reported. How long they were to be continued and whether additional productive pledges would be demanded was unknown. Many believed Germany was making an earnest effort to fulfil its obligations as

declared by the new Chancellor. Others saw only effort to avoid all possible obligations, especially those of reparations, and a burning desire to avenge the demands made as the result of war. The influence of the United States as a constraining and restraining force was never more necessary.

France's financial status was precarious and Germany's potential strength was a menace in her eyes. Her birth rate was about one-third that of Germany and her inability to compete in the world markets with her historic enemy in many products was only too well known. Recognizing those facts, France wanted to profit by her actual military superiority and her political advantages to bring about the conditions she thought would keep her safe in the future. The history of the Rhine for two thousand years shows fighting between the Gallic and Latin people on one side and the Teutonic on the other, and there was no reason to believe that with a continuation of the present policy the future would reveal any change in Central Europe in this respect. We had reason, however, to believe that a policy of understanding, involving fair dealing and toleration, possibly even during the periods fixed for the occupation, might cause these nations to recognize that their mutual well-being could be accomplished without the application of force. We had, therefore, some obligation and a very great opportunity to take the lead, and by our advice and counsel help bring these countries to a frame of mind that would make for real peace. This obligation and opportunity were not to be considered solely in their altruistic sense, but strongly in connection with the promotion of peace and stable conditions, under which

our commerce and trade might be fostered and not hindered. We could use our commanding position to ameliorate actual conditions and possibly to avoid the harmful results that were sure to follow the clearly outlined intentions of France, a state for which we had the greatest possible consideration and good will. There was no response to the above, nor was any anticipated. Perhaps the New Haven speech of Secretary Hughes may have been influenced by this argument, tardy though it was.

France's determination to adopt a more vigorous policy toward Germany was outlined not only by acts on the Rhine, such as the demand to control all the railways, the request for detailed information concerning German forces and the exclusion of Prussian officials, but also by her attitude at the various conferences, the utterances of her Premier and the press. The tone of the French press caused serious apprehension in the German papers of all parties. A report of Monsieur Dariac, a prominent member of the Chamber of Deputies, was specially disquieting. He advocated a separate financial system for the Rhineland with a special currency, the replacement of Prussian officials by native Rhinelanders, and the extension of authority of the High Commission and a Rhenish parliament. He further called for an independent Rhineland under the military protection of France. The frequent discourses of Monsieur Poincaré, both in Parliament and on war memorial occasions, left no doubt that he contemplated additional compulsory measures.

The outlines of the various conferences, conversations and proposals between the Allies and Germany

in 1922, the year of conferences, in an effort to settle reparations, appear elsewhere. Had security been given first place, better results would have been obtained. That does not mean, however, that the actual French government would have been satisfied with less than it secured.

The Reparations Commission established a default on the part of Germany on December 26, 1922, on account of its failure to deliver the stipulated quantities of timber to the Allied Powers, although that government had previously submitted a statement giving the reason for the delay and asking for an extension of the period by three months, until April 1, 1923. After thorough deliberation the German government, under Chancellor Cuno in succession to Herr Wirth, unanimously decided to submit new proposals as "the last effort of an exhausted people." The speech of Secretary Hughes on December twenty-ninth at New Haven suggesting a commission of experts rather than of statesmen to fix the definite amount to be paid by Germany in reparations apart from political considerations, came too late. Decisive crystallization of views had been effected.

Conversations on the reparations problem were resumed at Paris, January 2, 1923, the Allied governments being represented by their Prime Ministers, except Italy, in whose behalf Signor della Torretta negotiated. Premier Mussolini elected to remain in Rome. The British government believed that the French decision to seize guarantees in Germany would seriously interfere with any attempts by that country to reform its finances and make suitable reparations. The British representative on the Reparations Com-

mission proposed a reduction of reparations to fifty billion gold marks, a moratorium of several years, and a financial control by a committee of one representative each from Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, the United States and a European neutral state. The Belgian and Italian representatives supported Monsieur Poincaré, and in consequence the conference ended two days later in "complete but friendly disagreement." After hearing the German representatives on January ninth, in their effort to prove that the coal delinquency was due to unavoidable causes and was not intentional, the Reparations Commission nevertheless declared it a voluntary default. Sir John Bradbury, the British Delegate, voted against the decision, and Mr. Boyden, the American Unofficial Representative, advised against it.

A Franco-Belgian note, dated the following day, informed the German government that sanctions would be taken in the Ruhr district, and that a mission of control composed of engineers would be sent there, accompanied by the necessary troops as a guard to assure the execution of the mission's task. It was stated the task was to watch over the production and deliveries of coal, and assure strict application of the program drawn up by the Reparations Commission. The note expressly stated that the French and Belgian governments contemplated neither military operations nor an occupation of a military character.

On January twelfth the French Commander on the Rhine, General Degoutte, issued a proclamation stating that the French and Belgian governments, in accordance with the Versailles Treaty, had decided to send into the Ruhr a control commission consisting of

engineers vested with power to oblige Germany to respect the obligations it had contracted. The proclamation continued: "The object pursued by the French government is absolutely pacific. In sending this commission it declares that it has no intention of undertaking a military operation or a political occupation. Only such troops as are necessary to protect the commission and guarantee the execution of its duties are being sent into the Ruhr." General Dagoutte at the same time sent the writer a communication stating he was charged with assuring the safety of the economic mission going into the Ruhr.

However pacifically expressed or however carefully the phrases of the Treaty may have been employed, such a move could not be other than a military seizure. This was generally recognized at the time by all on the Rhine and by the rest of the world later. England and other countries have questioned the legality of the action taken by the two countries, France leading.

The occupation began January 11, 1923, just four years and two months after the Armistice when French troops entered Essen. Bochum was occupied two days later, and Dortmund, five.

At a meeting of the High Commission January sixteenth the French Commissioner reported he had received instructions from his government directing him to propose to the High Commission the application of the economic reprisals that France proposed to take. He accordingly presented three ordinances, which he asked might be considered immediately. The British Commissioner stated that under his instructions he was not to participate in any action or discussion con-

cerning measures of the kind proposed by Monsieur Tirard. Yet while the body was in session he received a despatch from London permitting him to participate in the sessions without voting. Apparently this modification was brought about in order that the meetings might be properly constituted, even though the British Commissioner opposed all the measures or refrained from voting on them.

Thereupon, the Commission considered and adopted the three ordinances: 1. Providing for the seizure of the coal tax collected in occupied territories. 2. Seizure of all customs receipts in occupied territories and impounding all funds accumulated from collection of customs wherever they were held. This did not contemplate taking over the customs operations, but did contemplate the stationing of Allied agents at all points where customs were collected in order that the moneys might be seized at the source. 3. Seizure of all proceeds resulting from exploitation of forests in occupied territories. At the conclusion of the meeting the Commission, at the request of Lord Kilmarnock, authorized the insertion of the following in the Allied press: "At a sitting this morning, the High Commission, in consideration of instructions received by certain of the High Commissioners from their governments, promulgated three ordinances. Acting upon instructions received from his government, the British High Commissioner was present at the sitting but refrained from voting. The Italian representative was also present."

In general, Signor dell' Abadessa participated only in discussions pertaining to financial matters.

Shortly after the occupation of the Ruhr a repre-

sentative of the German Commissioner called at the American Department of the Commission to invite attention to the protest of the Soviet government against the occupation. He placed special stress upon the following passage of the protest: "In this fateful day the Russia of the workers and peasants raises its voice again in passionate protest against the insane policy of imperialistic France and its allies." After the reading he stated: "If no powerful western government will help us, is it not clear that we will be thrown into the arms of the East?" It was intimated to him that Bolshevism as a bogey could not serve well, for if that political malady were to become a reality in the West, Germany would be an early victim. He replied that the destruction of Germany would result in the destruction of France and that Germans were fast approaching a state of mind in which they would suffer the one in order to bring about the other.

Enactment of the above ordinances resulted in open defiance by German officials of all grades throughout the territories occupied pursuant to the Treaty, as well as those newly occupied. This attitude was assumed with willing and general obedience under orders from the national and state governments. The following is one of these orders: "The action of the French and Belgian governments in the Ruhr District constitutes a grave violation of international law and of the Versailles Treaty. By reason of this, all orders and instructions issued to German officials in the execution of this action are legally of no effect. The national government and the governments of Prussia, Bavaria, Hesse, and Oldenburg * therefore direct that orders of

*Birkenfeld at the time belonged to Oldenburg.

the occupying powers are not to be followed, but that the orders of our own governments are to be adhered to exclusively. This applies to all officials of the territory formerly occupied with reference to all measures in conflict with the terms of the Rhineland Agreement. [Signatures] Cuno, Braun, von Killing, Ulrich, Tautzen."

In consequence of refusal to obey the ordinance, the High Commission deported many officials, in a number of cases including their families. At one session the Commission deported forty-eight higher officials, including governors and important customs, finance, forestry and municipal officials. At first the Commission removed only those who definitely refused to obey specific orders, but a number of others invited dismissal and deportation by defiant announcements in advance that they intended to disobey such orders. A marked example was this one signed by the highest executive in the Rhine Province, the *Oberpräsident*, together with all the high functionaries representing the province, districts and municipalities: "Under date of January 20, 1923, the German and Prussian governments issued instructions to the effect that all orders and ordinances decreed as a result of the action of the French and Belgian governments in the Ruhr Basin should not be executed by German officials, as being without legal effect; that on the other hand, the said officials must carry out the instructions of their own governments exclusively and that this applied equally to the officials of the old occupied areas in respect of all measures contradictory to the stipulations of the Rhineland Agreement."

The first to suffer deportation for this was Doctor

Fuchs, *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province, on February second. Although most of the officials immediately deported were from the French and Belgian Zones, one of the first was the Chief of the Finance Office at Cologne. Following this action the British Commanding General, Godley, announced that until new instructions were received from his government no further arrests or deportations of German officials would be made in the British Zone. As German officials consistently refused to obey the new ordinances, the number of expulsions continually increased. A total of fifty-four were deported at the session of February first. The attitude of the British toward this whole matter may be deduced from the following reservation made by the Commissioner for that country appearing in the minutes of the High Commission: "The British High Commissioner stated that in accordance with instructions received from his government, he would refrain from taking part in this decision and disclaimed all responsibility for it on behalf of his government and himself." He thus became a mere observer, for most of the discussions of the Commission now bore on the new occupation.

The position of the British authorities became increasingly difficult, as would that of the Americans had they not been recalled on the very day of the occupation. The office of the German coal administration was at Cologne in the British area. Presuming on the British government policy of not permitting arrests or punitive measures, the administrator refused to assist the Allied officials in collecting the coal tax or in the distribution of coal. In spite of unofficial intervention by the British, the German official still re-

fused. The French and Belgians became indignant and wished to take strong action, but the British authorities under their instructions could not permit this. If they continued to refuse, the Germans would construe that attitude as in support of Germany, and the French and Belgians would to that extent be unable to enforce their penalties. If they permitted the penalties, then it would be necessary to establish French and Belgian Courts in the British area, or to try offenders in British Courts in violation of instructions. This was a truly difficult situation.

Die Kölnische Zeitung, the most influential daily in the British Zone, called upon all German officials to resist. The French and Belgian Commissioners insisted that either the British or they must take action in this case. Steps in either direction would have been contrary to the London instructions. It seemed that one of two courses was possible, that the British collaborate or evacuate. Eventually a working ground was found that reflected much credit on the patience and tact of both British and French.

As a result of acts of sabotage and passive resistance scarcely any coal had reached France or Belgium from the Ruhr by the end of January. On the other hand, the supply to unoccupied Germany was considerably increased. In order to stop further consignments of coal there, the two holding countries encircled the entire Ruhr District by a cordon of troops and customs posts, thereby establishing strict control of all outgoing trains. This was immediately followed by a nation-wide movement for assistance of the Ruhr population. Collections by national, state, municipal and private organizations yielded material

sums. There was an unprecedented decline in the mark from eight thousand to the dollar on January fifth, to thirty-seven thousand within less than a month, and a corresponding increase in the cost of living amounting to sixty-two per cent. in ten days. All current contracts between the French mining industry in Lorraine and the German smelting corporations in the Ruhr were cancelled, and an economic war was declared that would work untold havoc, not only to the directly interested states, but serious impairment of trade to many others.

Though no official statement was ever made by our government connecting the occupation of the Ruhr and the evacuation of the American Rhine holding by our troops as cause and effect, Europe did not fail to see in the complete departure of the American representation from the Rhine the dissatisfaction of the great transatlantic Republic. Germany made much of it.

President Ebert and the National Cabinet issued proclamations to the German people against the occupation, pointing out that Germany did not possess the military power to resist and that everything possible would be done to shorten the occupation and alleviate the suffering of the population affected. The presidential proclamation lodged a solemn protest against this "violation of the peace treaty by France and Belgium." The Chancellor and the Foreign Minister in statements to the press called the occupation a "breach of justice and an act of violence against a defenseless nation." This view was shared by all parties from Nationalists to Socialists. Reply to the Franco-Belgian note was handed to the Ambassadors of those countries in Berlin January twelfth. This note de-

clared that "the mask would be torn from the face of the French government" and reveal the character of the Ruhr proceedings in a true light. The note pointed out that armed contingents of troops had crossed the border in a warlike manner and invaded Germany, and that the entire procedure was a purely military act. Finally, it announced that Germany would not be in a position to make payments or deliveries to France and Belgium while the illegal status in the Ruhr continued, nor until the serious consequences thereof had been overcome. Naturally this brought about the declaration by the Reparations Commission of a general voluntary default. The *Reichstag*, in plenary session on January third, unanimously approved the policy of the government and protest demonstrations were staged throughout Germany, including the occupied territory.

The situation in the Ruhr became very grave January fifteenth, when the German Coal Commissioner expressly forbade any person or persons to deliver coal or coke to France or Belgium, even in case of payment. Although the French immediately ordered the mine owners to resume deliveries, threatening severe penalties, both the industrialists and the labor unions maintained an obstinate attitude, declaring they would continue to obey the government's orders. The development of the policy of passive resistance continued throughout the entire occupied territory, as well as the Ruhr Basin, with results that are well known.

CHAPTER XXII

FINAL DAYS OF THE OCCUPATION

ON JANUARY 5, 1923, President Harding stated at a press conference that the Administration was in favor of withdrawing the troops, but that Germany, Belgium, Great Britain and France wished our troops kept on the Rhine; that they proved a most helpful influence; that they had acted as a buffer force between contending elements; and that this government had not wished to have them withdrawn at any time when the withdrawal might be considered a gesture on the part of the Government in relation to any European crisis.

The following day, despite the order for the concentration of troops, the French High Commissioner informed the writer that there was still a possibility that France and Germany might reach an agreement, thus avoiding the Ruhr seizure. The resolution by the Senate on January seventh, favoring our immediate withdrawal, did not indicate a belief in such a possibility and was a blow to those who considered that the trend of the Harding Administration at this time was toward more active participation in settling the aftermath of the war. This Resolution was disappointing to Europe, whose hopes of recovery had been strengthened recently by what seemed to be America's increased interest in her welfare.

Even after the concentration was made and the order for the advance was given, there was undoubted evidence of faltering. England's failure to cooperate was a grievous act and the passive resistance outlined from Berlin with the unanimous approval of the German people were depressing. In a conference with the French and Belgian Commissioners on the tenth, they stated that although the advance would begin the following day, it would not pass the eastern boundary of the Rhine Province at a distance of less than two marches, before the fifteenth. Both these Commissioners claimed to believe that the very mild policy that would be established would win both industrialists and workmen.

The writer, impressed with the extreme gravity of the results that would follow such a move and sensing the possibility of a compromise even at that late hour, suggested that a further effort be made to prevent the crisis by reopening negotiations with Germany. Naturally, this was a bold step, taken without the consent or approval of the State Department. It was, therefore, necessarily in a private capacity, and with the full conviction that he risked a rebuke from his government. The High Commissioners were most sympathetic toward his initiative, though each and all realized that the discussion of the renewal of negotiations between the Allies and Germany was not an affair of the Commissioners individually or as a body. Our close contact with the situation and knowledge of questions of the Rhineland and Germany, and the manner in which the Commission would be brought into relations with the Ruhr occupation by the French plan, should cause our views to merit consideration.

Monsieur Poincaré had just stated in the Chamber that France stood ready to talk with Germany and the Allies: "*Nous resterons toujours prêts, elle le sait du reste—quoiqu' elle affecte de l'oublier—à causer avec elle comme avec nos alliés et nous nous arrangerons pour ne pas l'embarrasser, au contraire, dans ses efforts de relèvement.*"

Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg, the German Commissioner, at first assumed that his country could not negotiate with countries that had violated the Treaty of Versailles and infringed upon the sovereignty of the *Reich* by the Ruhr aggression. After considerable discussion of the present status with no indication that it would fail to grow worse and cause general misfortune, not only to the directly interested countries but to all Europe, he expressed the opinion that his country, which had always consented to negotiate, would probably do so now under proper conditions.

Under these circumstances a special meeting of Commissioners Tirard, Rolin, Kilmarnock and the writer was called at three P. M. on the twelfth. All had given the following proposed resolution drafted by the American representative very careful consideration: "Impressed with the seriousness of the present situation in relation to the normal exercise of peace, trade and commerce and due to changed conditions that have taken place within the past few days, it is the sense of this body that between now and January fifteenth, a successful effort might be made to renew negotiations that would bring about an arrangement with Germany that would be satisfactory to the Allies." The three Commissioners were quite willing to bring the matter to the attention of their

respective governments. After all, that was the important consideration. The writer was not unduly optimistic as to the result, nor as to the reception of his proposal when it reached Washington.

The French High Commissioner reported the matter to his government as follows: "General Allen asked me to-day for a meeting with my Allied Colleagues. In the course of this meeting he informed us that in view of the development of events and of the respective attitude of the Allied Powers and Germany, he had invited the attention of his government, in a personal and private capacity, to the opportunity for negotiations that might adjust the situation.

"I replied to General Allen by reading a passage from the speech of Monsieur Poincaré before Parliament, relative to the attitude of France in regard to Germany and to French pacific intentions. Baron Rolin Jacquemyns stated that the Belgian government had made similar declarations. My Belgian colleague and I invited General Allen's attention to the fact that the present attitude of the German Government did not appear to be of a nature to favor the proposal. I am enclosing the text of General Allen's memorandum."

The communication of the British High Commissioner to his government is as follows:

"I was informed by General Allen yesterday that as he was so perturbed at the dangers of the situation created by the independent action of the French and Belgians, he thought that every endeavor should be made to reopen negotiations even at this late hour. He was most anxious that the High Commission should take some action in this sense and after he had talked

the matter over with my colleagues, a private meeting was called by the French High Commissioner this afternoon at which a proposed resolution was put forward by the General in the hope that it might be adopted as the considered view of the High Commission.

“The text of the resolution is as follows: . . .

“Both the French and Belgian High Commissioners were of the opinion that the matter was outside the competence of the High Commission, and I did not feel justified in disagreeing with them, but we all agreed to inform our respective governments of the action taken by General Allen in his private capacity and of the views in the same sense, which he was sending to Washington.

“I am entirely in agreement with General Allen that the French and Belgian action is extremely dangerous both to the future peace of Europe and to the present tranquillity of Germany and it is the hope that the action which he has taken may possibly lead to useful results that I am transmitting the above for your Lordship’s information.”

The Belgian High Commissioner’s report to his government was evidently drafted in conjunction with that of Monsieur Tirard, and as it was of similar tenor, it need not be repeated here.

At this time a telegram was received from Roland Boyden, the head of our Reparations Delegation at Paris, saying that the French were going to make new proposals. That fact, taken with the deferring of the payment of the half billion francs until January thirty-first, indicated a deep subjective study on the part of some of the principal actors in the tragedy that was being enacted.

Due telegraphic report was made of all these details to the State Department, but it was not until

January seventeenth that the Department saw fit to reply in substance, as follows: "In view of the recent developments it is desired that you should refrain from expressing any opinions or presenting any plans in relation to the existing delicate situation without explicit instructions from the Department. The French Ambassador here has received a telegram from Poincaré referring to a suggestion made by you concerning a renewal of negotiations. The French government does not view with favor this suggestion which is considered inopportune."

The delay of four days in sending this telegram concerning a matter of such exceptional importance strongly suggests that the Department was indulging hope that some amelioration might be accomplished.

Thus ended an earnest effort to prevent a calamity that eventuated almost as harmful to France as to Germany. This seizure constituted an important factor in France's present financial crisis. It is no more possible to dig coal successfully with bayonets than it is to fell forests with sabers. It was a presumptuous move on the part of the writer, but the conviction of the importance of the cause in which it was made was the dominant factor. He replied to the Washington telegram as follows:

"The cautionary telegram via Paris arriving yesterday was not wholly unexpected. My declared private and unofficial act was based on the close personal relations existing between the civil and military heads of the countries represented here and myself, and the hope that even this feeble effort might possibly help avert the untold misery that is being put on the population of Europe, especially innocent children. The

thought that possibly an expression from here where we see in the historical background of the Seven Years' War and the Thirty Years' War, a possible repetition of history was and is uppermost in my mind.

"The movement actually under way is creating implacable passions. The prairie has been set on fire and the wind of hate is fanning it. It was simply absurd to imagine that such an incursion as that of the so-called 'economic' or 'industrial commission' could be made in the proposed homeopathic manner. There was never a possibility of such an outcome and already allopathic treatment has begun.

"These thoughts motivated my action and now that they have been laid before you, Mr. Secretary, I beg to say that it is a deep regret for me if my humane intentions have annoyed you and furthermore, that your observations will be my guide."

Events were moving rapidly. The British Commissioner, Lord Kilmarnock, was instructed not to participate in any debates bearing on the Ruhr occupation. In consequence only the French and Belgian representatives were responsible for the ordinances that were being enacted, such as the seizure of the coal tax in Occupied Territories, the seizure of custom receipts, and the seizure of certain pledges in connection with the exploitation of forest resources in the Occupied Territories. Traffic by rail and river was ceasing and an inexpressible pall of gloom was being spread over the land.

Just one week after the seizure, Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg came to the headquarters of the American Commander bearing a letter from the German Chancellor. In delivering it he stated that as President Thiers and Marshal McMahon had given General Man-

teuffel, charged with the German occupation in France in 1871, a letter commending the justice with which the General had administered his charge, so he, Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg, was honored in delivering this one from Chancellor Cuno. The *Reich's* Commissioner was visibly moved when he had finished his remarks confirming the contents of the letter.

In thanking the Chancellor through him for this formal expression touching on our service, and he himself for his gracious remarks, the writer stated that the desire to make the burden of occupation as light as possible had always been uppermost in his mind, and that his policy had been based on the necessity of the reestablishment of normal conditions. It was, however, very pleasing to have this surprising formal recognition of his efforts:

“General:

“In accordance with the communications of your government, the day when the last American troops will leave the occupied territory on the Rhine is imminent. I seize this opportunity to tell you that the German government appreciates highly the spirit in which you have administered the authority vested in you. By maintaining the proper relations between your troops and the population, by non-interference in purely German political affairs, you have materially lightened in the section occupied by your troops the depression and the hardships which are unavoidably connected with the occupation.

“Accept, General, the assurance of my sincerest respect.

“CUNO.”

Formal written reply to this letter followed after the lapse of a few days:



Lord Kilmarnock, British High Commissioner

“Mr. Chancellor:

“It is with much satisfaction that I received from the hands of Prince Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg, German Commissioner here, the highly appreciated letter that you have seen fit to send me on the eve of the departure of the final elements of the American Forces from Germany, in which you state: ‘I seize this opportunity to tell you that the German Government appreciates highly the spirit in which you have administered the authority vested in you.’

“It is very flattering to feel that our efforts toward peace, restoration and trade have met the approval of you and the German people. It has been my constant endeavor to lighten the burden of occupation to the limit by demanding of all units of this command that courtesy and consideration toward German nationals which seem to me should be the aim of all holding forces in occupied territories.

“Please accept, Mr. Chancellor, the assurance of my highest regards and the sincere wish that peace conditions in Central Europe may soon assume a more hopeful aspect.”

Although no instructions had been received as to the departure of our representation on the High Commission along with our troops, the writer assumed that with only the five thousand French soldiers under his command his position would be impracticable, and he therefore made all arrangements for the complete withdrawal of American representation on the Rhine.

From correspondence and newspaper reports the Administration seemed to entertain some doubt as to whether its representation at the Commission should be retained. My colleagues, both civil and military, and our Embassies in Paris and Berlin seemed specially desirous of having our representation con-

tinued. It was a number of days before the Washington decision regarding this matter reached Coblenz.

The entrance into the Ruhr Basin was apparently the signal for our departure; one followed the other as cause and effect. Furthermore, the celerity demanded by Washington in connection with the withdrawal of our troops emphasized that general belief.

Monsieur Tirard sent the writer at this time this clipping from the French Journal published at Mayence, *l' Echo du Rhin*. "It is with profound regret that the High Commission, the officials of the High Commission, the troops of the French Army of the Rhine and the entire French colony of the Rhine see the last American contingent depart. The friendship which had been cemented on the French fields of battle between the valiant Yanks and our Poilus during the course of the war, has continued during peace, where the best accord has existed between the two sister republics occupying the Rhineland side by side. The officers and soldiers of the French Army of the Rhine, particularly those who have been garrisoned at Coblenz with the Americans, will preserve an excellent and cordial remembrance of their comrades from the other side of the Atlantic."

About the same time the following article appeared in the *Coblenzer Zeitung*: "When the troops of the Union marched into Coblenz on that dreary seventh of December, 1918, they appeared in the victor's feeling of triumph, namely, that victory which their entrance into the World War had decided against us. As to the others, including those who are now seeking to reap the fruits on the Continent, we would have finished with them—we had thus far done it—but the over-

powering might of America tore final victory from our hands, tired from the struggle of four years. The first weeks and months were passed under the influence of war psychology and for a while the mental attitude of troops fresh from the battle-field determined their relations with the population. . . .

“From this view-point the policy of Washington in ending General Allen’s mission just at the moment when its continuance was so necessary, when the Rhenish people in their greatest distress so urgently needed a protecting and moderating balance weight to offset the effects of an unrestrained political and industrial imperialism, is all the more deplorable.

“What would Franklin have thought of present-day France? One can not be in doubt after reading the inscription on his monument, ‘He wrested the lightning from Heaven and the scepter from the tyrant.’ But what would Franklin have thought of the America of our day and its policy?”

At noon, January 24, 1923, the American flag was lowered the last time at Ehrenbreitstein, thus marking the end of the occupation of the part of the Rhine Province held by the American troops. The French flag was then hoisted. The British and Belgian Commissioners, in a most delicate remonstrance against the departure of the American Forces, declined to be present at this flag ceremony.

From the top of the fort thousands of Germans could be seen assembled in the streets of Coblenz across the river watching the simple act by which the rich Rhineland might be reshaped. In all the romantic past of this great valley with its changing fortunes and allegiances, few events have been more significant.


Except for the Belgians, well to the north, and the light tenure of the British in the Cologne area, the ancient enemies east and west of the Rhine were left face to face to settle the debts and punishments of the last war.

This ceremony was followed by a formal lunch at the house of the writer, whereat he made these remarks: "The spectacle we have just witnessed was not grandiose nor particularly imposing, but the significance of the event possesses an importance of the greatest interest in connection with the affairs of the old and new world. It is worthy of mention that the grave acts now taking place before our eyes, pregnant with graver results in which you are to be participators, give this luncheon an unusually significant historic phase.

"I profit by this occasion to give whole-hearted recognition to you distinguished representatives of the Allied governments for the unfailing courtesy and consideration shown us at all times and to you Chiefs of the French Army who have so successfully fostered our fine comradeship in arms."

Monsieur Tirard, deeply moved, responded as follows: "I am sure I am voicing the sentiment of all those who witnessed the simple and beautiful ceremony this morning, in expressing the profound emotion we felt when the Star Spangled Banner was lowered from Fort Ehrenbreitstein. All of us felt that an historic event was taking place. Our emotion is founded on our common memories.

"As President of the Rhineland High Commission I wish to express once more, General, in the name of my colleagues and for myself, the friendship and



Final Departure of American Troops from Ehrubiteistein

esteem in which we hold you, and to do honor to the lofty spirit of impartiality which has characterized all your conduct. It is with sincere regret we lose the benefit of your advice and counsel which we have always valued most highly."

General Mordacq, representing General Degoutte, who was unavoidably detained in the Ruhr, spoke in a similar vein.

Baron Rolin-Jacquemyns' words were: "The sentiments of the Belgian government, which are those of the entire Belgian people, commission me to address in my turn a few words of affection and sympathy for the American army as the last detachment is about to leave Coblenz and Europe. I know that our time is too short to go into details and to speak my thoughts which are present in the memory of all Belgium. I shall limit myself therefore to saying to you, in the name of my country, that we are with you heart and soul and moved by this feeling I toast my dear friend General Allen, the worthy representative of the American Army."

Lord Kilmarnock and the Italian representative, for financial matters, Signor dell' Abadessa, also made short but touching addresses.

The closing ceremony of the day was the passage of the departing troops to the station between lines of French troops. There they were drawn up and inspected by the High Commissioners and French Generals.

It was not until February second that a telegram from the State Department contained a statement of its intention of withdrawing "its observer with the High Commission." This same telegram set forth in

exact words what should be said to the Commission in making this withdrawal, even to expressing thanks for the "many courtesies which the Commission and its members have shown to the Government of the United States and to its unofficial observer."

It was a source of satisfaction to know that after contending against so many measures put forward by our Gallic Associates that we parted with regret and with sincere personal friendship for each other. The British were truly grieved at our leaving, not only for personal but for political reasons. Common origin, common customs and common language were possibly sufficient to account for the exceptionally harmonious and delightful relations, official and social, that were always present between these two representations. Our relations with the Belgians were always excellent. They never failed to give publicly and privately frank expression to the real value of American aid in ending the war. At this time, however, they were largely under the influence of the Military Agreement made with France.

After the official farewell set forth in the Appendix given to the American Unofficial Observer at the High Commission, on February sixth, it could be said that the end was reached, although our departure could not take place until February nineteenth. In the meantime events in the Ruhr were confirming the worst apprehensions. Increased strikes and sabotage were followed by increased sanctions suggestive of more serious events. There were no indications that either side contemplated any change of policy. This would happen only when the Germans, worn down and hungry, had to succumb to siege tactics.

On arrival in New York Harbor, March 3, 1923, after an absence of nearly five years, the following letter from the Secretary of State was handed to the writer:

“My dear General Allen:

“The occasion of your return to the United States after a period of distinguished service abroad, offers an opportunity for me to express my own appreciation, and that of the Department of the splendid work which you have done.

“It has been of inestimable value to have the benefit of your mature judgment and opinion regarding the important developments that have transpired in the Rhineland and I deeply appreciate the manner in which, through your comprehensive reports, you have kept the Department in touch with the situation.

“Permit me, in addition, to express my pride and satisfaction in having had, as the Department’s representative in Coblenz, an official of your high qualities and distinction, and also my thanks, and that of the Department, for the manner in which you have maintained at all times the honor and prestige of the United States.

“I am, my dear General Allen,

“Very sincerely yours,

“CHARLES E. HUGHES.”

THE END

APPENDICES

I

AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BELGIUM, THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND FRANCE, OF THE ONE PART, AND GERMANY, OF THE OTHER PART, WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE RHINE

The Undersigned, acting under the powers conferred upon them by their respective Governments, have come to the following agreement as provided for in Article 432 of the Treaty of Peace of even date.

ARTICLE 1.

In accordance with Article 428 and the following Articles of the Treaty of even date, the armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers will continue in occupation of German territory (as such occupation is defined by Article 5 of the Armistice Convention of the 11th November 1918, as extended by Article 7 of the Additional Convention of the 16th January 1919), as a guarantee of the execution by Germany of the Treaty.

No German troops, except prisoners of war in process of repatriation, shall be admitted to the occupied territories, even in transit; but police forces of a strength to be determined by the Allied and Associated Powers may be maintained in these territories for the purpose of ensuring order.

ARTICLE 2.

There shall be constituted a civilian body styled *the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission*, and hereinafter called

the High Commission, which, except in so far as the Treaty may otherwise provide, shall be the supreme representative of the Allied and Associated Powers within the occupied territory. It shall consist of four members representing Belgium, France, Great Britain and the United States.

ARTICLE 3.

(a) The High Commission shall have the power to issue ordinances so far as may be necessary for securing the maintenance, safety and requirements of the Allied and Associated forces. Such ordinances shall be published under the authority of the High Commission, and copies thereof shall be sent to each of the Allied and Associated Governments and also to the German Government.

When so published they shall have the force of law and shall be recognised as such by all the Allied and Associated military authorities and by the German civil authorities.

(b) The members of the High Commission shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

(c) The German courts shall continue to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction subject to the exceptions contained in paragraphs (d) and (e) below.

(d) The armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers and the persons accompanying them, to whom the General Officers Commanding the Armies of Occupation shall have issued a revokable pass, and any persons employed by, or in the service of such troops, shall be exclusively subject to the military law and jurisdiction of such forces.

(e) Any person who commits any offense against the persons or property of the armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers may be made amenable to the military jurisdiction of the said forces.

ARTICLE 4.

The German authorities, both in the occupied and in the unoccupied territories, shall, on the demand of any duly authorised military officer of the occupying forces, arrest and hand over to the nearest commander of the Allied or Associated troops any person charged with an offence who is amenable under paragraph (d) or paragraph (e) of Article 3 above to the military jurisdiction of the Allied or Associated Forces.

ARTICLE 5.

The civil administration of the provinces (*Provinzen*), Government departments (*Regierungsbezirke*), Urban Circles (*Stadtkreise*), Rural Circles (*Landkreise*), and Communes (*Gemeinde*), shall remain in the hands of the German authorities, and the civil administration of these areas shall continue under German law and under the authority of the Central German Government, except in so far as it may be necessary for the High Commission by Ordinance under Article 3 to adapt that administration to the needs and circumstances of military occupation. It is understood that the German authorities shall be obliged, under penalty of removal, to conform to the ordinances issued in virtue of Article 3 above.

ARTICLE 6.

The right to requisition in kind and to demand services in the manner laid down in the Hague Convention, 1907, shall be exercised by the Allied and Associated Armies of Occupation.

The charges for the requisitions effected in the zone of each Allied and Associated army and the estimate of damage caused by the troops of occupation shall be determined by local Commissions composed in equal representation of German civilians appointed by the German civil authorities and Allied or Associated military officers, and presided over by some person appointed by the High Commission.

The German Government shall continue to be responsible for the cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation under the conditions fixed by the Treaty. The German Government shall also be responsible for the costs and expenses of the High Commission, and for its housing. Suitable premises for the housing of the High Commission shall be selected after consultation with the German Government.

ARTICLE 7.

The Allied and Associated troops shall continue undisturbed in possession of any premises at present occupied by them, subject to the provision of Article 8 (*b*) below.

ARTICLE 8.

(*a*) The German Government shall undertake, moreover, to place at the disposal of the Allied and Associated troops

and to maintain in good state of repair all the military establishments required for the said troops, with the necessary furniture, heating and lighting, in accordance with the regulations concerning these matters in force in the various armies concerned. These shall include accommodation for officers and men, guard-rooms, offices, administrative, regimental and staff headquarters, workshops, store-rooms, hospitals, laundries, regimental schools, riding schools, stables, training grounds and rifle and artillery ranges, aviation grounds, grazing grounds, warehouses for supplies and grounds for military manœuvres, also theatre and cinema premises, and reasonable facilities for sport and for recreation grounds for the troops.

(b) Private soldiers and non-commissioned officers shall be accommodated in barracks, and shall not be billeted on the inhabitants, except in cases of exceptional emergency.

In the event of the existing military establishments being insufficient or not being considered suitable, the Allied and Associated troops may take possession of any other public or private establishment with its personnel, suitable for those purposes, or, if there are no such suitable premises, they may require the construction of new barracks.

Civilian and military officers and their families may be billeted on the inhabitants in accordance with the billeting regulations in force in each army.

ARTICLE 9.

No German direct taxes or duties will be payable by the High Commission, the Allied and Associated armies or their personnel.

Food supplies, arms, clothing, equipment and provisions of all kinds for the use of the Allied and Associated Armies, or addressed to the military authorities, or to the High Commission, or to canteens and officers' messes, shall be transported free of charge and free of all import duties of any kind.

ARTICLE 10.

The personnel employed on all means of communication (railways, railroads and tramways of all kinds, waterways (including the Rhine), roads and rivers), shall obey any orders given by, or on behalf of, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated armies for military purposes.

All the material and all the civil personnel necessary for the maintenance and working of all means of communication must be kept intact on all such means of communication in the occupied territory.

The transport on the railways of troops or individual soldiers or officers, on duty or furnished with a warrant, will be effected without payment.

ARTICLE 11.

The Armies of Occupation may continue to use for military purposes all existing telegraphic and telephonic installations.

The Armies of Occupation shall also have the right to continue to install and use military telegraph and telephone lines, wireless stations and all other similar means of communication which may appear to them expedient. For this purpose, subject to the approval of the High Commission, they may enter upon and occupy any land, whether public or private.

The personnel of the public telegraph and telephone services shall continue to obey the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies given for military purposes.

Telegrams and messages to or from the Allied and Associated authorities and the High Commission and of an official nature shall be entitled to priority over all other communications and shall be despatched free of charge. The Allied and Associated military authorities shall have the right to supervise the order in which such communications are transmitted.

No wireless telegraphy installations shall be allowed to be erected by the authorities or by the inhabitants of the occupied territory without previous authorisation by the Allied and Associated military authorities.

ARTICLE 12.

The personnel of the postal service shall obey any orders given by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies for military purposes. The public postal service shall continue to be carried out by the German authorities, but this shall not in any way affect the retention of the military postal services organised by the

Armies of Occupation, who shall have the right to use all existing postal routes for military requirements.

The said armies shall have the right to run postal wagons with all necessary personnel on all existing postal routes.

The German Government shall transmit free of charge and without examination letters and parcels which may be entrusted to its post-offices by or for the Armies of Occupation or by or for the High Commission; and shall be responsible for the value of any letters or parcels lost.

ARTICLE 13.

The High Commission shall have the power, whenever they think it necessary, to declare a state of siege in any part of the territory or in the whole of it. Upon such declaration the military authorities shall have the powers provided in the German Imperial Law of May 30th, 1892.

In case of emergency, where public order is disturbed or threatened in any district, the local military authorities shall have the power to take such temporary measures as may be necessary for restoring order. In such case the military authorities shall report the facts to the High Commission.

Done at Versailles, the twenty-eighth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen.

WOODROW WILSON.
ROBERT LANSING.
HENRY WHITE.
E. M. HOUSE.
TASKER H. BLISS.
D. LLOYD GEORGE.
A. BONAR LAW.
MILNER.
ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.
GEORGE N. BARNES.
CHAS. J. DOHERTY.
ARTHUR L. SIFTON.
W. M. HUGHES.
JOSEPH COOK.
LOUIS BOTHA.
J. C. SMUTS.
W. F. MASSEY.
ED. S. MONTAGU.

GANGA SINGH MAHARAJA DE BIKANER.
G. CLEMENCEAU.
S. PICHON.
L. L. KLOTZ.
ANDRÉ TARDIEU.
JULES CAMBON.
HYMANS.
J. VAN DEN HEUVEL.
EMILE VANDERVELDE.
HERMANN MULLER.
DOCTOR BELL.

II

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY

Restoring Friendly Relations

Signed at Berlin, August 25, 1921

Ratification Advised by the Senate, October 18, 1921

Ratified by the President, October 21, 1921

Ratified by Germany, November 2, 1921

Ratifications Exchanged at Berlin, November 11, 1921

Proclaimed, November 14, 1921, and

Parts of Treaty of Versailles Concluded June 28, 1919

ARTICLE I.

Germany undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages specified in the aforesaid Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of July 2, 1921, including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States.

ARTICLE II.

With a view to defining more particularly the obligations of Germany under the foregoing Article with respect to cer-

tain provisions in the Treaty of Versailles, it is understood and agreed between the High Contracting Parties:

(1) That the rights and advantages stipulated in that Treaty for the benefit of the United States, which it is intended the United States shall have and enjoy, are those defined in Section 1, of Part IV, and Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, and XV.

The United States in availing itself of the rights and advantages stipulated in the provisions of that Treaty mentioned in this paragraph will do so in a manner consistent with the rights accorded to Germany under such provisions.

(2) That the United States shall not be bound by the provisions of Part I of that Treaty, nor by any provisions of that Treaty including those mentioned in Paragraph (1) of this Article, which relate to the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the United States be bound by any action taken by the League of Nations, or by the Council or by the Assembly thereof, unless the United States shall expressly give its assent to such action.

(3) That the United States assumes no obligations under or with respect to the provisions of Part II, Part III, Sections 2 to 8 inclusive of Part IV, and Part XIII of that treaty.

(4) That, while the United States is privileged to participate in the Reparation Commission, according to the terms of Part VIII of that Treaty, and in any other Commission established under the Treaty or under any agreement supplemental thereto, the United States is not bound to participate in any such commission unless it shall elect to do so.

(5) That the periods of time to which reference is made in Article 440 of the Treaty of Versailles shall run, with respect to any act or election on the part of the United States, **from** the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE III.

The present Treaty shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional forms of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect immediately on the exchange of ratifications which shall take place as soon as possible at Berlin.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate in Berlin this twenty-fifth day of August 1921.

[SEAL.]

ELLIS LORING DRESEL

[SEAL.]

ROSEN

AND WHEREAS, the said treaty has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two countries were exchanged at Berlin on November 11, 1921;

NOW THEREFORE be it known that I, Warren G. Harding, President of the United States of America, hereby proclaim that the war between the United States and Germany terminated on July 2, 1921, and cause the said treaty to be made public to the end that every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fourteenth day of November One Thousand Nine Hundred and
[SEAL.] Twenty-one and of the Independence of the United States of America the One Hundred and Forty-sixth.

WARREN G. HARDING

By the President:

CHARLES E. HUGHES

Secretary of State.

[RATIFICATION.]

WARREN G. HARDING,

President of the United States of America,

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING:

KNOW YE, That whereas a Treaty between the United States of America and Germany to restore the friendly relations existing between the two nations prior to the outbreak of war, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at Berlin on August 25, 1921, the original of which Treaty, in the English and German languages, is hereto annexed:

And Whereas, the Senate of the United States, by their resolution of October 18, 1921, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein) did advise and consent to the ratification of the said Treaty, subject to the understanding, made a part of the resolution of ratification, "that the United States shall not be represented or participate in any body, agency or commission, nor shall any person represent the United States as a member of any body, agency or commission in which the United States is authorized to participate by this Treaty, unless and until an Act of the Congress of the United States shall provide for such representation or participation"; and subject to the further understanding, made a part of the resolution of ratification, "that the rights and advantages which the United States is entitled to have and enjoy under this Treaty embrace the rights and advantages of nationals of the United States specified in the Joint Resolution or in the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles to which this Treaty refers";

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Warren G. Harding, President of the United States of America, having seen and considered the said Treaty, do hereby, in pursuance of the aforesaid advice and consent of the Senate, ratify and con-

firm the same and every article and clause thereof, subject to the understandings hereinabove recited.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

Given under my hand at the City of Washington, the twenty-first day of October, in the year of our Lord [SEAL.] one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and forty-sixth.

WARREN G. HARDING

By the President:

CHARLES E. HUGHES

Secretary of State.

III

TERMS OF ARMISTICE SIGNED BY GERMANY

Address of the President of the United States to the Joint Session of Congress Monday, November 11, 1918, in the House of Representatives.

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: In these anxious times of rapid and stupendous change it will in some degree lighten my sense of responsibility to perform in person the duty of communicating to you some of the larger circumstances of the situation with which it is necessary to deal.

The German authorities who have, at the invitation of the Supreme War Council, been in communication with Marshal Foch have accepted and signed the terms of armistice which he was authorized and instructed to communicate to them. Those terms are as follows:

I. MILITARY CLAUSES ON WESTERN FRONT.

One. Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

Two. Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by the Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be

regulated in accordance with a note annexed to the stated terms.

Three. Repatriation beginning at once and to be completed within fourteen days of all inhabitants of the countries above mentioned, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted.

Four. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment: five thousand guns (two thousand five hundred heavy, two thousand five hundred field), thirty thousand machine guns. Three thousand minenwerfer. Two thousand aeroplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly D. Seventy-three's and night bombing machines). The above to be delivered in Simmstu to the Allies and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the annexed note.

Five. Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be determined by Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine, Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, together with bridgeheads at these points in thirty kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to it forty kilometers to the east from the frontier of Holland to the parallel of Gernsheim and as far as practicable a distance of thirty kilometers from the east of stream from this parallel upon Swiss frontier. Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine lands shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of eleven days, in all nineteen days after the signature of the armistice. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the note annexed.

Six. In all territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No destruction of any kind to be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact as well as military stores of food, munitions, equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be moved. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroad, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.

Seven. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain. Five thousand locomotives, fifty thousand wagons and ten thousand motor lorries in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the same period, together with all pre-war personnel and material. Further material necessary for the working of railways in the country on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*. All stores of coal and material for the up-keep of permanent ways, signals and repair shops left entire *in situ* and kept in an efficient state by Germany during the whole period of armistice. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. A note appended regulates the details of these measures.

Eight. The German command shall be responsible for revealing all mines or delay acting fuses disposed on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. The German command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or pollution of springs, wells, etc.) under penalty of reprisals.

Nine. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and the United States Armies in all occupied territory. The up-keep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine land (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

Ten. An immediate repatriation without reciprocity according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war. The Allied Powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they wish.

Eleven. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

II. DISPOSITION RELATIVE TO THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY.

Twelve. All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Roumania or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August first, 1914.

Thirteen. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian as well as military agents, now on the territory of Russia (as defined before 1914) to be recalled.

Fourteen. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other undertaking with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (as defined on August first 1914).

Fifteen. Abandonment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

Sixteen. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on the eastern frontier either through Danzig or by the Vistula in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories or for any other purpose.

III. CLAUSE CONCERNING EAST AFRICA.

Seventeen. Unconditional capitulation of all German forces operating in East Africa within one month.

IV. GENERAL CLAUSES.

Eighteen. Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all civilians interned or deported who may be citizens of other Allied or Associated States than those mentioned in clause three, paragraph nineteen, with the reservation that any future claims and demands of the Allies and the United States of America remain unaffected.

Nineteen. The following financial conditions are required: Reparation for damage done. While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery or repatriation for war losses. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit, in the National Bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money together with plant for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

V. NAVAL CONDITIONS.

Twenty. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

Twenty-one. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

Twenty-two. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of one hundred and sixty German submarines (including all submarine cruisers and mine laying submarines) with their complete armament and equipment in ports which will be specified by the Allies and the United States of America. All other submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allied Powers and the United States of America.

Twenty-three. The following German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, for the want of them, in Allied ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only caretakers being left on board, namely: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers, including two mine layers, fifty destroyers of the most modern type. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the auxiliary fleet (trawlers, motor vessels, etc.) are to be disarmed.

Twenty-four. The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

Twenty-five. Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers. To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all

German forts, fortifications, batteries and defense works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Categat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any question of neutrality being raised, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.

Twenty-six. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allies and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture.

Twenty-seven. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

Twenty-eight. In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports, Germany shall abandon all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, cranes and all other harbor materials, all materials for inland navigation, all aircraft and all materials and stores, all arms and armaments, and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.

Twenty-nine. All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned and German materials as specified in clause twenty-eight are to be abandoned.

Thirty. All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

Thirty-one. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

Thirty-two. The German Government shall formally notify the neutral Governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland,

that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated Countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions such as the export of shipbuilding materials or not, are immediately canceled.

Thirty-three. No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

VI. DURATION OF ARMISTICE.

Thirty-four. The duration of the armistice is to be thirty days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, on forty-eight hours previous notice.

VII. TIME LIMIT FOR REPLY.

Thirty-five. This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within seventy-two hours of notification.

IV

BLACK TROOPS

THE French occupation of Frankfurt and other towns in April, 1920, was the signal for a bitter campaign in the German press against the colored troops in the French Army of the Rhine. The propaganda was so extensive and so long continued that there was considerable repercussion in the United States. Many protests against the use of black troops in the occupation of white territory were made to Washington, and on June twenty-second, the Secretary of State telegraphed General Allen as follows:

“Department recently in receipt of numerous protests based on reports of alleged mistreatment of German women by French colored colonial troops in occupied territories. Please report briefly by cable and at length by despatch any available information and also your opinion as to the truth of alleged outrages.”

On July second a report was sent to the State Department, which was given out in Washington and from which the following is extracted:

“During the period from January, 1919, to June 1, 1920:

“(a) The average number of negro troops in the French Army of the Rhine was five thousand two hundred men.

“(b) The average number of French colonial troops composed of natives of Africa not of pure negro blood, including distinct peoples such as Arabs, from Algeria, Moroccans, etc., and Negroids, was twenty thousand men. During the entire period from the first day of the occupation in 1918, to the first day of June, 1920, sixty-six cases of alleged rape,

attempted rape, sodomy, or attempted sodomy, have been officially reported to the French military authorities, against their colored colonial troops in the Occupied Territories of the Rhineland. Among these cases there have been twenty-eight convictions, including several cases where the intent was not fully proved, but punishment was given by minor courts corresponding to our Summary and Garrison Courts, for indecent proposals and obscene handling of women and girls against their will. There have been eleven acquittals. There have been twenty-three investigations leading to trials, the results of which have not been published yet. There have been six cases where the offenders could not be found. The penalties inflicted have been varied: from ten years at hard labor for aggravated cases of rape, to thirty days in prison for indecent mishandling of women.

"At the present time, the Senegalese Brigade having all left the Rhineland between June 1 and 6, 1920, there actually remains but one regiment of troops of negroid origin, the First Regiment of Chasseurs Malgaches from Madagascar. There are, however, individual negroes or negroids in the other French colonial regiments.

"Proper allowance must be made for the natural difficulties which always are to be expected in tracing the crimes referred to, due to the shame and distress of the victims. On the other hand, the great mass of the articles in the German press, appearing simultaneously all over Germany failed to cite time, place and circumstances sufficiently clear to enable the truth to be ascertained. They therefore gave to an impartial observer the impression of an adroit political move, intended to sow antipathy to France in the other lands of the Allied and Associated powers, especially in America, where the negro question is always capable of arousing feeling.

"The *Rheinische Zeitung*, and the *Koelnische Volkszeitung*, recently suspended for publishing attacks on the French colored colonial troops, admit under date of June fifteenth, that they employed certain terms and expressions which they should have omitted due to the imperfection of the news coming for the most part from outside sources.

"There were gross exaggerations in the German press, such as the following:

"There are forty thousand colored French troops in the Palatinate; and Frankfurt was occupied by twenty thousand men entirely formed of negro (Senegalese) troops. French official reports show that no Senegalese occupied Frankfurt,

but first Moroccan and Algerian Tirailleurs and later white troops.

"The impression gained from contact with and observation of the French colonial troops is that, as a general rule, they are quiet, orderly and well behaved. Discipline has purely relative value and is hardly of the same order as that which we would require. That the discipline of the Senegalese Brigade was not always good is established by the incidents which recently occurred at Marseilles, when a part of these troops committed serious infractions of discipline when ordered aboard their transport.

"The attitude of certain classes of German women toward the colored troops has been such as to incite trouble. On account of the very unsettled economic conditions, and for other causes growing out of the World War, prostitution has been abnormally increased and many German women of loose character have openly made advances to the colored soldiers, as evidenced by numerous love letters and photographs which are now on file in the official records. Several cases have occurred of marriages of German women with French Negro soldiers.

"Conclusions:

"1. The wholesale atrocities by French negro colonial troops published in the German press, such as the alleged abduction, followed by rape, mutilation, murder and concealment of the bodies of the victims, are false and intended for political propaganda.

"2. A number of cases of rape, attempted rape, sodomy, attempted sodomy, and obscene mishandling of women and girls, have occurred on the part of French negro colonial troops in the Rhineland. These cases have been occasional and in restricted numbers, not general or wide-spread. The French military authorities have repressed them severely in most cases and have made a very serious effort to stamp the evil out.

"3. As a rule, the number of convictions and the thoroughness of the reports of the investigations and trials indicate the very earnest effort of the French trial authorities to do justice and to stamp out the evil by stern repressive measures. That their sentences are often milder than ours would be is largely due to extenuating circumstances found in the evidence according to their rules of evidence which are very different from ours; and to the fact that, in general,

French courts do not punish these crimes as severely as American and English courts do.

"4. The discipline of the Senegalese Tirailleurs was not always good as evidenced by the refusal of some of them to get aboard transports at Marseilles when ordered to Syria."

Many extracts of this report from the American press were copied into European newspapers. German papers published disparagements of the accuracy of General Allen's information, and some alleged that the report showed him to have been unduly influenced "by French propaganda and by his own Francophile feelings." The violence of the "Black Shame" campaign subsided in the late summer, but it was not abandoned, as the press continued it in the United States as well as in Germany.

Another press campaign occurred in the spring and early summer of 1921. As before, there was much exaggeration concerning the conduct of the colored troops, and in a way the campaign waged by the Germans caused a reaction of feeling, even in Germany. Some of the German newspapers printed articles stating that the situation was by no means as bad as had been painted, and a number of protests against the campaign were made.

The agitation in 1921 became particularly intense after the publication of a report that three regiments of negroes had reenforced the French Army of the Rhine. The facts were as set forth in the following extract from a letter sent to the State Department on April twenty-first:

"The French Rhine Army has recently been reenforced by three regiments of colonial infantry. The reenforcing regiments are the 66th Regiment of Colonial Infantry (all Moroccans), the 34th Regiment of Colonial Infantry (two battalions of whites and one battalion of Madagascans), and the 42nd Regiment of Colonial Infantry (one battalion of whites and two battalions of Madagascans). I am officially informed that the three battalions of Madagascans which arrived recently in the Occupied Territories are to tide over the training of the class of 1921, and that they will leave in

June. The population tends to confuse the Madagascans with Senegalese Negroes and rumors have been circulating that there are three regiments of negroes in the Occupied Territories. The Madagascans in the Rhineland are usually known as Malgaches, but they are negroes with an infusion of Malay blood. There are also some negroes scattered among the various colonial troops stationed in the occupied territories. The 34th and 42nd Regiments of Colonial Infantry are in the same division with a regiment of Senegalese negroes, a fact which may explain why the Madagascan units are identified with negro units by the population. The regiment of Senegalese negroes referred to has not been sent to the Rhineland, but is still stationed in France. The total number of colored troops, yellow and black, chiefly yellow, now in the occupied territories is twenty-seven thousand five hundred."

In August, 1920, the German Commissioner for the occupied territories sent to the High Commission a note which made certain allegations concerning the conduct of the colored troops. The following reply was made on April 15, 1921, over the signature of Monsieur Tirard as President of the High Commission:

"I have the honor to send you herein the result of the inquiries made with respect to the memoranda which you sent to the High Commission concerning black troops.

"The High Commission first observed that these memoranda contained only one hundred and thirty-eight accusations during a period which extended over two years, while the strength of the troops against whom the charges were made at certain times, namely during the Armistice, reached a total of about thirty thousand men."

"While the above figures demonstrate with what rigorous severity the military authorities acted when the complaints were shown to be well-founded, they demonstrate also the incredible carelessness shown in the collection of the documentary evidence, which formed the basis not only of your memoranda, but also of the German press campaign against the black troops.

"Further: certain charges were fabricated in every particular by the German officials.

"The High Commission decided, by way of a first example,

to take punitive measures against the Ludwigshafen official who was responsible for inventing the cases of Emlich, Schey, Greim, Schon and Hugo, as there can be no doubt whatsoever as to these cases since the pretended victims are non-existent.

"The High Commission requests you to furnish at the earliest possible date the name of the author of these charges."

As in 1920, the campaign had subsided by autumn, and only occasional references to the colored troops were made after that time. The American press had been publishing articles on the subject, but there too the agitation died away.

During both years the French had taken up the cudgels against the German propaganda. An issue was made of the word "black," the French papers asserting that there were no black troops in Germany, and a considerable splitting of hairs developed. There were actually no wholly black organizations stationed in the Rhineland after the departure of the Senegalese and Madagascars. But there were some negroid organizations and the other colored units contained numerous individuals of purely negro blood, as well as many negroids. A thorough investigation of the matter showed that in June, 1921, from twelve to fifteen per cent. of the colonial troops in the French Army of the Rhine were pure negroes or approximately pure negroes.

While it was realized that the German campaign against the colored troops had over-reached itself and that their conduct had not been as bad as was claimed, European sentiment, in general, was inclined to sympathize with the feelings of the German population. From many points of view it was deemed unwise to utilize semi-civilized colored troops, whether brown or black, as an occupying force in the territory of a highly civilized people. It is certain that the presence and conduct of the colored troops in the Rhineland aroused an increased hatred of the French by the German people. There were many Frenchmen who doubted the wisdom of using these colored soldiers in the Rhineland.

V

THE SMEETS CASE

Interallied Rhineland High Commission
Coblenz, Germany

Office of
American Representative.

Herr Smeets, leader of the Separatist movement, was arrested and tried by the German authorities for distributing pamphlets without police permission in violation of German law. The offense was alleged to have been committed during November and December, 1921. On March 25, 1922, he appealed to the High Commission asking that the sentence imposing a fine upon him of one hundred and fifty marks be set aside and that the execution of the sentence be delayed until the Commission had taken a decision.

He claimed to be innocent of the charges against him and further stated that even if the facts as represented by the German authorities were true, they would denote a political offense on his part in connection with the policy inaugurated by him during the Armistice. For this reason he applied for protection under Ordinance No. 70 which prevents the German authorities from punishing any person for political offenses committed during the Armistice, which ended January 10, 1920. He relied also upon Articles 15 and 17 of Ordinance No. 2 to sustain his appeal. As the provisions of these articles apply only to civil actions and as Smeets' alleged offense was criminal, it was at once evident that his appeal under Ordinance No. 2 could not be sustained. The German court, in giving judgment against Smeets on February thirteenth, informed him that the sentence would become operative within a week unless an objection was

lodged with the German court, in accordance with German law, within that time. In a letter dated February twenty-first, addressed to the court, Smeets objected to the judgment against him on the ground that he was not guilty of the facts alleged. In this letter he did not rely upon any ordinance of the High Commission. The Court disallowed the objection on the ground that it was out of time as it should have been lodged with the Court February twenty-second, whereas it did not reach the Court until February twenty-third. Smeets claimed that this action of the Court was illegal because he had mailed his objection on February twenty-first, and was therefore within the period prescribed by law.

When this case came before the High Commission the Belgian High Commissioner proposed that the Commission take the same action it had taken on February twelfth, regarding the other pleas submitted by Herr Smeets. The High Commission at that time informed the German authorities that the proceedings might be continued, but that reference would have to be made to the Commission before the execution of any sentence. The French Commissioner agreed to this proposal. The British Commissioner objected, stating that the present case was unlike the other cases against Smeets. He pointed out that this case had been concluded by the German courts, whereas in the other cases objection had been made to the High Commission before the cases were heard; that the charge in this case was in no wise one of a political nature and therefore Ordinance No. 70 was not applicable; and that whether the Ordinance was applicable or not Smeets had not followed the procedure laid down by Ordinance No. 70 which provides that "any person wishing to claim the benefit of this ordinance shall put forward his claim to the German court of authority having cognizance of the matter before raising any other defense." The British High Commissioner therefore proposed that Smeets' appeal be dismissed.

The Belgian High Commissioner objected strongly to this

proposal stating that the case was purely political and not at all a question of law. He proposed that the High Commission support Smeets' appeal since he was being prosecuted by the German authorities because of his relations with the authorities of occupation. He suggested that even if the appeal could not be sustained under Ordinance No. 70, it could be sustained under Ordinance No. 90 which provides for the protection of persons who have rendered services to or have had relations with the authorities of occupation. The French Commissioner was in favor of this proposal. The British Commissioner again objected and asked that the question be referred to the Legal Committee. The Belgian and French Commissioners refused to submit the question to the Legal Committee and pressed for an immediate decision. They contended that the case was purely political and should be decided on the basis of political exigencies and, if necessary, regardless of the provisions of the High Commission's ordinances.

The present case is quite unimportant in itself. Its importance arises from the fact that the German authorities, press and people are keenly interested in all the Smeets cases and appear to believe that the High Commission intends to protect Smeets on account of his Separatist activities and at any cost. These cases do not directly concern the American area and, therefore, the American representative had great hesitation in making any suggestions concerning them. It appeared, however, that the consequence of an unwise decision might be serious and far-reaching. He therefore pointed out to the High Commission that even if these cases were political the High Commission's Ordinance No. 70 was also political and that in this Ordinance the Commission had laid down the conditions and stated the circumstances under which it would protect political offenders; that if the case in question did not fall within the provisions of this ordinance, the High Commission would be well-advised to abide by its own ordinances and not set the bad example of violating them;

and if it could not justify the appeal by applying the Ordinance the appeal should be rejected.

The American representative caused a brief to be prepared concerning this case and suggested to the High Commission that, if it so desired, he would file this brief for its consideration. The Commissioner expressed a desire to study it and decided that the case would be postponed for that purpose, and meanwhile that the sentence of the German court might not be executed without the consent of the High Commission. A copy of the brief follows:

INTERALLIED RHINELAND
HIGH COMMISSION

April 11, 1922.

Office of
American Representative

Appeal of Joseph Smeets
of March 25, 1922.

Herr Smeets appeals to the High Commission (1) to remove his case pending before the *Amtsgericht*, from German jurisdiction; and (2) to delay execution of the sentence until the High Commission acts thereon.

He invokes (1) Ordinance No. 70, paragraphs 3 and 4;
(2) Ordinance No. 2, Article 15 (2),
Clause 2; and

(3) Ordinance No. 2, Article 17,
as a basis for his appeal.

Approaching the issue firstly with reference to the relevancy of citations (2) and (3) *supra*, since the appeal of Herr Smeets is from "a conviction and judgment" of the *Amtsgericht*, Cologne, of February 13, 1922, sustained on appeal by the *Landgericht* (Criminal Court No. 6) on March 10, 1922, it is obvious that the proceedings against Herr Smeets were of a criminal character. If this be so, the appeal under Ordinance No. 2, Article 15, Paragraph 2, Clause 2, and under Ordinance No. 2, Article 17, is not receivable, because the Articles in question have reference to civil cases, civil jurisdiction, and are not intended to apply to proceedings in a German *criminal* court.

This view is potentially emphasized if recourse be had to Article 18 of the same ordinance, referring to the institution

and jurisdiction of the "High Commission Court"; Section 3 of that Article reads:

"It shall be the duty of these courts to decide any civil cases referred to them under the provisions of the proviso to Clause 2 of Article 15 above . . ."

This "proviso to Clause 2 of Article 15 above" is one of the citations relied upon by Herr Smeets to support his application to the High Commission, but it manifestly avails him nothing, since his appeal is from a *criminal* prosecution and judgment, while the jurisdiction of the High Commission Courts is specifically civil. It may be added, as a matter of sound legal construction, that the additional wording of the proviso to Clause 2 of Article 15, to wit:

"or disposed of in such way as the High Commission may direct . . ."

was not intended to change the character of issues or actions covered by Article 15 of Ordinance No. 2, for this Article is the first enumerated under Part II of that ordinance dealing with civil jurisdiction.

The words above indented and quoted show merely a reservation of power in the creating body itself, the High Commission, to deal with the "classes of cases" referred to in proviso to Clause 2, otherwise than by reference to its High Commission Courts; but it never was intended to *widen* the jurisdiction or change the character of the actions embraced in Article 15, which exclusively pertains to *civil* jurisdiction and *civil* actions. Moreover, this proviso to Clause 2 of Article 15 of Ordinance No. 2 confers *original* and not appellate jurisdiction. The prohibition that certain cases "Shall . . . not be heard before the German Courts but, etc.," clearly indicates the intent of the High Commission. Under such a construction, the appeal of Herr Smeets is again not receivable by the High Commission.

In conclusion on this point, it may be observed that the uniform practise of the High Commission in construing Articles 15 and 17 of Ordinance No. 2 has been to confine their operation or applicability to protected persons, enumerated in Article I and Clause 5 of Article II of Ordinance No. 2, *i. e.* to High Commission and Army personnel, (See Moha case, Legal Committee, File 344). Herr Smeets is not a person embraced within these classifications. Accordingly no legal reason appears to justify Herr Smeets' appeal based upon Articles 15 and 17 of Ordinance No. 2.

Reverting to Herr Smeets' appeal for intervention by the High Commission under Ordinance No. 70, and assuming, for the sake of argument, that his conviction was for a political offense, Paragraph 3 of that ordinance is not applicable. The date of commission of his alleged offense is given by him as "November and December, 1921"; but the paragraph cited refers explicitly to a "political act done *during the period of the Armistice.*" That period ended with the entry into vigor of the Treaty of Peace, January 10, 1920. Hence, no "political" act done or committed subsequent to that date would entitle him to immunity under Paragraph 3, Article I of Ordinance No. 70, or warrant his invocation of the High Commission's protection.

Herr Smeets, while denying his alleged guilt, remarks that the acts charged

"would denote a political offense on my part in close connection with the policy inaugurated by me during the Armistice . . . In this case therefore the necessary conditions for the intervention by the I. A. R. H. C. in accordance with the ordinances quoted above would be fulfilled."

If by his reference to a "policy inaugurated by him during the Armistice," Smeets hopes to establish a casual connection between that policy and the act for which he has been convicted so as to make the policy and the act one and, accordingly, an Armistice transaction, his reasoning is legally unsound. It is a firmly established principle of law that intent unaccompanied by an overt criminal act is not punishable; but the moment the overt act is committed, criminal process may be invoked; and, for all statutory purposes, the time of the commission of the act controls, irrespective of how long previously the intent may have existed, for it is merged in the act itself.

An illustration of this principle is seen in a conspiracy, where two or more persons combine to commit some offense or punishable action. Although the statements made by these

inter sese, or the plans outlined, discussed or approved by them jointly, may become known to the authorities, no prosecution against them or either of them may be based on such evidence, nor can the same be used against the conspirators or either of them until proof of the commission of some overt act toward the accomplishment of their common design is first established. The policy of Herr Smeets may truly enough have existed, in either an active or dormant cause since the period of the Armistice, and yet not render him liable to prosecution. On the other hand, as soon as he had done something which the German authorities considered criminal, proceedings against him would be in order, and the only time then to be considered would be the date of such action by him.

It seems that there is an analogy between the "policy" of Herr Smeets and his associates and the illustration quoted, to wit: a conspiracy. Political movements for the overthrow of an existing governmental system partake of the nature of a conspiracy and their projectors are referred to as political conspirators. Their views, policies, etc., not translated into physical action, are not punishable, but the moment they lead to such, prosecution follows. But the acts of recent occurrence for which Smeets is prosecuted are not even parts of a connected whole as in cases of conspiracy. The most that can be said is that Smeets' motive has been continuous. The acts for which he is prosecuted are entirely separate acts.

Granting the validity of the arguments above, it may nevertheless be contended that Herr Smeets should be protected because he is being prosecuted "on account of services rendered" to the "Allied authorities of occupation" or on account of "relations" with said authorities within the meaning of Ordinance No. 90. The relations and the services contemplated by Ordinance No. 90 are those with "the Allied authorities of occupation." Not all relations with Allied persons in the occupied territories constituted relations with "Allied authorities of Occupation." Clearly, the ordinance

refers to services and relations which assist the Allied authorities of occupation in the performance of their duties under the Rhineland Agreement. Herr Smeets contends in his appeal that his alleged offense was a political offense connected with a policy inaugurated by him during the Armistice. Have the Allied authorities in performing their duties under the Rhineland Agreement any relations with such an offender, or in the commission of such an offense has a service been rendered to the Allied authorities of occupation in the performance of their duties? Herr Smeets' political policy is well known. It contemplates at most the separation of the Rhineland Territory from Germany, and at least the separation of the Rhineland Territory from Prussia. Would the performance of such a program perform or violate the Rhineland Agreement? In Article 5 of this Agreement we read that the civil administration of the occupied territories shall remain in the hands of the German authorities and the civil administration of the areas shall continue under German law and under the authority of the Central German Government, except insofar as it may be necessary for the High Commission to adapt that administration to the needs and circumstances of military occupation. When the armies of the Allied authorities came into these territories, the German military forces withdrew. It might be contended that the Allied Armies thus succeeding, succeeded also to the duty of the German armies to see to it that lawful governments be not overthrown. It might be contended that Article 5 makes it the obligatory duty of the Allied authorities to see to it that the authority of the Central German Government shall continue and that the local German Government be not overthrown. Certainly the Article should prevent the Allied authorities from protecting persons who conspire to overthrow these governments when such persons are prosecuted for their unlawful acts.

This case is cited at length to show to what degree political exigency imposed itself upon some of the holding authorities.

VI

FORTIFICATIONS OF COBLENZ

ALONG with the other fortification elements of the defense of Coblenz, the Interallied Board of Control was determined that Ehrenbreitstein should be destroyed as soon as our forces could vacate it. The several assaults made to that end were finally repulsed when it became definitely known that the American Commanding General would not consent to its destruction. The Board knew quite as well as he that this monument had no military value. Primarily stone works have become obsolete and secondarily in the hands of the Allies, it could be dominated easily by reason of the terrain by long-range guns coming from the East.

This fortress could have no value and perhaps no sentimental significance for any Allied state that might have dreamed of its future holding. There were already too many ruins on the Rhine attesting the hatred of men, and it did not seem in the interest of any worthy end to add another. Jestingly the commander of the American Forces informed the Board that some day his own government might want that superb site with its historical buildings. In truth such a thought is no less probable of realization than would have seemed an ante-bellum expressed intention of holding with a military force a given section of Central Europe over a period of four years. It was only the determined attitude of the American Commanding General that saved Ehrenbreitstein.

VII

FORMAL FAREWELL TO GENERAL ALLEN, FEBRUARY 6, 1923.

(Extract from *Journal*)

TO-DAY at three P. M. the High Commission gave me a formal farewell. The ubiquitous Zimmerman was there with his camera to complete the historical record of the occasion. The speeches made were to me quite impressive.

Monsieur Tirard said:

“Before opening the Sitting I must call the attention of my colleagues to the fact that to-day for the last time our American friends are present at this table. General Allen has been good enough to honor us with his presence. I wish to thank him, both as President of this Assembly and as French High Commissioner.

“It is unnecessary to dwell upon the military merits of General Allen. We know how magnificently the American garrison at Coblenz bore itself and that such troops can only be commanded by a great chief. I wish rather to express for my part my opinion of the diplomat and the man. In respect to the former we must cast our thoughts far back. You will remember, doubtless, gentlemen, the difficult circumstances in which the High Commission assumed its functions at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920. From that date the United States Government expressed their desire to dissociate themselves somewhat from European affairs and did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Perhaps the event which brings us together now is but the normal consequence of a policy which it does not behoove us to judge. But from that moment General Allen found himself in a situation which was, from a diplomatic point of view particularly delicate.

The Allied Governments having promulgated the Agreement, the High Commission had to exercise its authority over the whole of the Occupied Territories of the left bank of the Rhine. On the other hand the United States Government, not having ratified the Treaty of Versailles but having most happily maintained its troops at our side, the Coblenz area remained under the Armistice régime. A solution had to be found to this difficult problem. It is thanks to the courtesy and diplomacy of General Allen that the American Representatives took their place at our deliberations. It is thanks to him that for three years in the most varying circumstances no difficulty has arisen from the special situation of the American troops. In this zone our ordinances, drawn up of common accord with the American Representatives, were promulgated by General Allen as military orders and for three years our relations have been of the best.

"As for the man, I will express what you all feel; every time that he has taken his place among us we have been impressed by his high-mindedness and the perfect impartiality of his judgments, to which we have always endeavored to give the greatest possible weight. It is not without real emotion that I salute for the last time the Representative of the United States of America. We shall always associate the remembrance of General Allen with the magnificent spirit which, in the hour of danger, united the troops of his country with those of the Allies in their struggle for the identical principles of justice and liberty.

"I address at the same time my thanks to the whole of the American Delegation and particularly to Colonel Stone and to Major Manton Davis who have both lent their valuable collaboration in the work of the High Commission and whose labors are incorporated in our ordinances and decisions."

Baron Rolin-Jacquemyns, Belgian High Commissioner, said:

"I will content myself with asking your permission to say in a word that I associate myself most heartily in my name and the name of my collaborators with what you have said about the merits of General Allen and the services which he has rendered.

"Not only was America here at our side but, in expressing the desires and the sympathy of the American people, General

Allen was better able than any other to express the feeling of union which has never ceased to reign among us.

"I thank him for it and I will not forget."

Lord Kilmarnock, British High Commissioner, said:

"I would like to add a word on my own behalf and on behalf of the British Department to say how much we have always appreciated the tact and courtesy which General Allen has consistently exhibited and the spirit of high-minded impartiality with which he has handled the many delicate questions which have from time to time arisen. It has been a great pleasure to have him among us and we have all appreciated his high qualities. It only remains for me to express my extreme regret that this is the last time that General Allen will be among us at the Sitzings of the High Commission."

My reply which was somewhat lengthy for the occasion, was a very general summary and declaration of our relatively harmonious collaboration:

"The brief announcement of the reason for the severance of our relations with the Rhineland and the High Commission was contained in my letter addressed to you, Monsieur Tirard, as President of the High Commission under date of February second. Now I am here at your request to associate myself in this session with the members of this Superior Body for the last time. I have no words with which properly to express my personal gratitude for the great courtesy, consideration and unfailing generosity you have at all times extended to me. In making this statement, I am also the interpreter of the feelings of all my collaborators who have had the honor of personal contact with you.

"After a period of four years on the Rhineland in charge of the American Zone and nearly three years at the High Commission, ties of friendship have been established that take precedence over any discordant thoughts that may have arisen during this long period. It is but natural that far-away United States should at times view measures of transcendental importance to the countries directly concerned, through American glasses, but our close association here with you as principal actors in measure of world importance, especially

during recent times, has been potent in its enlightening influence.

"We have worked in common counsel toward the solution of many difficult and delicate problems coming before the High Commission in regard to the government of the occupied territories and the relation of our military forces to the German people. Our deliberations have been conducted in two languages under the handicap of dissimilar laws, traditions and customs of our respective countries, and yet so great has been the spirit of tolerance, kindness and friendly cooperation which has governed each member of this body that our differences have been compounded and we have been able to reach an agreement on almost every question. Every law and decision enacted by this body has been made for the four zones alike and has found application throughout the Occupied Territories.

"The many complicated questions connected with state administration and policy must serve to determine the course of the respective states. To criticize these would be an act of presumption foreign to my thoughts, but to express appreciation of all the courtesies and good will extended our representation both civil and military by the high agents, both civil and military, of the states represented on this Commission, gives me genuine pleasure.

"It has been a great privilege to share in your labors and to benefit by your wisdom and experience in working with you in common purpose toward the execution of our missions. In the delightful memories of coming years and in the reveries of this historic period in which America participated in the Watch on the Rhine, each of you will be in my mind in affectionate remembrance."

INDEX

INDEX

- Agricultural interests,
 - High Commission meeting with representatives of, 233
 - lands for military purposes, 240
- Alcohol, monopoly, German, in Occupied Territory, 212
- Allen, General,
 - letter from Secretary Hughes, 295
- Allied Armies,
 - at cessation of hostilities, 11
- Allied Armies in Rhineland,
 - See* Army of Occupation
- Amaroc News*, 134, 135
- American Expeditionary Forces, 12
- American Forces in Germany, 127-141
 - commanders, temporary and permanent, 127
 - crimes, 133
 - education and schools, 140
 - insignia, 127
 - recreation, 132, 137
 - see also* Army of Occupation
- American Library Association, 131
- American Red Cross, 131
- Andrews, Lieutenant - Colonel Frank M., 129
- "Anti-Fraternizing Order," 69-72
- Antwerp, 138
- Armistice Commission, 56
- Armistice Commission, Permanent Allied, 35
- Armistice, terms of, 56-67
 - arms, locomotives and trucks, 62, 63
- Armistice, terms of, *con't.*
 - machinery, tools and materials, 65-67
 - military property, 59-62
 - Neutral Zone, 64, 65
 - prisoners, Allied, 57, 58
- Army of Occupation,
 - administration of, difficulties in, 130
 - advance into neutral zone, 204
- American Army, Third, 11, 113, 127, 186
 - insignia, 127
 - reduction in, 249
 - see also* American Forces in Germany
- Belgian, 11, 97
- British Army, Second, 11, 95-97, 113
 - changed status, 117
- French Army, Eighth, 11, 190, 198
- French Army, Fifth, 11
- French Army, Tenth, 11, 92-95, 113, 198
- French Army of the Rhine, 198
- French Corps, Thirty-third, 97
- illiteracy, 77
- personnel, 13
- reception in Luxemburg, 16-17
- reception in Rhineland, 24-27
- Bachum, occupation of, 273
- Barthou, M., 254
- Bavaria, 157, 194
- Bergmann, State Secretary, 253

- Berlin,
 new government, 160
 strike, 161
 Birkenfeld, 197, 198
 Bolshevism, 72, 275
 Germany, 8, 27
 Boulogne Conference, 203
 Boyden, Roland, 272, 285
 Bradbury, Sir John, 272
 Brandt, Doctor von, 174
 Brest, 138
 Briand, Aristide, 206
 resignation, 248

 Cannes Conference, 248
 Cattoir, Fernand, 143
 Center Party (clericals), 187, 188,
 195, 197, 199
 Citizenship, training for,
 American forces in Germany,
 141
 Civilian trials, 75
 Coblenz, 2
 as head of Rhineland Commis-
 sion, 81
 history, 3
 population, 101
 Cologne, 2
 Conference of Ambassadors, 156
 Conference on Army Costs, 260
 Conferences, The Year of (1922),
 247-265
 Craig, Brigadier-General Malin, 12
 Crimes,
 American forces in Germany,
 133
 of American soldiers, 74
 Criminals, war, 203
 treatment of during occupation,
 172
 Cuno, Chancellor,
 letter to General Allen, 288
 Customs, 83

 Customs policy,
 American and British attitude
 toward, 215
 Customs posts,
 establishment, 208
 Germany's attitude, 211

 Dariac, M., 270
 Darmstadt, seizure, 154
 Dawes Plan, beginning of, 264
 Degoutte, General, 198, 272, 273
 della Torretta, Signor, 271
 Dickman, Major-General Joseph
 T., 12
 Disarmament demands, 203
 Germany's delay, 203
 Dorten, Doctor, 192, 194, 196, 197,
 201
 abduction, 218, 219
 plan for government of Rhine-
 land, 85
 Dortmund, occupation of, 273
 Duisburg, occupation, 204, 205
 Düsseldorf, occupation, 204
 Düsseldorf - Duisburg - Ruhrort
 Bridgehead, 206

 Ebert, Herr, 188
 Economic Commission, Interallied,
 (Luxemburg Commission),
 36, 38-40, 79
 Education, United States Army of
 Occupation, 77, 140
 Employers' Associations,
 High Commission meeting with,
 233
 Essen, 166

 Fayolle, General, 198
 Foch, Marshal, 11, 136
 Proclamation to Inhabitants of
 Occupied Territory, 18

- Food, 84
 - Germany. *See* Germany
 - Hoover Commission, 42
- Food Commission, Interallied Military, 37
- Foreigners, sale of German goods to, 235
- France,
 - desire for territory, 268
 - disregard of certain terms of Treaty, 267
 - growing intention to seize additional territory, 258
 - her position recognized, 266
- Frankfurt, seizure, 154
- Frohberger, Herr, 189, 195
- Fuchs, Doctor, deportation, 277
- Genoa Conference, 253
- Gérard, General, 190, 198
- German Commission, The, 171-185
- German Military Commission, 135
- German People's Party, 247
- Germania Inferior, 2
- Germania Superior, 2
- Germantown, Philadelphia, founding, 259
- Germany,
 - army, morale, 8
 - American forces in, 127-141
 - Bolshevism, 8, 27
 - business conditions, 234-238
 - Chambers of Commerce, High Commission meeting with, 233-240
 - coal shortage, 238
 - condition (January, 1919), 111
 - disarmament. *See* Disarmament demands
 - economic situation, 31
 - farther advance into, 110-115
 - food situation, 28-31, 37, 41, 239
 - see also* Hoover Commission
 - Germany, *con't.*
 - government, 4-10
 - industrial center, 97
 - industry following war, 104
 - labor situation, 33
 - occupation of, by Allied Armies, 11
 - of Rome, 2
 - partition of, scheme for, 163
 - Peace Treaty,
 - reluctance at signing, 110-115
 - signing, 115
 - political and economic situation (January, 1922), 247
 - reparations. *See* Reparations
 - revolution, 30
 - states in Occupied Territory, 148
 - strikes, 105
 - taxes, 239
 - Governments, comparison of military, 90-100
 - Groote, von, 195
 - Hahn, General, 12
 - Hale, Brigadier-General H. C., 129
 - Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg, Prince, 174, 183, 283, 287
 - Hermes, Doctor, 253
 - Herrick, Ambassador, 251, 260
 - Hesse, 194, 196
 - Hesse, Rhenish, 194
 - Hessian mercenaries of Revolution, 114
 - High Commission, The (Interallied Rhineland High Commission), 80, 84, 89, 118, 122-124, 142-158, 206-215, 274
 - America's disinterestedness, 216
 - committees, 142
 - matters before the, 216-232
 - civilian or military representation, 219-222

- High Commission, The, *con't.*
 matters before the, *con't.*
 examination of new German laws, 223
 judicial proceedings against any person, 218
 notification of appointment of German officials, 224-227
 postal censorship, 222
 railroads, authority over, 228-232
 strikes, notification of public utility, 227
 members, 142
 powers, 142
 seat, 142
 special sessions of, 233-246
- Hines, General, 12
- "Hole in the West," 83
- Hoover Commission, 42
- Hughes, Charles E.,
 letter to General Allen, 295
 speech at New Haven, 271
- Illiteracy, Army of Occupation, 77
- Industrialists, 247
- Industries, private, control of, 101-109
- Industry, Germany. *See* Germany
- Industry following war. *See* Strikes, Labor
- Ingolstadt, 157
- Interallied Rhineland Commission,
See High Commission, The
- Jewish Welfare Board, 131
- Johnston, Brigadier-General W. H., 129
- Kapp, Doctor von, 160
- Kapp, von, government, 159-170
- Kilmarnock, Lord, 287
- Knights of Columbus, 131
- Labor,
 Germany, 33, 106-108
 requisition, 107-108
see also Strikes
- Labor Committees, 194
- Law, Bonar, 265
- Liggett, Lieutenant-General, 81, 127
- Liquidation Committee, 137
- Lloyd George, 206
 attitude toward Rhineland Republic, 263
- Luttwitz, General von, 160
- Luxemburg,
 Proclamation, Pershing's, 14
- Luxemburg Commission. *See* Economic Commission, Interallied
- Maginot, M., 252
- Mangin, General, 192, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199
- Marks, shortage of, 259
- Marriage, American soldiers with German girls, 73
- Mayence, martial law, 154
- McLachlin, Major-General E. F., 127
- Meister, Herr, 194
- Memorandum No. 4,
 purpose, 21
 text, 22
- Military command, supreme, 28-45
- Military Government, American, 46-55
- Military governments, comparison of, 90-100
- Military intelligence, American forces in Germany, 134
- Military property, 59-62
- Moers, motor-bus collision, 179
- Momm, Doctor, 181-185, 195, 225
- Moratorium, 261
- Mussolini, 265, 271

- Napoleon, 186
 Nassau, Old, 194
 Neutral Zone, 63, 64
 Noske, Defense Minister, 160
 Noyes, Pierrepont B., 80
 plan of government for Rhineland, 85-88
 Noyes, Theodore B.,
 appointment, 143
 withdrawal, 147
 Nudant, General, 56

 Occupation, Army of. *See* Army of Occupation
 Occupation, final days of, 281-295
 Palatinate, Bavarian, 157, 186,
 190, 194, 196, 197
 see also Rhineland
 Passau, 157
 Peace Treaty of Versailles,
 America's failure to sign,
 confusion caused by, 119, 216,
 217
 Germany signs, 115
 Germany's reluctance to sign,
 110-115
 signing, 54
 Pershing, General,
 Proclamation to Inhabitants of
 Occupied Territory, 19
 Proclamation to People of
 Luxemburg, 14
 Pétain, Marshal, 64
 Poincaré, 202, 255, 258, 265, 266,
 270, 283
 Prisoners, Allied, 57, 58
 Proclamations,
 Foch's to Inhabitants of Oc-
 cupied Territory, 18
 Pershing's to Inhabitants of
 Occupied Territory, 19
 Pershing's to People of Luxem-
 burg, 14

 Prussia, 194
 see also Germany
 Public Utilities, control of, 101-
 109
Putsch, The, 159

 Railway Commission, Interallied,
 36, 43, 44
 Rapallo, Treaty of, 253, 254
 Rathenau, Foreign Minister, 248,
 254
 Recreation, American forces in
 Germany, 132, 137
Reichscommissar, 171
Reichswehr, 165-167
 Relations between army and popu-
 lation, 68-78
 Reparations,
 amount, 204
 British proposal on, 271, 272
 Germany's inability to pay, 248
 Germany's refusal to accept
 terms, 204, 205
 attitude of United States,
 207, 208
 Reparations Commission, 247, 248,
 261, 280
 Reparations Committee, 271
 Republic, Rhenish. *See* Rhenish
 Republic
 Rhenish autonomous state, agita-
 tion for. *See* Separatist
 Movement
 Rhenish Republic, 196
 proclamation, 194
 protest against, 195
 see also Separatist Movement
 Rhineland, The, 1-10
 American evacuation of,
 attitude of Europe, 281
 attitude of France, 290
 attitude of Germany, 290, 291

- Rhineland, The, *con't.*
 attitude of United States, 281
 date, 291
 government, plans for, 85-88
 early invasions, 2
 history, 1, 3
 reception of Army of Occupation, 24-27
 separation of. *See* Separatist Movement
- Rhineland Agreement, 89, 216, 217
 signing, 117
 under, 116-126
- Rhineland Commission, Interallied
 (I. A. R. C.), 36
- Rhineland Commission, The, 79-89
- Rhineland High Commission, Interallied. *See* High Commission, The
- Rhinelanders, The, 1-10
- Rhine Province, 194
- Riddle of the Rhine*, 241
- Robertson, Sir Malcolm A., 143, 153
- Rolin-Jacquemyns, Baron, 143
- Rotterdam, 138
- Roussellier, Amedée, 143
- Rucquoy, General, 205
- Ruhr District,
 conditions in, subsequent to American departure, 294
 occupation of (1923), 226-280
 British attitude toward, 277
 date of, 273
 German reaction to, 275, 279
 seizure, General Allen's proposal for negotiations to prevent, 282-287
 strike and political conditions, 165
- Ruhrort, occupation, 204, 205
- Ruhr revolt,
 influence on the Rhineland, 167-170
- Russia, Soviet, 253
- Ryan, Colonel Rupert S., 153
- Sage, Brigadier-General W. H., 129
- Salvation Army, 131
- Sanctions, 203-215
 in Ruhr District, 272
 United States unable to participate in, 208, 209
- Sanitation orders, 76
- Separatist Movement, The, 186-202
 first manifestation, 187
 growing disregard by Rhenish people, 199
 historical background for, 186, 187
 Republic proclaimed, 194
- Separatists, 197, 201
see also Separatist Movement
- Silesian Brigade, 128
- Simons, Foreign Minister, 205
- Sladen, Brigadier-General F. W., 129
- Smeets, Herr Joseph, 200-202
- Smith, General H. A., 17
- Socialists, in separatist movement, 188
- Spa Conference, 203
- Spartacist situation, dread of, 110
- Speyer, Communist disturbance at, 152
- Springorum, Herr, 194, 196
- Starck, Herr von, 149, 219, 226, 227
 resignation, 174
- Stone, Colonel David L., 144, 148

- Strikes,
 Germany, 105
 most complete in history, 160
Stuart, Sir Harold, 80, 143
 resignation, 153
Summerall, General, 12
Supreme Economic Council, 79,
 120, 124

Theunis, 265
Third American Army. *See* Army
 of Occupation
Tirard, M. Paul, 80, 143, 200, 206
Transconster, M., 80
Treaty of Versailles. *See* Peace
 Treaty of Versailles
Treves, 2

Ulrich, President, 196
United States Army, march of,
 into Germany, 11-27

Versailles, Peace Treaty of. *See*
 Peace Treaty of Versailles
Vienna, Treaty of, 186, 187
von Brandt, Doctor, 174
von Groote, 195

von Kapp, Doctor, 160
von Kapp government, 159-170
von Luttwitz, General, 160
von Starck, Herr, 149, 219, 226,
 227
 resignation, 174
von Winterstein, President,
 expulsion, 191

War, possibility of renewal of, 110
Waterways Commission, Inter-
 allied, 44
Weissenthurm, 129
Wilson, Field-Marshal, 136
Wilson, President, 85
Winterstein, President von,
 expulsion, 191
Wirth, Chancellor, 247, 254
Workmens' Associations, High
 Commission meeting with,
 233, 240-246

Young Men's Christian Associa-
 tion, 131, 140
Young Women's Christian As-
 sociation, 131

LIBRARY
COLLEGE OF PUGET SOUND
TACOMA, WASH.

D
650
M5
A7

Date Due

D
650
M5
A7


Allen, Henry
Rhineland occupation.

LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND
Tacoma, Washington

Collins Memorial Library

D650.M5 A7

Allen, Henry T./The Rhineland occupation uppa



3 5121 00139 8182